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PREFACE 
Hydropower plants are still the most important renewable energy resource worldwide. Hydropower 
is also the most efficient electricity production and has a very high flexibility in combination with 
reservoirs. Nevertheless, the construction of hydropower plants, especially in the case of large 
schemes, requires high investments with long payback periods. Thus, future uncertainties have to 
be considered in early design stages in order to obtain robust and flexible projects with high 
resilience. With his research, Dr. Felix Oberrauch made a significant contribution by showing how 
hydropower projects have to be designed with advanced methods which allow to take into account 
the future uncertainties.  
Very large hydropower project developments are often in the public focus associating them with 
significant cost overrun and bad performance. With the slogan “Small is beautiful” in the public 
awareness often preference is given to the development of small hydropower. Dr. Oberrauch 
analyzed for the first time in a systematic way with a coherent sample of realized projects the 
uncertainties of small and large hydropower projects in Switzerland regarding cost overrun and 
production overestimation. He could show that small hydropower projects, on average, can have 
similar range of cost overrun as large projects. However, the probability that small projects exceed 
the estimated costs is smaller than for large projects. Nevertheless, the sample analysis revealed 
that small hydropower projects have a tendency to more extreme cost overruns than large facilities. 
Based on the Swiss hydropower dataset Dr. Oberrauch showed how the uncertainties of 
construction cost and energy production forecasts can be implemented in the economical 
evaluation of a project.  
As novel contribution for the engineering practice Dr. Oberrauch presented a new framework which 
allows a straightforward selection of the design objective and the required design method in order 
to consider uncertainties in early design stages of hydropower projects. He showed how the 
methods of Robust Decision Making, Info-Gap Decision Theory and Flexible Design have to be 
formulated and applied to a real hydropower project. Dr. Oberrauch discusses in detail the value 
and the limitations of each approach and gives final recommendations for their application. 
We would like to thank the members of the jury, Dr. Romerio Franco from the Institute for 
Environmental Sciences, University of Geneva, Dr. Balmer Markus, IWB Industrielle Werke Basel and 
Prof. Philippe Thalmann from EPFL for their helpful suggestions. Finally, we also thank gratefully the 
Swiss Federal Office of Energy for their financial support under contract No. SI/500635. 
Prof. Dr. Anton Schleiss     Prof. Dr. Matthias Finger  
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Abstract 
The design of hydropower is determined by estimates and long-term forecasts. These forecasts and 
estimates are highly uncertain and make performance evaluation and design choices challenging. 
Performance evaluation of hydropower projects is affected by a number of uncertainties such as 
construction cost estimates and energy production forecasts. Recent studies indicate dramatic cost 
overruns for large hydropower schemes. Accuracy of energy production forecasts are questioned, 
especially in light of future climate change. 
It is generally assumed that the risk associated with small plants is much lower compared to large 
hydropower projects. Policy makers, developers, environmental and conservation organizations, 
and NGOs often tend to adhere to the principle “small is beautiful”. Small hydropower plants have 
been intensively supported in many countries despite a knowledge gap about uncertainties 
affecting small hydropower plants.  
Based on an evidence-based approach, cost overruns of small and large Swiss hydropower projects 
were analyzed and compared. In addition, the reliability of mid-term and long-term energy 
production data was examined.  
The results show that small hydropower projects, on average, suffer a similar range of cost overrun 
as large projects. However, the chance that small projects will exceed the estimated costs is much 
smaller than for large projects. On the other hand, small hydropower projects tend to have more 
extreme cost overruns than large facilities. This long tail to adverse outcomes indicates a potential 
for improvement, especially in terms of the methods used for estimating the construction costs, 
including quality of design, and in terms of appropriate approaches to controlling actual 
construction costs. 
Compared to previous research studies on cost overrun of large international hydropower schemes, 
the results on Swiss projects show that the average cost overrun is significantly below the figures 
derived from global databases.  
In addition, small hydropower plants show a tendency for energy production overestimates. In 
contrast, the production of large hydropower projects in the long term was on average 8% higher 
than the estimated figures. About 80% of the projects reached or exceeded the production targets.  
These findings challenge the current assumption that large hydropower schemes are generally 
highly risky structures and that small hydropower projects should be preferred to reduce associated 
threats. 
In addition, the results enable a more comprehensive political debate on the current subsidizing 
system for small hydropower projects. Also, based on the derived statistical distributions of 
uncertainties, this allows a more comprehensive performance evaluation of hydropower projects. 
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Beside the characterization and assessment of uncertainties of small and large hydropower projects 
in Switzerland, a register of political, commercial and project uncertainties was established. The 
register can be applied as a basis for a project-specific assessment of uncertainties.  
The other part of the study focuses on design methods that are useful for the management of 
uncertainties. Hydropower projects face long-term uncertainties, such as electricity price and future 
inflow. Whereas it is commonly agreed that these forecasts are highly uncertain, there remains the 
question of how to make design decisions under the consideration of uncertainties with the final 
aim to decrease the threats and increase the opportunities.  
Various past research studies have suggested and applied different design methods to overcome 
this problem. Recent studies focused on Robust Decision Making. Other studies applied real option 
valuations for hydropower schemes. Another method that has been identified as a promising 
approach is the Info-Gap Decision Theory, but it has not been formulated and applied to 
hydropower projects up to now. There is very limited experience with the application of these 
methods in real hydropower projects. 
To promote their application in the engineering practice, a new framework for hydropower projects 
is introduced, allowing a straightforward selection of the design objectives including robustness, 
versatility, flexibility, or interoperability. Depending on the design objectives, different mitigation or 
exploitation methods (design methods) can be applied. The framework covers the design methods: 
Robust Decision Making, Info-Gap Decision Theory, Portfolio Planning, Adaptation of Operation 
Rules and Real Option Analysis as well as Flexible Design.  
In addition, the Robust Decision Making, Info-Gap Decision Theory and Flexible Design methods 
were formulated and applied to a real hydropower project. The value and the limitations of each 
approach are described and final recommendations for their application and further development 
are made.  
Keywords 
Hydropower design, uncertainties, cost overrun, Outside View, reference class forecast, Robust 
Decision Making, Info-Gap Decision Theory, Flexible Design 
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Zusammenfassung 
Langfristige Prognosen wie Zuflüsse und Energiepreise sowie Abschätzungen von Baukosten sind für 
die Projektierung von Wasserkraftanlagen nötig. Diese Abschätzungen und Prognosen sind mit 
grossen Unsicherheiten behaftet und erschweren sowohl die Bewertung als auch die Auslegung der 
Anlagen. 
Aktuelle Studien weisen auf signifikante Kostenüberschreitungen bei grossen Wasserkraftanlagen 
hin. Dazu kommt, dass die langfristigen Zufluss-Abschätzungen durch den Klimawandel erschwert 
werden. Das führt zu einer zunehmenden Zurückhaltung bei Investitionen in die Grosswasserkraft.  
Es wird derzeit davon ausgegangen, dass die Kleinwasserkraft deutlich tieferen Risiken ausgesetzt 
ist als die Grosswasserkraft. Sowohl die Politik als auch zahlreiche Umweltverbände, NGOs und 
Projektentwickler bevorzugen Kleinwasserkraft. Des Weiteren wird Kleinwasserkraft in zahlreichen 
Ländern stark subventioniert, obwohl es keine fundierten Studien zu den Unsicherheiten in der 
Kleinwasserkraft gibt.  
Um diese Lücke zu schliessen, wurden im Zuge dieser Arbeit Kostenüberschreitungen und die 
Genauigkeit von Energieabschätzungen sowohl für kleine als auch grosse Wasserkraftanlagen in der 
Schweiz untersucht. Dazu wurden historische Daten ausgewertet.  
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Kleinwasserkraft im Durchschnitt einer ähnlich grossen 
Kostenüberschreitung ausgesetzt ist wie die Grosswasserkraft. Allerdings ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit 
einer Kostenüberschreitung bei kleinen Anlagen deutlich geringer als bei grossen Anlagen, jedoch 
ist eine aussergewöhnlich hohe Kostenüberschreitung bei kleinen Wasserkraftanlagen häufiger zu 
beobachten. Die relativ häufigen sehr hohen Kostenüberschreitungen weisen auf ein deutliches 
Verbesserungspotential in Hinsicht der Projektierung, Kostenabschätzung, Ausschreibung sowie 
Kostenkontrolle am Bau von Kleinwasserkraftanlagen hin. 
Im Vergleich zu anderen Studien mit Fokus auf Grosswasserkraftanlagen weltweit zeigt die 
Auswertung, dass Schweizer Grosswasserkraftwerke von deutlich geringeren 
Kostenüberschreitungen betroffen waren.  
Des Weiteren wird gezeigt, dass für kleine Anlagen eine Tendenz zur Überschätzung der 
Energieproduktion besteht. Dagegen hatten 80% der Grosskraftwerke in der Stichprobe der 
Schweizer Anlagen eine langfristig höhere Produktion als ursprünglich in der Planung angenommen.  
Diese Erkenntnisse stellen damit die Annahme, dass Grossanlagen deutlich risikoreichere 
Investitionen darstellen als Kleinwasserkraftanlagen, zunehmend in Frage. Die Ergebnisse sind nicht 
nur für eine umfassendere politische Ausrichtung in Hinsicht der Subventionspolitik von Bedeutung, 
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sondern erlauben eine Berücksichtigung der Unsicherheiten in der Projektierung und Evaluierung 
von Wasserkraftanlagen. Dafür wurden Verteilungsfunktionen der Kostenüberschreitung und 
Energieprognosen ermittelt, und die verschiedenen Methoden für den Evaluierungsprozess werden 
aufgezeigt. 
Für eine projektspezifische Evaluierung von Unsicherheiten wurde ein Register für 
Wasserkraftprojekte mit möglichen politischen, kommerziellen und projektspezifischen 
Unsicherheiten erstellt. Dieses Register kann als Grundlage für eine projektspezifische Evaluierung 
herangezogen werden.  
Ein weiterer zentraler Teil der Studie beschäftigt sich mit Auslegungsmethoden, welche die 
langfristigen Unsicherheiten bei der Auswahl von Auslegungsparametern berücksichtigen. In dieser 
Studie werden die langfristigen Unsicherheiten des Zuflusses unter Einwirkung des Klimawandels 
und der Energiepreise berücksichtigt. Es steht ausser Frage, dass diese Abschätzungen von grossen 
Unsicherheiten betroffen sind, allerdings stellt sich die Frage, wie man eine Wasserkraftanlage unter 
Berücksichtigung dieser Unsicherheiten auslegen sollte, um einerseits negative Risiken zu 
reduzieren und andrerseits Opportunitäten zu nutzen. 
Verschiede Forschungsarbeiten haben bereits innovative Auslegungsmethoden für die Wasserkraft 
vorgeschlagen und teilweise angewandt. Dazu zählen unter anderem „Robust Decision Making“, 
Realoptionenanalyse und „Info-Gap Decision Theory“. Allerdings bedarf es einer zusätzlichen 
Bestätigung ihrer Anwendbarkeit und ihres Nutzens in der Wasserkraftplanung.  
Einerseits wurde die vielversprechendsten Methoden entsprechend den Anforderungen in der 
Wasserkraft in einer neuen konzeptionellen Leitlinie organisiert, die die Anwendungen in der 
Ingenieurspraxis fördern soll. Die Leitlinie zeigt je nach angestrebten Planungszielen „Robustness“, 
„Versatility“, „Flexibility“ oder „Interoperability“ verschiede Methoden auf, welche sich für die 
Anwendung in der Wasserkraft eignen.  
Darüber hinaus wurden die Methoden „Robust Decision Making“, „Info-Gap Decision Theory“ und 
„Flexible Design“ erstmals gemeinsam an einer typischem Auslegungsfragestellung angewandt. 
Nach- und Vorteile der einzelnen Ansätze werden aufgezeigt und Empfehlungen für die Anwendung 
und Weiterentwicklung werden gemacht.  
Schlüsselwörter 
Auslegung von Wasserkraftanlagen, Unsicherheiten, Kostenüberschreitung, Outside View, 
Reference-Class Forecast, Robust Decision Making, Info-Gap Decision Theory, Flexible Design 
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1 
 Introduction 
The design of hydropower is determined by estimates and long-term forecasts. These forecasts and 
estimates are highly uncertain and make performance evaluation and design choices challenging. 
Effective values deviating from the estimates can have a significant impact on the success of a 
hydropower project.  
This study contributes to the description and characterization of uncertainties affecting hydropower 
projects. It analyzes the accuracies of cost estimates and energy production forecasts of realized 
small and large hydropower projects in Switzerland.  
In addition, a register of political, commercial and project uncertainties has been elaborated, 
allowing a project-specific assessment of uncertainties.  
Finally, this study provides support for design methods taking uncertainty of long-term forecasts 
into account. These methods are seeking an active way to avoid threats or to exploit of opportunities 
by means of appropriate design choices or design strategies. Robust Decision Making, Info-Gap 
Decision Theory and Flexible Design were applied to a real hydropower project.  
1.1 Context 
1.1.1 Uncertainties of Small and Large Hydropower Projects in Switzerland 
Performance evaluations of hydropower projects are affected by the uncertainties of construction 
cost estimates and energy production forecasts. They do not only influence decisions on project 
investments, but also political preferences in terms of subsidizing systems. 
Several publications show that hydropower projects suffer significant cost overrun. Ansar et al. 
(2014) describe a mean cost overrun of 96% based on a global sample size of 245 large dams. Bacon 
and Besant-Jones (1998) calculated an average cost overrun of 27% for 71 hydropower projects in 
developing countries. The Word Commission on Dams (WCD, 2001) derived an average cost overrun 
of 56% for a data sample consisting of 81 hydropower, irrigation and multipurpose projects. 
Sovacool et al. (2014) give an average cost overrun of 71% based on 61 hydro facilities.  
In research, less attention was given to the accuracy of energy production forecasts. The only 
identified study (WCD, 2001) on the accuracy of long-term energy production forecasts concludes 
that hydropower plants have on average met expectations for power delivery, but with considerable 
variability, much of it on the downside.  
The studies on dramatic cost overruns of hydropower schemes support the current trend of 
preferring small hydropower plants over large-scale schemes.  
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It is generally assumed that the risk associated with small plants is much lower compared with large 
hydropower projects. Policy makers, developers, environmental and conservation organizations, 
NGOs and various researchers (e.g. Ansar et al., 2014; Dursun and Gokcol, 2011; Sovacool et al., 
2014) tend to adhere to the principle “small is beautiful”. 
Supporting systems to push small hydropower have been introduced in several countries. Also in 
Switzerland the feed-in tariff system was launched in 2008. According to the Energy Strategy 2050 
(BFE, 2012), it is intended make small hydropower one of the major sources of additional renewable 
energy. 
Small hydropower plants have been intensively supported in many countries despite a knowledge 
gap about uncertainties affecting the performance of small hydropower plants. Studies on the actual 
performance of cost estimates and energy production forecasts are outstanding.  
In addition, recent research works show high cost overrun for international large hydropower 
plants. The accuracy of cost estimates and energy production forecasts for large Swiss hydropower 
plant has not been analyzed so far.  
The traditional way of integrating the cost overrun uncertainty into the planning process is to make 
a contingency provision. A common approach is to estimate cost contingency on the basis of 
predetermined guidelines. More comprehensive project evaluations, such as by applying the 
Expected Value (ENPV), Value at Risk (VaR) and Value at Gain (VaG) criteria, are not typically applied 
in hydropower projects as the probability distributions of the uncertain factors are not available.  
1.1.2 Management of Uncertainties 
Uncertainty in forecasts of hydrology, electricity price, ecological conditions and preferences, 
sedimentation as well as irrigation demand, water supply or flood retention volume in multipurpose 
projects complicates the choices of design parameters of hydropower plants.  
Climate change as one of the driving factors of hydrological uncertainties has been given a lot of 
attention during the last few decades of research. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(2007) records that energy production and energy demand are especially sensitive to climate 
change.  
In Switzerland, a slight decrease in annual discharge is anticipated in Ticino and in South Wallis until 
2100, whereas no significant change of the discharge situation is estimated in the North Alps (SGHL 
and CHy, 2011). However, the impact on hydropower plants is expected to show large variation 
depending on the location and characteristics of a particular catchment area. Project-specific impact 
studies can be based on the report and data elaborated for the extensive research project “Swiss 
Climate Change Scenarios CH2011” (CH2011, 2011). Different model chains are available to allow 
for an assessment of the modelling uncertainty. Even though climate change projections make it 
possible to run various inflow projections and thus come up with estimates of power productions, 
there is lack of knowledge and experience with practical application in hydropower projects as to 
which design choices to make under the consideration of this uncertainty. 
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Another uncertain factor is the future electricity price. Electricity prices have a direct impact on the 
performance parameters and consequently on the design decisions. Decisions regarding the active 
storage capacity and the installed capacity depend significantly on the forecast of the electricity 
price. The forecast period has to cover the entire economic lifetime of a hydropower plant, which 
can be up to 80 years. Such long-term processes can be significantly influenced by unpredictable 
events. The longer the forecast period is, the more likely it is that pivotal events will change the 
underlying economic and relationships that all models attempt to replicate (Craig et al. 2002). Also 
Switzerland faced such unpredictable events in recent history. The impacts of the Fukushima nuclear 
accident on the European energy policy, the wind and solar substitution policies, or the liberalization 
of the Swiss energy market were difficult or impossible to predict.  
In addition, due to the liberalization of the electricity market, electricity suppliers are faced with an 
increasingly complex market situation. In the context of a liberalized market, not only the forecasts 
are becoming less confident, but there are also limited management possibilities to compensate 
wrong or non-optimal decisions. In a monopolistic situation, design errors could be compensated 
by increasing rates to match real costs, while in a competitive environment, they would result in a 
loss that would jeopardize the durability of the company or at least reduce the cost effectiveness of 
a project (Gollier et al., 2005). 
Also if ongoing research should improve the accuracy of climate change projections and electricity 
price forecasts, a high uncertainty will remain and finally lead to a demand for adequate design 
methods that incorporate these uncertainties into the planning process.  
Various research projects have suggested and applied different design methods. Recent studies 
focused on Robust Decision Making (RDM) in hydropower projects (e.g. Cervigni et al., 2015; 
Nassopoulos et al. 2012). Other studies applied real option valuations to hydropower schemes 
(Wang, 2008; Bockman, 2006; Michailidis and Mattas, 2007; Elverhøi et al., 2010; Fertig et al., 2013). 
The Information-Gap Decision Theory (IGDT) was suggested by Ray and Brown (2015) as a potential 
approach to deal with climate change uncertainties, but has not been applied for hydropower 
projects so far. 
However, the traditional engineering task still is to optimize the hydropower plant so that it will 
meet the forecasted scenario, then followed by sensitivity analyses as a standard part of good 
engineering practice.  
According to the author’s opinion, there are two main reasons why these approaches are not used 
in engineering practice. Firstly, there is no framework providing guidance for pragmatic selection of 
an adequate design method for hydropower projects. Secondly, experience with the application of 
the design methods in real hydropower projects is limited or, in the case of IGDT, non-existing for 
the moment. 
1.2 Objectives  
This study focuses on the following three principal research aims: 
 Characterization and assessment of uncertainties affecting hydropower projects 
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 Elaboration of a method for project-specific assessment of uncertainties 
 Adaptation and formulation of new design methods for incorporation of uncertainties into 
the design process. 
The uncertainties characterization and assessment process focuses on small and large hydropower 
projects in Switzerland and is aimed at the elaboration of statistical distributions of uncertainties. 
Therefore, the outside view has been selected. Historical data of the small and large hydropower 
plants as constructed was collected and analyzed.  
A crucial part of this study is the assessment of uncertainties of small hydropower plants, as these 
schemes have been intensively supported in many countries despite a lack of detailed information 
on related uncertainties.  
In addition, the study aims to provide the required statistical distributions of cost overrun and 
production overestimation to enable a more comprehensive performance evaluation of small and 
large hydropower schemes. 
The second research aim focuses on a method for a project-specific assessment of uncertainties. A 
register of political, commercial and project uncertainties was established, which can be applied as 
a basis for assessing a risk-adjusted performance parameter, such as NPV, of a project  
The final main part of the study focuses on design methods that allow for management of 
uncertainties. One objective is to provide a framework with guidance for engineers on the potential 
application of promising methods. The other main objective was to formulate, apply and test the 
methods on a real hydropower project.  
Beside the identification of the values and limitations of the different methods, that part of the 
study is intended to provide a basis for the application of the methods in the engineering practice 
and to close the gap between research and hydropower engineering practice. It contributes to the 
improvement of traditional engineering approaches to designing hydropower schemes with the 
final aim to lead to better design choices decreasing the threats and increasing the opportunities. 
This study contributes to a better understanding of uncertainties affecting hydropower projects and 
application of innovative design methods for management of uncertainty in the hydropower sector.  
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1.3 Structure 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the study’s structure in connection with the three main research aims. 
The first part of the study, which includes Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, provides basic 
information on the conventional design approach, definitions of terms frequently used in this study, 
and a short summary on the uncertainties of hydrology and electricity price forecasts, as driving 
factors for the application of new design methods. 
The second part focuses first on the assessment of uncertainties in Swiss hydropower projects on 
the basis of the outside view (see Chapter 5), then followed by the project-specific assessment (see 
Chapter 6), the framework of the design methods and the various approaches applicable to stand-
alone hydropower plants (see Chapter 7 to Chapter 11).  
Since Chapter 5, Chapter 7 and Chapter 9 are intended for publication, some redundancy may be 
present in the literature review. In addition, as this study deals with a number of different issues, 
relevant literature of the specific topics is summarized at the beginning of each chapter for the sake 
of better readability. 
The outlines of the chapters are as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a high-level overview on the traditional approach of hydropower design with 
focus on the choice of plant size. The motivation is to show that hydropower planning is 
characterized by a process that covers several planning phases and considers various constraints. 
The planning phases and the constraints are also limiting for a potential application of design 
methods and have therefore to be considered. 
Chapter 3 gives the definitions of the words risk, uncertainty, opportunity and threat, because these 
terms are not ordinarily part of the discourse of engineering and there is no unique definition 
available. Also, the concept of strategic misrepresentation and optimistic bias is introduced, 
motivating the approach selected for the assessment of the uncertainties of hydropower projects, 
namely the outside view. 
Chapter 4 characterizes the uncertainties of electricity price and hydrology. It shows the magnitude 
of accuracy of climate change projections based on a literature review. In addition, it explains the 
complexity of electricity price forecasts and summarizes the main driving uncertainties. It also 
includes a retrospective analysis to indicate how accurate historical electricity price predictions have 
been.  
Chapter 5 describes the assessment of the uncertainties of small and large hydropower projects in 
Switzerland. It summarizes the current state of research and provides details on the research 
method and the data samples. It describes the analyses of the estimated and actual construction 
costs and energy production figures. The chapter concludes with political implications and with 
implications on the design and planning of hydropower projects.  
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Figure 1: Sketch of thesis outline. Main research aims (grey bubbles), topics and chapters (white 
bubbles). 
 
Chapter 6 presents the concept of a project-specific assessment. A project-specific assessment can 
be developed from a performance-oriented register of uncertainties. The register gives an overview 
on the wide field of uncertainties potentially affecting a hydropower project and can also be used 
as a basis for the preparation of project-specific assessments of uncertainties.  
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Chapter 7 describes the framework that is foreseen as guidance on the application of the different 
design methods considering long-term uncertainties. Design methods are organized and adapted to 
the design objective they are focused on. The framework makes a distinction between design 
methods that require structural modifications, on the one hand, and non-structural measures on 
the other.  
Chapter 8 gives an overview of the hydropower project selected for the case study. Its main part 
describes the elaboration of the climate change projection required for the application of the 
different design methods. 
Chapter 9 describes the design methods that are suggested in cases where robustness is selected as 
design objective. The Info-Gap Decision Theory and Robust Decision Making methods are 
introduced and applied to the case study.  
Chapter 10 introduces a brief discussion of design objective versatility. Even though versatility was 
not applied in the case study, because it is not an adequate method in this case, a description is 
provided to give an overview on the different possible approaches.  
Chapter 11 focuses on the methods and tools leading to a flexible system. Real Option Analysis and 
the more general approach of Flexible Design are described and finally it is shown how the Flexible 
Design was applied to the case study. The chapter concludes with the value and limitations of this 
approach. 
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 Design of Hydropower Plants 
2.1 Introduction 
The following chapter gives a short overview on the traditional approach of hydropower design with 
focus on the choice of plant size. The main parameters characterizing the size of a hydropower plant 
are installed capacity and active storage. The choice of these parameters is in general a process that 
covers several planning phases and considers various constraints. The plant size is selected based 
on economic performance parameters in consideration of the different constraints.  
Finally, identified gaps in the traditional approach and key aspects characterizing the planning 
process of hydropower plants are described.  
2.2 Conventional Design 
Design procedures for hydropower engineers are described in several documents. Widely used are 
Wasserkraftanlagen (Giesecke and Mosonyi, 2005), Hydropower Development published by 
Norwegian Institute of Technology (1992), Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines 
for Water and Land Resources Implementation Studies (Water Resources Council, 1983) and by the 
US Corps of Engineers Planning Guidance Notebook, Engineering Circulars and Engineering 
Regulations (especially EM 1110-2-1701, 1985).  
Hydropower project development starts with the identification of water–related needs and 
opportunities, followed by developing alternative plans that provide for those needs and 
opportunities, and by selecting the project alternative that most effectively and efficiently provides 
for the needs and opportunities (US Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation, 1987). 
Typical needs and opportunities, also known as purposes, are:  
 Energy production: base load energy, peak energy, reserve energy 
 Irrigation 
 Industrial or municipal water supply 
 Flood control. 
The focus of this research work is on the selection of an adequate plant size. For international 
projects, the process for the selection of the best alternative and determination of the plant size 
covers in general the following planning phases:  
 Master Plan: The master plan formulates a development plan for a basin and lists the various 
projects of the scheme in order of merit.  
 Pre-Feasibility Study: The purpose of the prefeasibility study is, generally speaking, to 
establish a list of hydropower projects economically and technically feasible. It is basically a 
study of alternatives with the selection of the best-suited one, often preceded by an 
inventory of the master plan type.  
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 Feasibility Study: The feasibility study will comprise the optimization of the main parameters 
and the layout of the selected alternative. Its main objective is to prepare a full report 
containing sufficiently detailed information based on reliable field investigations, adequate 
for submission to international financial agencies for loan application.  
Planning phases in Switzerland are slightly different in structure (SIA, 2014). Typically, the final plant 
size is selected in “Project Studies” (see Figure 2). The report and drawings prepared during this 
phase are used as a basis for the concession agreements and therefore design discharge and design 
water levels are contractually fixed. 
 
Figure 2: Planning phases in Switzerland 
Before the plant size can be determined a stepwise project framing for the salient features of the 
project has to be carried out. Alternatives are evaluated based on engineering, power market, 
economic, hydrologic, environmental, and social conditions and criteria. For the selection of the 
alternatives, preliminary design and estimates must usually be elaborated before the most 
economical design can be selected.  
In general, a number of alternative concepts such as the following are examined: 
 Alternative project locations 
 Alternative project configurations 
 Alternative purposes (multi-purpose scheme, energy production) 
 Alternative types of storage (seasonal, weekly, daily or run-of scheme) 
 Alternative operation regimes (base load, peaking, reserve energy) 
 Alternative dam sites 
 Alternative dam heights 
 Different dam types 
 Alternative types of spillways 
 Alternative power house locations 
 Alternative types of power houses (underground, pitch, open ground) 
 Alternative sizes and numbers of units 
 Different waterway alignments  
 Different types of waterway 
Planning Phase Operation Phase 
Commissioning 
Strategic Planning – SIA 11 
Preliminary Studies – SIA 21,22 
Project Studies – SIA 31,32,33 
Tender – SIA 41 
Construction – SIA 51, 52, 53 
Operation – SIA 61, 62 
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During the planning phases, progressive refinements in technical, economic, environmental and 
social evaluations are carried out. Solid project development practices also include progressive re-
examination. 
The identification of needs and the selection of alternatives should be based on a comprehensive 
and participatory assessment (WCD, 2001). The WCD report mentions that unsatisfactory social 
outcomes of past dam projects are linked to cases where affected people played no role in the 
planning process. A transparent and participate approach can reduce conflicts and can increase 
public acceptability.  
The IHA hydropower sustainability assessment protocol (IHA, 2011) shows the importance of a 
stakeholder engagement during the optimization process of a hydropower project. In a best case 
findings form directly affected stakeholders have been thoroughly and timely taken into 
consideration for the selection of alternatives.  
An outcome of this typically long, resource-intensive and iterative process and, in good cases, 
participative and transparent process is the plant size as determined by active storage and installed 
capacity. Active storage and installed capacity are referred to as global design parameters. 
Active Storage 
According to the EM 1110-2-1701 (1985), active storage is defined as the portion of the live storage 
capacity in which water normally will be stored or withdrawn for beneficial uses, in compliance with 
operating agreements or restrictions. 
In a first step, the constraints for the dam height in a specific location are defined. There can be 
physical (topography, geology), social or environmental as well as non-power operating constraints, 
such as flood control storage. The full supply level (FSL) of a specific active storage is then defined 
by deducting freeboard requirements and flood control storage requirements, if any. The minimum 
operation level (MOL) is defined by drawdown limitations, physical constraints, or non-power 
requirements. At a later stage, it is often related to tourism or environmental requirements.  
Installed Capacity  
The installed capacity is the sum of the rated capacities of all of the units in the power plant. The 
rated capacity of a unit is the capacity it is designed to deliver at a given head, discharge and 
efficiency. Sometimes the installed capacity is also known as nominal capacity (EM 1110-2-1701, 
1985). 
 
The installed capacity is calculated using the power equation: 
𝑃 =  𝜌 ∙ 𝑔 ∙ 𝜂 ∙ 𝑄𝑑  ∙  𝐻𝑛 (1) 
 
where  
 12 
P = power output of all units (installed capacity), W 
ρ = density of water, kg/m3 
g = acceleration of gravity, m/s2 
η = overall efficiency of all units (including efficiency of turbines, generator, transformer) 
Qd = design discharge of power plant, m3/s 
Hn = net head, m. 
2.2.1 Selection of Plant Size 
Typically the selection of plant size consist of the following three main working steps, which are 
refined in each planning phase: 
Definition of Needs 
Generally, this study consist of a comparison between projected electricity supply and predicted 
demand. Typically, the analysis differentiates between annual energy demand, peak and off-peak 
energy for various months and reserve energy. Especially for smaller hydropower plants, the needs 
are defined on the basis of the national energy strategies (e.g. BFE, 2012) 
Identification of Constraints 
The identification of constraints is an ongoing process and typically several new constraints are 
identified during the planning phases up to the feasibility study. The most common constraints are 
listed below: 
Physical Constraints 
 Geological conditions of all project components (dam, reservoir, waterways, powerhouse) 
 Topographical site conditions 
 Technical constraints of project components (dam height depending on dam type, maximum 
turbine head, etc.) 
 Sedimentation 
 Limitation of access 
Environmental Constraints 
 Land use 
 Resettlements 
 Protected areas 
 Cultural heritages 
 Fish migration (limitations in dam height for fish migration facilities) 
Non-Power Operating Constraints 
 Minimum discharge requirements (ecological flow, tourism, river rafting etc.) 
 Storage release schedule for downstream uses (navigation, irrigation, water supply, etc.) 
 Flood control requirements 
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 Minimum reservoir elevation requirements for other purposes (tourism, navigation, 
irrigation, etc.) 
 Maximum discharge limits to reduce the risk of bank erosion 
 Limitation to do hydropeaking 
Optimization of Plant Size 
Energy production is simulated for a number of different active storages, alternative installed 
capacities and various operating patterns.  
The range of installed capacity of run-of schemes is selected on the basis of typical figures of plant 
factor and usable inflow, characterized by the flow duration curve. The annual plant factor (PFA) is 
given by the following function: 
𝑃𝐹𝐴 =  
𝑃𝐴
8760 ∙ 𝐼𝐶
 (2) 
 
where PA is the average annual energy expressed in kWh and IC the installed capacity in kW. Often 
run-of schemes are optimized in the range of an exceedance probability of 10% to 40% and of a 
plant factor between 30% and 70%. In Switzerland about 75% of the run-of schemes have a plant 
factor between 30% and 70%.  
For storage schemes the installed capacity depends significantly on the services to be provided. 
Most of the storage schemes have a plant factor between 10% and 40%. Seasonal, weekly and daily 
storages are analyzed, depending on the identified constraints and needs.  
 
Figure 3: Frequency of plant factors of existing run-of schemes in Switzerland (run-of schemes: 
n = 499, storage schemes: n = 82, source of data: BFE, 2015) 
For each alternative a preliminary design and a cost estimation are prepared. Based on these data, 
the economical key parameters are calculated and typically integrated in a multi-criteria analysis.  
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2.3 Performance Parameters 
For the evaluation of project alternatives and optimization of the plant size, typically one of the 
following performance parameters is applied: 
 Net Present Value (NPV) 
 Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE), or  
 Internal Rate of Return (IRR). 
These parameters are used as monetizable attributes to evaluate the project performance over the 
life of the project and are calculated with a discounted cash flow model.  
NPV is given by  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 =  ∑
𝐶𝑡 
(1 + 𝑖)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 (3) 
where Ct is the net cash flow at time t, i is the discount rate, and T is the total number of time 
periods.  
 
LCOE is calculated with the following formulas: 
𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 =  ∑
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 + 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑡 
(1 + 𝑖)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 (4) 
 
𝑃𝑉𝑃𝐴 =  ∑
𝑃𝐴𝑡 
(1 + 𝑖)𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
 (5) 
 
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 =  
𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
𝑃𝑉𝑃𝐴
 (6) 
 
where PVcosts is the present value of the total costs; CAPEX (capital expenditure) is the investment 
cost; OPEX (operational expenditure) is the operation cost; i, t and T are defined as for equation (3); 
PVPA is the present value of the total energy production, and PA is the average annual energy 
production. 
IRR is the annual discount rate at which the present worths of two streams of cash flow (positive 
and negative) are equal. That means the NPV equals zero (see equation 3). Generally, a project 
design with a higher IRR is preferred if the risks are similar. 
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For details on the application of hydropower projects, reference is made to Goldsmith (1993) and 
Malovic et al.(2015).  
The traditional performance parameters, which are based on the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
method, have clear advantages (see also Mun, 2002): 
 Consistent decision criteria for all projects 
 Same results independent of risk preferences of investors 
 Quantitative 
 Relatively simple 
 Accepted and widely applied in the hydropower sector 
 Transparent, simple to communicate to decision makers 
However, the DCF has several disadvantages, which have been discussed in several articles and 
books (e.g. Mun, 2002; de Neufville and  Scholtes, 2011). 
For the sizing of plants in hydropower projects, especially the following shortcomings have to be 
mentioned. 
Usually, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is applied for the discount rate. The WACC is 
defined as the after-tax weighted average of an investor’s entire source of finance. All uncertainties 
or risks are accounted for by a constant WACC. The performance parameters are highly sensitive to 
WACC, and the effect is generally difficult to estimate. A small variation of the WACC can 
significantly change the results and affect the selected plant size. In addition, as uncertainties 
associated with a project may change during the course of a project, a constant WACC is 
questionable especially for projects with a very long economic lifetime, such as hydropower 
projects.  
The results of a DCF are point estimates and ignore the variability of the input values of a 
hydropower project. All major input factors (e.g. energy production, electricity price, CAPEX) are 
associated with major uncertainties. Monte Carlo simulations taking into account relevant 
probabilities can be carried out. However, because of the complexity of a hydropower project and 
the difficulties to assess reliable probabilities, this approach is typically not applied to hydropower 
projects.  
Furthermore, the DCF is not able to capture managerial flexibility (Trigeorgis, 1996). The DCF is 
based on the assumption that all and any decisions (including design decisions) are made right now. 
It neglects the possibility of design adjustments, i.e. the flexibility of a hydropower scheme.  
2.4 Gaps of Conventional Design Strategy 
The traditional engineering task is to optimize the hydropower plant so that it meets the forecasted 
scenario, followed by sensitivity analyses as a standard part of good engineering practice. Normally, 
scenarios involving variations of electricity price, inflow, WACC and construction costs are carried 
out to determine the effects of such changes.  
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There are numerous hydropower projects where the forecasts were not matching the effective 
values and where the plants did not reach the expected performance. Consequently, hydropower 
is strongly associated with risks and this makes many developers skeptical about hydropower. This 
is a major reason why some hydropower projects will never be constructed and thus unable to 
contribute to sustainable energy supply. 
Whereas the standard procedure is mainly focused on financial and contractual risk management, 
opportunities to manage uncertainties via the technical design are mostly ignored.  
2.5 Conclusions 
Conventional hydropower design is characterized by the following key aspects: 
 Determination of the global design parameters typically covers a long planning period with 
several planning phases 
 Constraints are identified over several planning phases and take the findings of various 
technical disciplines into account 
 A number of parties and stakeholders are participating during these planning phases 
 Preliminary designs are prepared in order to provide an adequate basis for cost estimations 
 Optimization studies are typically carried out for a limited range of installed capacity and 
active storage, as various constraints narrow the design range 
 The best alternative is selected based on a performance parameter sometimes integrated in 
a multi-criteria analysis while taking physical and non-physical constraints into account 
 Uncertainties are not directly integrated into the determination of the plant size. 
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 Uncertainties and Risks 
3.1 Introduction 
The focus of this research work is on uncertainties having a potentially significant impact on the 
performance of a hydropower plant. 
To help to describe the uncertainties of hydropower projects, this work deliberately uses the four 
words risk, uncertainty, opportunity and threat. As these terms are not ordinarily part of the 
discourse of engineering with no unique definition being available, definitions are given below. In 
addition, Chapter 3.3 describes different methods to characterize uncertainties.  
A special issue in large infrastructure projects is strategic misrepresentation and optimistic bias. 
These factors can significantly influence the accuracy of forecasts. One intention of this study is to 
provide a holistic view on uncertainties affecting hydropower projects, and to avoid a purely 
technical view; the concept of psychological and political-economic explanations for inaccurate 
forecasts is presented in Chapter 3.4. 
Finally, the role of a project team involved in a hydropower project is discussed in respect to 
uncertainties. 
3.2 The Terms Risk, Uncertainty, Opportunity and Threat 
Risk and uncertainty are terms applied in a wide range of applications. The definitions vary not only 
by fields of application, but also from project to project. Also in the field of hydropower design there 
is no uniform or generally accepted understanding of the terms.  
Some of the most recognized guides on project management published by the US Project 
Management Institute (PMI) and the UK Association for Project Management (APM) define the term 
‘risk’ as follows: 
Risk – an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a project 
objective (PMI, 2000) 
Risk – an uncertain event or set of circumstances that, should it occur, will have an effect on the 
achievement of the project’s objectives (Simon et al., 1997) 
These definitions refer to upside and downside effects and offer a broad view of possible effects on 
project objectives. The definitions include also opportunities or so called upside effects and thus are 
in line with the aim of the present study, which is to incorporate upside as well as downside effects 
into the design process. 
However, as argued by Ward and Chapman (2003), the term risk is widely associated with adversity, 
implying that project risks are potential downside effects or, in the wording of Ward and Chapman, 
“things that might go wrong”.  
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Also, in hydropower engineering the term risk is generally defined as potential adverse effects on 
project performance or failure of structures, for example seismic risk, flood risk, etc. 
This is not limited to the engineering domain, but risk is typically associated with downside effects 
also by other stakeholders involved in hydropower projects. Politicians, financers, environmental 
experts, contractors, NGOs, affected local populations etc. often consider risks to be “things that 
might go wrong”. Environmental risks, financial risks, safety risks are clearly associated with hazard, 
bad consequences or loss. As several parties will become involved in the development of a 
hydropower project, it will be very difficult to avoid misunderstandings in terms of what a risk is and 
to the effect that risk is not associated with down-side effects only.  
Because of this common understanding of the term risk in the hydropower community and among 
stakeholders, the term uncertainty is preferred over the term risk.  
According to Ward and Chapman (2003), uncertainty is simply lack of certainty.  
Uncertainty covers both tails of the distributions around engineering projects. Consequently, 
uncertainty can be either an opportunity for better project performance (upside effect) or a threat 
(downside effect).  
 
Figure 4: Uncertainty, opportunity and threat 
As described by Van Asselt and Rotmans (2002) and Walker (2003), uncertainty can prevail in 
situations where a lot of information is available. It has to be noted that additional information or 
knowledge can either decrease or increase uncertainty. New knowledge on complex processes may 
illuminate that our understanding of such processes is even more limited or that such processes are 
even more complex than thought before.  
3.3 Characterization of Uncertainties 
Uncertainties affecting hydropower projects can cover the entire spectrum of levels from the 
unachievable ideal of complete deterministic understanding at one end of the scale to total 
ignorance at the other.  
The terminology used to distinguish between the various levels of uncertainty described by Walker 
et al. (2003) is suitable also for hydropower projects.  
Uncertainty 
Threat 
Opportunity 
Value creation 
Value destruction 
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One limit is the determinism, which is an ideal situation in which the knowledge is absolutely 
precise. No uncertainty exists, and the decision maker knows everything precisely.  
Statistical uncertainty is uncertainty that can be quantified adequately in statistical terms. 
Phenomena described by statistical uncertainty require a reasonably good description of the 
process by a model and require the data applied for calibration to be representative of the 
circumstances for the selected application. One example of statistical uncertainty in hydropower 
projects is the uncertainty of short-term variation of the inflow. A stochastic model is used to 
measure the probabilities of uncertainty.  
Scenario uncertainty refers to scenarios as a plausible description of how the system and/or its 
driving forces may develop in the future. Scenarios are usually applied to describe future conditions 
or processes and cover the range of possible outcomes. The main difference to statistical 
uncertainty is that it is questionable or impossible to formulate probabilities.  
Typically, this group includes uncertainties that can be shaped by Design Methods. Long-term 
electricity price or inflow forecasts are generally described by scenarios.  
Recognized ignorance is fundamental uncertainty about the functional relationships and the 
statistical properties. Because of the weak basic knowledge, no reliable scenarios can be developed. 
This category of uncertainty can further be divided into reducible ignorance and irreducible 
ignorance. Reducible ignorance can be resolved as example by getting additional knowledge by 
further research.  
Recognized ignorance can be also described with the term of the “known unknown”.  
Total ignorance is at the end of the scale and the contrary of determinism. It summarizes all 
phenomena that we do not even know that we do not know, i.e. the “unknown unknown”. 
We even do not know the full extent of our ignorance, as indicated by the arrow in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: The progressive transition between determinism and total ignorance 
(Source: Walker et al., 2003) 
Brown (2004) proposes a similar terminology for uncertainties as Walker et al (2003), but extended 
by additional criteria, namely if the uncertainties are bounded or unbounded (see Figure 6). For 
bounded uncertainty all possible outcomes are deemed known, whereas for unbounded uncertainty 
some or all possible outcomes are deemed unknown. Statistical uncertainties falls into the group of 
bounded uncertainty, as quantitative probabilities require a knowledge of all possible outcomes. If 
possible outcomes can be described, but no probabilities are known, uncertainties can be described 
by scenarios.  
Statistical uncertainty Scenario uncertainty Recognised ignorance Total ignorance 
Determinism Indeterminacy 
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Figure 6: Taxonomy of imperfect knowledge resulting in different uncertainty situations 
(Brown, 2004) 
3.3.1 Nature of Uncertainty 
Walker et al. (2003) distinguish the nature of uncertainty into the following two categories: 
 Epistemic uncertainty: Uncertainty from imperfect knowledge 
 Stochastic uncertainty: Uncertainty due to inherent variability 
Epistemic uncertainty can be reduced by additional studies, data collection etc., whereas stochastic 
uncertainty is non-reducible.  
An essential point in measures for the exploration and mitigation of uncertainty is whether or not 
factors can be influenced by the project team. Therefore it is useful to distinguish uncertainty into 
the following categories: 
 Exogenous uncertainty stems from factors or events outside of the control of the project 
team. Political and commercial uncertainties of hydropower projects are typical examples 
for this category. Typically, this category also includes certain project uncertainties like 
hydrological uncertainties.  
Certainty 
(outcome known) 
Bounded uncertainty 
(all possible outcome known) 
Unbounded uncertainty 
(not all outcome known) 
State of knowledge about «reality» 
(uncertainty concepts) 
Ignorance: unaware of imperfect knowledge 
All probabilities known Some probabilities known (rare) No probabilities known 
Some outcomes 
and probabilities 
Some outcomes 
No probabilities 
Scenarios 
No outcomes 
«Do not know» 
Statistical Qualitative 
Recognized 
ignorance 
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 Endogenous uncertainty stems from factors or events that can be influenced by the project 
team. One example in the hydropower business is inadequate high-risk allocations at the 
contractor’s site, which might lead to bankruptcy of the contractor. Another example is 
geological uncertainties some of which can be reduced by additional site investigations.  
3.4 Inaccuracy of Forecast – Psychological and Political-Economic Explanations 
Flyvbjerg documented in his work (2002, 2006) that large engineering projects have significant 
inaccuracy in forecast of costs, demand etc. Based on large data samples of projects, he argues that 
the main reasons for this inaccuracy are optimistic bias and strategic misrepresentation. These 
psychological and political-economic explanations much better account for inaccurate forecasts 
than technical explanations.  
Technical explanations for forecasting errors, such as imperfect techniques, inadequate data, 
honest mistakes, inherent problems in predicting the future, lack of experience on part of forecasts, 
are not sufficient to explain biased errors in forecast. 
Strategic misrepresentation summarizes the effect when forecasters and planners overestimate 
benefits and underestimate costs for strategic reasons in order to increase the likelihood of 
obtaining the necessary approval and funding for their projects.  
Optimistic bias is a cognitive predisposition found with most people to judge future events in a more 
positive light than is warranted by actual experience.  
 
Figure 7: Inaccuracy of forecast 
Ansar et al. (2014) applied the “outside view” to data of large hydropower projects and describe 
systematic cost underestimations. Strategic misrepresentation and optimistic bias are the 
explanations for these unexpected high cost overruns.  
The “outside view” allows an estimation of uncertainties, including also psychological and political-
economic effects. Therefore it is based on the assumption that the range of observed data is a 
reasonable proxy for the future, but this is not true for some of the factors influencing the 
performance of hydropower projects. Especially for uncertainties in terms of hydrology under the 
influence of climate change and electricity price, the historical observation cannot explain the full 
range of future scenarios.  
Strategic 
misrepresentation 
Optimistic bias 
Technical 
inaccuracy 
Inaccuracy of 
forecast 
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Another disadvantage is that the “outside view” approach limits the possibility of analyzing the 
underlying causes and the relationships between uncertainties – a crucial condition for the 
application of exploration or mitigation measures. 
3.5 The Project Team 
The available knowledge and experience in a project team is an essential criterion for the description 
of uncertainties for a specific hydropower project. A project team, including developer, owner, 
owner’s engineer, contractors’ engineers, contractors etc., may not have or represent the full extent 
and current state of knowledge and experience in the field of hydropower or for a specific project. 
A gap might exist between the knowledge in the project team and the state of knowledge in relevant 
disciplines of hydropower projects. There may be a host of factors that are currently unknown in 
the project team but that would in fact be knowable, if the right resources and analyses were done.  
Since the available information in a project team has a major influence on the extent of uncertainty, 
the categories of uncertainties have been extended by the concept of the known known, known 
unknown, unknown known and unknown unknown. This wording is from the Secretary of State 
Ronald Rumsfeld and it allows to distinguish the knowledge or competence of a project team.  
A typical example is the unavailability of information on site-specific issues. Hydropower projects 
are often developed over several decades. The project team may change over such long periods 
with only part of the information being documented or otherwise available for the design team in a 
later design stage. This can lead to a gap between the theoretically available knowledge and the 
actually available knowledge in the project team and can be best described as the “unknown 
known”.  
This may be an issue not only for projects with a long project development history. Projects with 
very limited resources can face similar issues. The limited engineering budget does not allow to 
incorporate all required technical disciplines and site investigation may be avoided, as is often the 
case at small hydropower projects. For example, an electrical engineer has to prepare the 
hydrological study which can lead to significant errors in the forecast, as he is not familiar with this 
discipline. The resulted uncertainties falls into the category of “unknown known”.  
3.6 Conclusions 
The main points described in this chapter are summarized as follows: 
 As risk is typically associated with potential adverse effects in the hydropower community, 
the term of uncertainty is preferred over the term of risk. 
 Uncertainty in this work covers both tails of the distributions around engineering projects 
(threat and opportunity) and is defined as lack of certainty (Ward and Chapman, 2003) 
 Psychological and political-economic factors need to be taken into account for the analysis 
of inaccuracy forecasts in hydropower projects.  
 For the characterization and assessment of the uncertainties of a specific hydropower 
project, it is necessary to consider the experience, knowledge and information available to 
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the project team, as they might not match with the state of knowledge in relevant disciplines 
of engineering.  
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 Uncertainties of Hydrology and 
Electricity Price 
4.1 Introduction 
Uncertainties in hydrology and electricity price are affecting several hydropower projects around 
the world. This chapter provides a description and outlines the possible magnitude of these 
uncertainties.  
Climate change as one of the driving factors of hydrological uncertainties has been given a lot of 
attention during the last few decades of research. Therefore, this chapter includes a review and a 
retrospection on the accuracy of climate change forecasts.  
The other factor described in this chapter is electricity price, regarding the current market situation 
and the main issues for deriving accurate forecasts. Retrospective analyses were carried out to 
indicate how accurate historical electricity price predictions have been.  
4.2 Hydrological Uncertainty 
In general, hydrological uncertainties affecting the performance of hydropower projects can be 
distinguished into the following categories: 
 Flood damage during construction and operation phase 
 Short-term variation of inflow 
 Long-term variation of inflow 
4.2.1 Flood Damage during Construction and Operation Phase 
Flood damage during construction and operation phases can have a significant impact on the 
performance of a hydropower project. Delays during the construction phase are often related to 
problems with river diversion. In extreme cases, physical damage during the operation phase can 
even mean end of operations, i.e. end of asset lifetime. However, the management of these 
uncertainties is not related to global design parameter choices and thus is not considered in this 
study.  
4.2.2 Short-term Variation of Inflow  
The uncertainty of short-term inflow variation has typically two components: epistemic uncertainty 
and stochastic uncertainty. The epistemic uncertainty can be reduced by additional hydrometric 
measurements to prolong the available time series and thus improve the hydrological analysis or 
model. However, there will always remain the stochastic uncertainty, which is related to the 
stochastic and chaotic nature of rainfall-runoff process and weather phenomena.  
The estimation of the short-term variation of inflow, including probabilities, can be integrated into 
the economic and financial analysis. Depending on the rate of return, it can have a significant impact 
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on performance parameters, such as the NPV, by projecting occurrences of wet or dry periods after 
start of operation. The stochastic uncertainty and the impact can be estimated, but they cannot be 
reduced.  
4.2.3 Long-term Variation of Inflow 
Uncertainty of long-term hydrological forecast is the major source for the uncertainty of energy 
production forecast. Long-range planning hydrological forecasts for design purposes have typically 
been based on information from recent historical and observed data records (for example stream 
gauge evaporation pan, rainfall stations and so on). These assumptions are based on the premise 
that the range of observed supply variability is a reasonable proxy for future inflow possibilities.  
In general, such hydrological forecasts include uncertainties that may stem from errors in the 
measured data, from interpretation of incomplete data, from errors and simplifications inherent in 
the hydrological model structure, and from errors and uncertainty due to the values of the model 
parameters (Refsgaard and Storm, 1990). 
Another source of uncertainty is whether the climate of a reference period is still relevant at the 
time the hydropower plant is operated. This issue is getting more and more important in the light 
of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) records that energy 
production and energy demand are especially sensitive to climate change. 
Many research projects from all over the world have shown an effect of possible climate change on 
hydropower production. The following summary gives first examples from studies outside 
Switzerland, then followed by research in Switzerland. 
The Hydklima research project prepared for Austria (Nachtnebel and Fuchs, 2001) describes a 
decrease in annual discharge, but lower seasonal fluctuation of discharge, which partly 
compensates for the lower inflow to hydropower plants. Atsushi (2007) indicates for three cases 
studied in India, Sri Lanka and Vietnam that the climate change will significantly change water inflow 
during dry years. As a consequence, it is proposed to increase the installed capacity and the storage 
capacity. In the US, a change in water availability and inflow fluctuations, particularly in snowmelt-
dominated basins where impacts have already been reported, can be expected (Hamlet et al., 2002; 
California Energy Commission, 2005; Northwest Power Conservation Council, 2005). Hydropower 
production at facilities that are operated to meet multiple objectives (for example flood-risk 
reduction, irrigation, municipal and industrial water supply, navigation, in-stream flow 
augmentation and water quality) may be especially vulnerable to climate change (USGS et al., 2009).  
The report prepared by Hänggi and Plattner (2009) summarizes the research on climate change and 
hydropower in Switzerland. The study highlights that the forecasted impact of the climate change 
on hydropower, especially in the Alps, is uncertain and has been frequently changed over the last 
few years. The forecasts of the year 2000 estimated an increase in precipitation in Switzerland due 
to climate change. For example, a 26% increase in energy production was simulated for the Grande 
Dixence hydropower plant for the period from 2031 to 2060 (Westaway, 2000). In 2002, the OcCC 
projected an increase in precipitation based on the third report of IPCC (2001). A trend towards 
lower precipitation during the summer and higher precipitation during the winter along with higher 
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annual fluctuations was estimated. Simulations show an increase in annual precipitation by about 
10% for the North part of the Alps and a decrease by about 10% for the South part for the year 2050. 
The impacts on the energy production of hydropower plants were controversially evaluated 
(ProClim, 2003). In 2004, new studies estimated a decrease in total precipitation for Switzerland 
(Frei, 2004). Those studies were based on a new generation of global and regional climate models 
(Christensen et al., 2002). As a consequence of the decrease of precipitation, forecasts predicted a 
decrease by around 7% of the mean discharge in the Alps for 2050 (Horton et al., 2005). Calculations 
projected a reduction of the energy output from hydropower (OcCC, 2007; BAFU and BFE, 2007). 
The significance of the forecasted reduction of energy production can be seen in the example of 
Mauvoisin. For the period from 2070 to 2099, a decrease in energy production by 36% was 
estimated (Schäfli et al., 2007).  
A summary study presented in 2011 (SGHL and CHy) assesses a slight decrease in annual discharge 
in Ticino and in South Wallis until 2100, whereas no significant change of the discharge situation is 
estimated in the North Alps of Switzerland. 
The above retrospection on forecasts of climate change and hydropower in Switzerland shows a 
shift from an increase to a decrease and finally to no significant changes of water availability within 
a research period of about 10 years.  
Also, the comparison of different projections based on different climate scenarios underlines a high 
level of uncertainties. A summary is presented in Table 1. 
The ranges of projection for most of the catchments are large. It should be noted that these 
uncertainties do not include uncertainties stemming from errors in the measured data, 
interpretation of incomplete data, errors and simplifications inherent in the model structure and 
errors and uncertainty due to the values of the model parameters. Taking also these uncertainties 
into account, it can be concluded that uncertainties can easily reach about 20%. 
Whereas there is not a predominant cause for changes in hydrological regimes in Switzerland, the 
situation is different for certain international hydropower projects where changes in land-use 
practice can influence the hydrological regime. Population pressures can lead to more settlements, 
deforestation, change in agricultural practice, which can finally affect the runoff of a catchment. A 
long-term assessment of land-use changes is typically highly uncertain.  
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Table 1: Range of projection of annual discharge for various catchments in Switzerland simulated 
with various climate scenarios and models.  
Study River Change of Annual 
Discharge 
Range of 
Projections 
Hänggi et al., 2011a Löntsch 0% to +6% 6% 
Hänggi et al., 2011b Dischmabach-Davos, Kriegsmatte -5% to +4% 9% 
Hänggi et al., 2011b Landquart-Klosters, Auelti +4% to +12% 8% 
Hänggi et al., 2011b Mönchalpbach-Trittwald -4% to +3% 7% 
Hänggi et al., 2011b Stützbach-Davos -19% to -4% 15% 
Hänggi et al., 2011b Taschinasbach-Grüsch -14% to -1% 13% 
WSL and SLF, 2011 HPP Göscheneralp -2% to +23% 25% 
WSL, 2011a HPP Gougra +4% to +12% 8% 
WSL, 2011c HPPs Oberhasli 0% to +6% 6% 
WSL, 2011b HPP Mattmark +1% to +11% 10% 
 
4.2.4 Climatic Changes in the Last Decades 
Hänggi and Weingartner (2012) discuss the climatic variation over the last century and its impact on 
the water available for hydropower production in Switzerland. Flow duration curves (FDC) of various 
runoff regimes and record periods were analyzed. Based on virtual intakes located all over 
Switzerland, the study shows that the warming and the increase in winter precipitation over the last 
century have influenced the available water volumes for hydropower production. The highest 
variations in discharge volumes were found in glaciated catchments of the Swiss Alps. The study 
comes to the general conclusion that the climatic changes have given rise to more balanced 
discharge regimes, resulting in higher energy production.  
For most run-of hydropower schemes, the design discharge is selected on the basis of the FDC. As 
mentioned for run-of schemes in Chapter 2.2.1, the installed capacity is typically optimized for a 
discharge exceeding the duration curve between 10% (Q10) and 40% (Q40).  
The data presented by Hänggi et al. show a significant uncertainty for the selection of a design 
discharge. Depending on the catchment and the period of record, Q10 and Q40 are differing 
significantly (Q10 ±30%, Q40 ±30%) compared with the reference period 1995-2009. 
The study also shows a significant variation of the available water volume for hydropower 
generation depending on the period of record.  
4.2.5 Conclusions 
The main findings of this literature review are as follows: 
 Uncertainties in hydrology have different sources such as measured data, interpretation of 
incomplete data, hydrological model structure, or climate change. 
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 The retrospection on past climate change projections in Switzerland underlines the generally 
high uncertainties of long-term hydrological estimates.  
 Previous impact studies of climate change for hydropower plants in Switzerland indicate a 
range of climate projection up to about 25% of the annual discharge (see Chapter 4.2.3).  
 Also, in the last decades, the available water volume for hydropower generation showed 
significant variation in some of the Swiss catchments (see Chapter 4.2.4). 
4.3 Electricity Price 
Electricity prices have a direct impact on the performance parameters and are therefore the basis 
for design and investment decisions. The time frame generally covers the entire economic lifetime 
of a hydropower plant, which ranges between 25 and 80 years.  
Compared with other industries, the turnover of hydropower projects is very slow. Starting from a 
conceptual design, it can take years or even decades until the power plant finally starts to operate. 
That means that major decisions have to be based on long-term forecasts, not only because of the 
long economic lifetime, but also because of the long pre-construction phase. This increases the 
uncertainties of forecasts significantly.  
Decisions on the active storage capacity and the installed capacity depend mainly on the forecast of 
peak and off-peak energy. In addition, hydropower plants are also designed to contribute to the 
stability of the grid. This aspect is getting more and more important in order to compensate the 
highly fluctuating production rates from renewables such as wind and solar.  
Long-term electricity price forecasts differ from medium or short-term forecasts. Medium-term 
forecasts have a time horizon from a few days to a few months ahead and are often used for balance 
sheet calculations, risk management and derivatives pricing. Short-term electricity price modes are 
generally focused on short periods from a few minutes up to a few days ahead and thus are of 
importance in day-to-day market operations (Weron, 2014). As short and medium-term forecasts 
are not relevant for design decisions regarding global design parameters, these groups of models 
are not further discussed. 
Craig et al. (2002) categorize the most-used long-term forecasting methodologies into six groups: 
trend projections, econometric projections, end-use analysis, combined approaches, systems 
dynamics, and scenario analysis.  
However, regardless of which type of long-term forecast model is applied, the main questions for 
the design of hydropower projects are: How wrong are electricity price forecasts? What is the 
consequence if the forecast is wrong, or, in other words, how does it influence the design decisions? 
Smil (2005) discusses various forecasts of energy affairs over a period of more than 100 years and 
concludes that they are “a manifest record of failure” and that “we should abandon all detailed 
quantitative point forecasts”.  
Also, other authors have tested the accuracy of energy forecasts. O’Neill and Desai (2005) assessed 
the accuracy of predictions of US energy consumptions produced by the Energy Information 
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Administration (EIA) over the period 1982-2000. For a projection horizon of 10-13 years, the average 
error is about 4%. Also, Winebrake and Sakva (2006) explore the forecast accuracy of predictions of 
the energy consumption based on the data from EIA covering the period between 1982 and 2003. 
For 10-year forecasts of energy consumption, they highlight a mean percentage error of 4.86%. The 
errors vary significantly over the analyzed energy sectors (commercial, industrial, residential, and 
transportation).  
4.3.1 Liberalized Market 
Deregulation of the electricity industry came on the political agenda in many countries around the 
world in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Switzerland, partial liberalization started in 2009. 
Customers that consume more than 100’000 kWh/year have the option either to choose their 
supplier or to remain within the scope of the basic provision mandate. Full liberalization of the 
electricity market is planned for 2018, subject to a referendum by the Swiss population.  
Due to the liberalization of the electricity market, electricity suppliers are faced with an increasingly 
complex situation marked by increased uncertainties. 
Before liberalization of the energy market, the relative security in the market outlets and the price 
stability made it possible to make decisions with fuel price and demand level as sole uncertainties. 
Liberalization of the markets has increased the sources of uncertainty (see Figure 8). In particular, 
when making their investment choices, electricity suppliers face market uncertainties (future 
demand, supply and prices) and regulatory uncertainties (lack of visibility on the future legal 
environment controlling the electricity generation activity). All factors that affect supply and 
demand have an immediate impact on the electricity price. A major influence factor on the supply 
side is fuel prices (coal, gas, oil).  
 
Figure 8: Factors influencing the electricity price (Source RWE, 2015) 
Long-term electricity price models generally assume a gradual variation in process relationships. 
However, the real world is rife with discontinuities and disruptive events, and the longer the frame 
of the forecast, the more likely it is that pivotal events will change the underlying economic and 
relationships that all models attempt to replicate (Craig et al. 2002).  
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Smil (2005) provides a long list of examples of unpredictable events capable to influence significantly 
the energy market. Some examples from the recent history in Switzerland can be added. The 
impacts of the Fukushima nuclear accident on European energy policy, the substitution politics for 
wind and solar, or the development of Swiss energy market liberalization were difficult or impossible 
to predict.  
4.3.2 Retrospective Electricity Price Forecasts – AEO, US 
The following section shows a review of long-run forecasts of electricity prices for the US market. 
The analysis gives some evidence on the forecast error of electricity price prediction. 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) prepares forecasts of electricity price, energy 
production and energy consumption each year and presents the results in the Annual Energy 
Outlook (AEO). In addition, a review report is issued each year to show the relationship between 
past reference case projections and actual energy indicators. Figure 9 shows the actual electricity 
price and the projected values from 1993 until 2013. The electricity prices were almost always 
underestimated from 1998 on. The report gives an underestimation of pre-2009 natural gas prices 
and of coal prices as the main reasons for the underestimation of the electricity price (EIA, 2015).  
 
Figure 9: Projected (dashed line) and actual electricity price (continues line), data published by EIA, 
2015 
The works by O’Neill and Desai (2005) as well as by Winebrake and Sakva (2005) have focused on 
the errors of energy consumption predictions, whereas our interest lies in the accuracy of electricity 
price forecasts. Similar to above quoted studies, we applied an error decomposition technique to 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
P
ro
je
ct
e
d
 a
n
d
 A
ct
u
al
 E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
 P
ri
ce
[N
o
m
in
al
 U
Sc
e
n
ts
/k
W
h
]
 32 
analyze the electricity price predictions. The difference between the projected electricity price and 
the actual electricity price was analyzed and characterized by the mean percentage error (MPE) and 
mean absolute percentage error (MAPE). The definitions and formulas applied in our work are based 
on the work of Winebrake and Sakva (2005) and are as follows:  
Mean percentage error (MPE) is an average error of all electricity price forecasts of a given forecast 
horizon. MPE is given by the function:  
𝑀𝑃𝐸𝜏 =  
∑
(?̂?𝑡,𝜏 −  𝑌𝑡,𝜏)
𝑌𝑡,𝜏𝑡
𝑛𝜏
 
(7) 
 
Where τ is the forecast horizon (1 year, 2years … x years); t is the year in which the forecast was 
published; Ŷ𝑡,𝜏 is the predicted electricity price for period τ published in the year t; 𝑌𝑡,𝜏 is the actual 
value of the electricity price for period τ and year of AEO publication t; and 𝑛𝜏 is the number of 
predictions with the time horizon τ. 
An MPE greater than 0 means that the electricity price was overestimated. If MPE < 0, then the 
predicted electricity price was less than the actual value. However, a figure close to 0 does not 
necessarily indicate that the forecast is highly confident over the complete period. It might be 
caused by a combination of a period with overestimation and a period of underestimation. To avoid 
such misinterpretations, also the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) has been calculated, 
given by the following function: 
𝑀𝐴𝑃𝐸𝜏 =  
|∑
(?̂?𝑡,𝜏 −  𝑌𝑡,𝜏)
𝑌𝑡,𝜏𝑡
|
𝑛𝜏
 
(8) 
 
where the variables and indices are the same as defined for the MPE. 
 
Figure 10: Mean percentage error (MPE) and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), AEO U.S. 
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Table 2: Mean percentage error (MPE) and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) for forecast 
horizons up to 19 years 
Forecast horizon (years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Number of observations 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 
MPE 0.1% -0.7% -1.4% -2.0% -2.4% -2.7% -2.9% -3.5% -3.5% -3.2% 
MAPE 1.8% 2.7% 4.0% 5.4% 6.5% 7.7% 8.8% 10.3% 11.2% 12.0% 
 
Forecast horizon (years) 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Number of observations 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 3 1 
MPE -2.3% -1.2% 0.1% 1.3% 3.5% 6.6% 9.9% 13.8% 14.6% 
MAPE 12.2% 12.3% 12.1% 12.3% 11.9% 11.4% 12.1% 13.8% 14.6% 
 
The MPE and MAPE of the electricity price forecasts show the range of forecast error up to a time 
horizon of 19 years. For forecast horizons up to 15 years, the MPE was below 5%. However, the 
MAPE shows already a strong increase up to about 12%.  
For the forecasts with a time horizon of more than 15 years, the MPE increases significantly to about 
14.6%. Is has to be noted, however, that because of the limited number of observations, confidence 
is low.  
4.3.3 Electricity Price Forecasts in Switzerland 
In Switzerland, there are no periodically published long-term electricity price predictions, as for 
example for the US market. The focus of publicly available energy predictions over the last few 
decades has been on explorative scenarios rather than on forecasts (see also Dolecek, 2004). An 
explorative scenario investigates the question: What can happen? Explorative scenarios can be 
distinguished into external scenarios and strategic scenarios. External scenarios are driven by 
external factors, which cannot be influenced. Strategic scenarios are based mainly on internal 
factors, answering the question: What can happen if we act in a certain way? The aim of explorative 
scenarios is to explore developments that are regarded as possible to happen. Typically, a set of 
scenarios is elaborated, covering a wide scope of plausible developments. Explorative scenarios are 
focusing on the long time horizon and can allow profound system changes (Börjeson et al., 2006). 
The working group “Energie Trialog” summarized various scenarios. Figure 11 illustrates the 
explorative scenarios of energy consumptions developed before 2007. The comparison of the 
energy consumption scenarios shows a high variability ranging from a significant decrease 
(Greenpeace et al. 2006) to a significant increase (Axpo Hoch).  
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Figure 11: Overview on energy consumption scenarios in Switzerland until 2050 (Sources energy 
consumption scenarios: BFE 2007c, PSI 2007, Axpo 2005, VSE 2006, Greenpeace et al., 2006) 
(Source of Plot: Energie Trialog Schweiz, 2009) 
Also other summary studies (e.g. Dolecek, 2004) show that energy scenarios for Switzerland cover 
a very wide range and highlight the high uncertainty. 
4.3.4 Long-term Electricity Price Scenarios for Switzerland – An Example 
An example of a long-term energy scenario covering the period between 2015 and 2050 can be 
found in Pöyry (2012). The study aims to analyze three questions: (i) the need of flexible energy 
production capacity, (ii) the interdependence of demand and supply of flexible energy and security 
of energy supply, (iii) the influence flexibility has on the electricity prices. The study includes three 
main scenarios, which make different assumptions in terms of energy demand and development of 
renewable energy capacity.  
Figure 12 shows the actual electricity price and the projected values for each scenario. The year the 
prediction was made was 2012. For the year 2015, the actual electricity price was overestimated 
between 46% and 54%, depending on the scenarios. 
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Figure 12: Projected (dashed line) and actual spot market electricity price (black line), Switzerland, 
data source Pöyry (2012) 
4.3.5 Retrospective Electricity Price Forecasts – Switzerland 
For the design of larger hydropower projects, electricity price forecasts are typically specifically 
prepared. In most projects a forecast is prepared during the feasibility stage.  
To provide an indication of the forecast error of such electricity price prediction in Switzerland, 
historical electricity price forecasts until 2015 had been collected and analyzed. The data was 
provided by a major Swiss energy utility. The source of data is confidential, as major business 
decisions have been based on this information.  
Figure 9 shows the actual electricity price and the projected values from 2010 until 2015. Annual 
forecasts, excluding 2012, were prepared. The development of the electricity prices was always 
significantly overestimated.  
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Figure 13: Projected (dashed line) and actual spot market electricity price (black line), Switzerland, 
data source: confidential 
The MPE and MAPE were calculated based on equations (7) and (8), respectively (see Table 3). 
The MPE and MAPE of the electricity price forecasts show the range of forecast error for a time 
horizon of up to 6 years. The MPE was about 60% for said time horizon and equal to the MAPE over 
the complete period. 
 
 
Figure 14: Mean percentage error (MPE) and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) 
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Table 3: Mean percentage error (MPE) and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)for forecast 
horizons up to 6 years 
Forecast horizon (years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Number of observations 5 4 3 2 2 2 
MPE 17.6% 26.0% 34.3% 44.2% 55.7% 60.6% 
MAPE 17.6% 26.0% 34.3% 44.2% 55.7% 60.6% 
 
Confidence is limited by the low number of observation. Also, it has to be noted that the time period 
(2010-2015) followed an electricity price peak in 2008. The analysis of the range of error of long-
term electricity price forecasts could be supported by taking into account additional forecasts from 
different institutes and covering a longer time horizon. However, this data could not be made 
available for this research work. 
4.3.6 Conclusions 
In the complex context of a liberalized market, not only the forecasts are becoming less reliable, but 
there are also limited management possibilities to compensate wrong or non-optimal decisions. A 
design error or a wrong investment decision in a liberalized market can have much greater impact 
on a company’s electricity trading business than in a monopoly. In the case of a monopolistic 
situation, an unpredictable situation could be compensated by an increase in rates to match real 
costs, while in a competitive environment, this would result in a loss that would endanger the 
durability of the company, or at least reduce the cost effectiveness of a project (Gollier et al., 2005). 
In terms of electricity price forecasts, the following conclusions are made: 
 Hydropower design requires forecasts covering a time period in a range from 25 to 80 years.  
 The most sensitive time period for performance parameters (NPV) are the first years of 
operation, even when assuming relatively low discount rates. However, as the sole pre-
construction period can cover several years, also the predictions for this periods are subject 
to large errors. 
 For hydropower design, it is necessary to have forecasts of peak, off-peak or even reserve 
energy prices to make decisions on active storage and installed capacity.  
 There is increased uncertainty in a liberalized market. Unpredictable events can have major 
impacts on the electricity price.  
 The analysis of the AEO forecasts indicates that the MPE for a forecast horizon of about 
20 years is about 15%. 
 Electricity price scenarios are typically explorative scenarios and are published without 
information on likelihood and probability. 
 The analysis of forecasts for Switzerland indicates an MPE of 60% for a mid-term forecast 
horizon of 6 years. 
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 Uncertainties of Small and Large 
Hydropower Projects in Switzerland  
5.1 Introduction 
Recent publications have shown a dramatic cost overrun in large hydropower schemes (e.g. Ansar 
et al., 2014; Sovacool et al., 2014). These unexpected high cost overruns support the current trend 
of preferring small hydropower plants over large-scale schemes. A general assumption is that the 
risk associated with small plants is much lower compared with large hydropower projects. Policy 
makers, developers and especially NGOs and various other environmental organizations are often 
following the principle of “small is beautiful”.  
In addition, various publications from research groups give support to this assumption. Ansar et al. 
(2014) argue that more numerous small hydropower projects are more prudent than large or 
megaprojects from the perspective of risk management. Dursun and Gokcol (2011) assume that 
large dams have become much riskier investments, while there still remains much unexploited 
potential for small hydro projects around the world. Sovacool et al. (2014) argue that smaller, 
decentralized, modular, scalable systems have less cost overruns in terms of frequency and 
magnitude. Flyvbjerg et al. (2004) summarize that research literature and media occasionally claim 
that the track record for infrastructure projects is poorer for larger projects than for smaller ones 
and that cost overruns are higher and more frequent for large projects.  
On the other hand, several countries have introduced incentive programs to stimulate an increase 
of electricity production from small hydropower plants. The introduction of such supporting systems 
has led to a revival of small hydropower plants, which are in general defined as plants with an 
installed capacity up to 10 MW, over the last decade.  
Most European countries (CH, BG, CZ, DE, EE, ES, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, PT, SK, UK and AT 
until 2010) opted for the feed-in tariff as supporting system. The feed-in tariff guarantees the 
producer a certain energy price. The tariff is fixed over a long period of time, commonly 20 years, 
and therefore excludes the uncertainties of energy price fluctuations for the investors (see also 
ESHA, 2012). In general, the feed-in tariffs are significantly higher than the market price. 
The effect of this supporting system is that currently about 46 TWh/year are produced by small 
hydropower plants in the EU-27. This is a share of about 8% in the renewable energy mix. Further 
expansion is foreseen in several European countries such as Austria, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Romania, Greece or Poland (ESHA, 2012).  
Also in Switzerland the feed-in tariff was introduced to push small hydropower projects. Before the 
feed-in tariff was launched in 2008, about 1’000 small hydropower plants with a total annual 
production of about 3400 GWh were in operation (Hirschberg et al., 2005). The supporting system 
led to more new developments and increased rehabilitation of existing plants. Recent figures (2015) 
show that 401 small hydropower plants were commissioned after 2008. The total production of 
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these schemes in 2015 was about 877 GWh, which is share of about 2% of the total hydropower 
production in Switzerland (2015: 39’486 GWh). 
Small hydropower is intended to play a significant role for the future development of renewable 
energy sources in Switzerland. According to the Energy Strategy 2050 (BFE, 2012), it is planned to 
be one of the major sources of the additional renewable energy. The Energy Strategy 2050 identifies 
the increase of hydropower production: by 1.53 TWh/a under actual conditions and by 3.16 TWh/a 
under improved conditions. The largest portion is intended to be covered by small hydropower 
plants (1.29 TWh/a under actual conditions, 1.60 TWh/a under improved conditions). 
Small hydropower projects have been intensively supported by feed-in tariffs in many countries over 
the last few years without any systematic analysis of uncertainties and with surprisingly little 
attention being paid to comparing the uncertainties of large and small hydropower schemes. 
In addition, most previous studies focused on the performance of construction cost estimates only. 
The uncertainties of energy production were not included. As energy production, in addition to the 
costs of construction, is another main factor influencing the economic performance of a hydropower 
project, we included this factor as well in our analysis. 
A focal point of this study is to analyze the uncertainties of small hydropower projects supported by 
feed-in tariffs in Switzerland and to compare them with uncertainties of large hydropower plants. 
The following issues have been analyzed: 
 How high is the cost overrun for small hydropower plants? 
 Do large Swiss hydropower projects face cost overruns similar to those of international 
projects? 
 Is the cost overrun of small hydropower schemes lower than that of large hydropower plans, 
as generally assumed? 
 How accurate were the energy forecasts of large and small hydropower projects? 
The results on uncertainties of small and large hydropower plants will allow a more comprehensive 
political debate as to the current supporting system. 
Finally, implications for the planning and design of hydropower projects are discussed.  
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5.2 Uncertainties of Construction Costs and Energy Production 
5.2.1 Construction Costs 
Several publications show that hydropower projects suffer significant cost overrun.  
The article by Ansar et al. (2014) establishes highest cost overruns. A mean cost overrun of 96% was 
calculated, based on a sample size of 245 large dams. The results have led to a debate in the 
hydropower community on the performance of hydropower schemes and the study itself. No 
associated data has been published so far. This makes a cross-check on the basic data impossible.  
Bacon and Besant-Jones (1998) analyzed power generation projects approved for financing by the 
World Bank and International Development Association between 1965 and 1986, and completed by 
1994. The study focuses on the reliability of estimates for construction costs and schedules for 
thermal and hydropower projects. In addition, the paper shows how estimations can be improved 
by applying regression models. The database contains 71 hydropower projects in developing 
countries. The average cost overrun is 27% (S.D.= 38%).  
Head (2000) summarizes the figures presented by Bacon et al. (1998) and mentions that the 
analyzed projects were all carried out in the public sector. He indicates that an improvement can 
reasonably be expected if projects are financed by the private sector. This statement is based on a 
comparison with thermal projects. However, this is questionable, as other studies on construction 
costs for large infrastructure projects within a much larger data sample could not distinguish 
between cost overruns in the private or public sector (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg et al., 2004).  
Additional data on cost overruns for hydropower projects have been published by WCD (2001). The 
sample consists of hydropower, irrigation and multipurpose projects. The average cost overrun is 
56% (n=81). 
Sovacool et al. (2014) investigate the frequency and magnitude of cost and time overruns during 
the construction of 401 electricity projects between 1936 and 2014. The study is focused on 
different types of technologies, including hydropower plants. The 61 hydro facilities in the data 
sample had an average cost overrun of 71%.  
The following table summarizes the results of previous studies.  
Table 4: Average cost overruns published in previous studies 
 
Bacon and 
Besant-Jones 
(1998) 
WCD  
(2001) 
Ansar et al. 
(2014) 
Sovacool et al. 
(2014) 
n 71 81 245 61 
Average 27% 56% 96% 71% 
 
According to our best knowledge, no study analyzing cost overruns of small hydropower projects 
with feed-in tariffs has been published so far. 
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5.2.2 Energy Production 
WCD (2001) reports that large dams designed to deliver electric power have on average met 
expectations for power delivery but with considerable variability, much of it on the downside. Data 
of 63 large dams could be made available for this analysis. Almost half of the sample exceeded the 
targets set for power generation, with about 15% exceeding the targets by a significant amount. 
More than half of the sample fall short of their power generation target. About 20% of the projects 
achieve less than 75% of the production target. It is important to note, that the data base includes 
also projects where the installed capacity varies between feasibility and commissioning status. That 
means that the over or underestimations of the energy production are also influenced by design 
decisions and should not be handled as uncertain factors such as hydrology, climate change.  
Other studies on the quality of energy production estimates of hydropower schemes based on 
evidenced data could not be found.  
5.3 Research Methods 
Inspired by the research work of Flyvbjerg and his colleagues (Flyvbjerg, 2008; Ansar et al., 2014), 
the outside view has been selected for the data analyses. The outside view is an evidence-based 
approach allowing decision makers to base their decisions for new projects on the experience 
gained in projects realized in the past. Taking an outside view on the outcomes of an alternative or 
project means to place it in the statistical distribution of the outcomes of comparable, already 
constructed projects.  
5.3.1 Sample Collection 
The sample was collected according to the following principles: 
 The class of small hydropower plants contains only projects subsidized by the feed-in tariff 
in Switzerland. The average capacity must be equal or below 10 MW in order to have access 
to the subsidizing program. 
 Large projects contain only projects without feed-in tariff and with an installed capacity of 
at least 10 MW. 
 All projects are located in Switzerland.  
 For all projects costs for transmission lines were excluded. 
5.3.2 Focus on Project – Specific Uncertainties 
Uncertainties of hydropower projects are influenced by many underlying uncertainties caused by a 
wide range of factors as described in Chapter 6.3. This is the case for construction costs and energy 
production. The uncertainties can be grouped into political, commercial and project-specific 
uncertainties.  
The target was to prepare data samples for small and large hydropower projects having similar 
political and commercial uncertainties. Therefore, all projects are located in Switzerland, which is a 
market characterized by low commercial uncertainties and stable political conditions.  
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Uncertainties in the collected project samples leading to errors in cost and energy production 
estimations are mainly stemming from project-specific uncertainties.  
The limitation to Swiss projects allows a more reliable comparison of the estimate performance of 
small and large hydropower projects, compared with all previous studies where no country specific 
approach was selected.  
5.3.3 Data Source – Small Hydropower Plants 
Data of small hydropower projects has been provided by the Federal Office of Energy in Switzerland 
(BFE). The latest available report is from November 2014 and the projects started operation 
between 2008 and 2013. The available parameters of each project are summarized in Table 5. To 
ensure confidentiality, no project name, owner or location of the projects was made available. 
Because of this limitation, it was not possible to also provide a project-specific assessment of the 
causes leading to cost overruns or production overestimations.  
The total number of projects in our data base is 1417. Depending on the analyzed factors, various 
filter criteria have been applied to improve the reliability of the statistical analyses. These filter 
criteria are described in the sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2.  
Table 5: Available parameters of small hydropower plants 
Parameters Unit/Notes 
Status of project Planning phase or operation phase 
Planned installed capacity  kW 
Realized installed capacity  kW 
Date of start of operation dd/mm/yyyy 
Date of registration dd/mm/yyyy 
Gross head m 
Type of plant Diversion scheme, w/o diversion, waste water, 
compensation, drinking water 
Type of project Rehabilitation or greenfield project 
Type of turbines Pelton, Francis, Kaplan, Ossberger, others 
Estimated annual energy production kWh 
Actual annual energy production kWh 
Estimated investment costs CHF 
Civil costs CHF 
Actual investment costs CHF 
 
For the analysis of long-term production data of small hydropower plants, additional data was 
collected from the publications “Wasser und Energiewirtschaft” (SWV, 1964-1974). These 
publications include energy production estimates for projects that were in the planning and 
construction stage. The actual energy production data was obtained from the statistics of 
hydropower plants in Switzerland (BFE, 1991 - 2016). Details on this data base are shown in Annex C.  
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5.3.4 Data Source – Large Hydropower Plants 
Data on estimated construction costs of large hydropower projects was collected from the 
publication series on hydropower development in Switzerland published by “Eidgenössiches Amt 
für Wasserwirtschaft”, a former Swiss public authority with focus on water management. The books 
were published periodically, in general annually, and summarize the key data of projects in the 
planning stage, under construction and starting operation in the respective years. Data from the 
annual publications between 1947 and 1969 was collected and analyzed. 
It has to be noted that these periods were the booming years of large hydropower development in 
Switzerland, similar to the high activity in the small hydropower business after the introduction of 
the feed-in tariff system.  
Actual construction costs were collected from different sources. A large portion of the data was 
collected from the dissertation of Balmer (2012). Specific references are given in the data protocol 
(Annex A).  
The estimated production figures were collected from the publications of “Wasser und 
Energiewirtschaft” (SWV, 1964-1974).The actual energy production data was obtained from the 
statistics of hydropower plants in Switzerland (BFE, 1991 - 2016). Details on this data base are shown 
in Annex B.  
5.4 Data Samples 
5.4.1 Construction Costs 
Small Hydropower Projects 
The data sample established for the analysis of cost overruns in small hydropower projects contains 
facilities fulfilling the following criteria: 
 Actual construction costs higher than CHF 10’000. Very small projects were excluded.  
 Projects with an installed capacity variance of less than ±25% from estimate to actual. 
Several projects show significant changes even during the construction phase with an impact 
not only on construction costs but also on energy production. According to the rationale of 
this work, such decisions are not errors in estimates, but clear management decisions and 
thus are not categorized as uncertainties.  
 The ratio of actual to estimated construction costs must be smaller than 10 and larger than 
0.1 (one project was excluded from sample Planning Phase 2). 
Estimated costs have been collected for different planning phases. Planning Phase 1 contains all 
projects with cost estimates from the registration request for the feed-in tariff. This early design 
stage typically corresponds to a conceptual design. The sample Planning Phase 2 contains all figures 
of the construction or concession projects. It has to be noted that results of Planning Phase 1 and 
Planning Phase 2 are not reported for all of the projects. The sample size for Planning Phase 1 is 85 
and the data sample for Planning Phase 2 contains 30 projects.  
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Results of Planning Phase 2 have been considered for the comparison of cost overruns of small and 
large hydropower projects. This sample has a portfolio of CHF 208 million and the actual 
construction costs range between CHF 0.1 million and CHF 59 million.  
The sample contains projects with a wide range of gross heads and installed capacities (see Figure 
15). Apart from pure hydropower projects, the sample also includes multipurpose projects. 11 
facilities out of 30 projects are multipurpose projects (drinking water (8), waste water (1), 
compensation flow (2)).  
The greater part of the plants were greenfield projects. 8 projects were rehabilitation or extension 
projects.  
Inflation was neglected in the analysis of the cost overrun of small hydropower projects. Like in the 
period between 2008 and 2013, the level of inflation in Switzerland was less than 1% (FSO, 2016). 
  
  
Figure 15: Small hydropower plants, data sample costs – Planning Phase 2, histograms of actual 
cost, mean annual production, installed capacity and gross head. 
 
Large Hydropower Projects 
The data sample contains medium to large hydropower projects with an installed capacity between 
13 MW (Airolo-Piotta HPP) and 735 MW (Grande Dixence).  
Because of the relatively long planning and construction times of large hydropower plants, the long-
term inflation rate has been considered. For this purpose, the estimated and actual costs were 
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adjusted according to the Swiss Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by the Federal Statistical 
Office (FSO, 2016). 
The portfolio amounts to CHF 14’156 million adjusted for the CPI 2015. 
The data sample and the key figures are shown in Annex A. 
5.4.2 Energy Production 
Small Hydropower Projects 
Out of the 1417 projects, a representative sample of 264 plants was selected. About 73% of the 
projects were excluded as they were not constructed. The selected projects meet the following 
criteria: 
 A minimum of one full calendar year of production data. 
 The reported installed capacities of the corresponding year of estimated and actual energy 
production vary up to ± 25%. 
 Actual and estimated annual energy figures must be equal or less than the theoretical 
maximum annual energy production (Pt) limited by the installed capacity (IC), calculated as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑡  = 𝐼𝐶 ∙ 365 ∙ 24 (9) 
 
 Projects with a ratio of actual to estimated energy production equal or higher than 2 have 
been excluded (number of projects excluded: 2). 
Based on above criteria, 264 projects have been selected covering both multipurpose projects and 
pure hydropower plants. An overview of the different plant types included in the data sample is 
shown in Figure 16. The projects cover a broad range of different characteristics of hydropower 
schemes in terms of head and installed capacity (see Figure 17).   
Out of this sample, 163 plants are greenfield projects and 101 plants are rehabilitation or extension 
projects.  
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Figure 16: Small hydropower plants, data sample energy production, type of plants in the data 
sample 
 
   
Figure 17: Small hydropower plants, data sample energy production; histograms of installed capacity, 
gross head and mean annual production 
 
Small Hydropower Projects with Long-Term Production Data 
This data group includes 15 projects with a total actual mean annual production of about 217 GWh. 
The actual installed capacities (at the generator) cover a range between 410 kW and 9.2 MW. The 
projects were commissioned between 1962 and 1973 and the actual production data records cover 
a period of at least 43 years. All projects are located in Switzerland.  
Large Hydropower Projects with Long-Term Production Data 
Actual and estimated production data of 24 projects was collected and integrated in the data 
sample. The actual mean annual production of these power plants is about 5’086 GWh, which is a 
share of about 13% in total Swiss hydropower production in 2015 (2015: 39’486 GWh). 
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The sizes of the power plants vary between an installed capacity (at generator) of 13 MW and 
288 MW. The plants started operation in the years between 1962 and 1978. The production data 
covers a period from 21 to 54 years.  
5.5 Results and Discussion on Cost Overruns 
This section is structured as follows. The first subsection discusses cost overrun for small 
hydropower projects in Switzerland and includes a cost overrun analysis by planning stages. The 
second subsection covers the cost estimation performance in large hydropower projects and makes 
a comparison with results from previous studies. Finally, the qualities of cost estimates for small and 
large hydropower projects are compared. 
5.5.1 Cost Overrun of Small Hydropower Plants 
The analysis of the cost estimates for concession or construction projects (Planning Phase 2) and of 
the actual costs leads to following findings.  
About 53% of the small hydropower projects suffer a cost overrun. The empirical distribution of cost 
overruns shows a very low median of 2%. This indicates a reliable estimation of the costs. The 
average cost overrun of 18% is strongly influenced by high cost overrun cases. About 24% of the 
projects suffered a cost overrun of more than 20%. 10% of the projects even had cost overruns of 
more than 50%. The fat tail of the density trace supports this finding. 
The very high standard deviation of 42% indicates a very large variation in reliability of estimates for 
costs. These findings are summarized in Table 6 (Planning Phase 2 column). 
Swiss standards (SIA, 2014) provide a target value for the accuracy of construction cost estimates. 
According to these standards, a construction or concession project should lead to an accuracy of 
construction cost estimation of ±20%. The major portion of the small hydropower projects (76%) 
meet this criterion. However, there is a clear trend towards underestimation of construction costs.  
Cost Overrun and Planning Phases 
Typically, the accuracy of cost estimates increases with the progress of the planning work, as data 
from site investigations or additional information get available, more detailed drawings for bills of 
quantities can be established, details of construction programs can be elaborated etc.  
Beside this aspect, recent academic works argue that these technical reasons can only explain a 
minor portion of cost overestimation. Flyvbjerg documented in his work (2002) that large 
engineering projects have a significant lack of accuracy in forecasting costs, demand etc. Based on 
large data samples of projects, he argues that the main reasons for this inaccuracy are optimistic 
bias and strategic misrepresentation. It is argued that psychological and political-economic 
explanations much better account for inaccurate forecasts than technical explanations.  
If strategic misrepresentation and optimistic bias are a main source for overestimating a project’s 
performance, it could be expected that the underestimation of costs would be in a similar range or 
even tend to increase over the planning phases. In early planning phases, when projects have to be 
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pushed to be continued, one could expect a similar or higher portion of strategic misrepresentation 
or optimistic bias than in later design stages. In such case, technical explanations would be of minor 
importance.  
The dataset established for this work, allows the cost overrun to be analyzed based on cost 
estimates made at an early design stage, corresponding to the data provided for the registration of 
the feed-in tariff request, and on cost estimates elaborated for the construction or concession 
project.  
The data is organized in two groups. Planning Phase 1 contains data from the registration of the 
feed-in tariff request, which corresponds typically to the conceptual design phase. Planning Phase 2 
contains all cost estimates of construction or concession projects.  
The average cost overrun based on the cost estimated in Planning Phase 1 is 28% with substantial 
variation around that mean value. Standard deviation (S.D.) is 55% and the density trace shows a 
fat tail (see Figure 18).  
The accuracy of cost estimation increases over the planning stages. Cost estimates prepared for the 
construction or concession projects (Planning Phase 2) are on average 18% lower than the actual 
costs.  
The likelihood that projects suffer a cost overrun decreases only slightly from 56% to 53% from 
Planning Phase 1 to Planning Phase 2. The Mann-Whitney U test indicates that there is not enough 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is a positive shift in the median (p=0.6181, h=0). 
However, the variation of the cost overrun is reduced along the design progress, as the statistical 
key data show: S.D. decreases from 55% to 42%; IQR decreases from 41% to 20% (see Table 6). In 
addition, extreme cost overruns leading to the fat tail and the number of outliers are reduced (see 
Figure 18 and Figure 19). This is also supported by key figures on extreme cost overruns. During 
Planning Phase 2, only 3% of the projects suffer a cost overrun of 100% or more, whereas in the 
case of cost estimates prepared in early design stages, the actual costs will double in 9% of the 
projects.  
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Figure 18: Density trace of cost overrun (actual/estimated) for small hydropower projects in 
Switzerland 
 
 
Figure 19: Box plots of cost overrun of small hydropower projects and two groups of planning 
phases; central mark indicates the median, bottom and top edges indicate the 25th and 75th 
percentiles, whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not considered outliers (Whisker 
corresponds to approximately ±2.7 S.D.), outliers are plotted as crosses. 
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Table 6: Small hydropower projects: Statistical key data of cost overrun, Planning Phases 1 and 2 
  Planning Phase 1 Planning Phase 2 
n 85 30 
Portfolio [CHF million] 311 208 
Max actual costs [CHF million] 25 58.7 
Min actual costs [CHF million] 0.03 0.10 
Max installed capacity [MW] 14.0 11.3 
Min installed capacity [kW] 1.8 4.0 
Average 28% 18% 
Median 9% 2% 
S.D. 55% 42% 
Q1 -1% 0% 
Q3 40% 20% 
IQR 41% 20% 
Cost overrun 56% 53% 
More than 100% 9% 3% 
More than 50% 19% 10% 
More than 20% 41% 24% 
 
The data of small hydropower projects indicates that cost overruns are mainly caused by technical 
reasons, as the continued underestimation of the costs of the progressing planning phases could 
not be detected. The following results of the comparison of cost overruns for Planning Phase 1 
versus Planning Phase 2 support this finding: 
 The median drops from 9% to 2% 
 Average cost overrun decreases from 28% to 18% 
 There is a decrease in high or extreme cost overruns 
 Empirical distribution is getting narrower and skewness towards adverse outcomes is 
reduced. 
5.5.2 Cost Overrun of Large Hydropower Projects 
A major part of the large hydropower projects in Switzerland (67%) suffered a cost overrun. The 
average cost overrun is 15% with a high variation in values (S.D. 27%). The median and average cost 
overruns are very close to one another.  
Empirical distribution of cost overruns typically shows a skewness towards adverse outcomes. 
However, the density trace of the analyzed data sample follows closely the shape of a normal 
distribution (see Figure 20).  
38% of the projects suffered a cost overrun of more than 20%, 9% more than 50% and no project in 
the data sample shows a cost overrun higher than 100%. 
The results of the analysis for large hydropower projects are given in Table 7.  
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Figure 20: Density trace of cost overrun (actual/estimated) for large hydropower projects in 
Switzerland 
 
Table 7: Large hydropower projects: Statistical key data of cost overrun 
n 20 
Portfolio [CHF2015 million] 14'114 
Max actual costs [CHF2015 million] 5'118 
Min actual costs [CHF2015 million] 39 
Max installed capacity [MW] 735 
Min installed capacity [MW] 13 
Average 15% 
Median 15% 
S.D. 27% 
Q1 -4% 
Q3 35% 
IQR 39% 
Cost overrun 67% 
More than 100% 0% 
More than 50% 9% 
More than 20% 38% 
 
Inflation  
Inflation can have a significant impact on the project costs. This is also the case in an economically 
and politically stable country such as Switzerland.  
Due to the long duration of hydropower projects, especially when comparing figures from the 
planning phase against the actual costs reported after the commissioning date, inflation effects can 
lead to significant cost variation and are a source of economic uncertainty. Therefore, poor 
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prediction of inflation is often an important component of cost overruns as mentioned by WCD 
(2001).  
The comparison of cost overrun for large hydropower plants in current and constant price terms 
shows a shift from 31% to 15% for the average cost overrun. 
 
 
Figure 21: Density trace of cost overrun for large hydropower projects in current and constant 
Swiss Francs 
Obviously the best way to reduce the risk of inflation is to select projects with short implementation 
schedules. In this respect, small hydropower projects show less exposure to inflation-induced cost 
overruns than large schemes.  
However, the small and large hydropower projects in our data base were realized in different 
periods. Small hydropower plants in the data sample were constructed between 2008 and 2013 
with almost no local inflation (CPI lower than 1%). The values of the large hydropower projects cover 
the period from 1947 until 1969. In this period, inflation rates were significantly higher than those 
during the analyzed period of small projects. Therefore, the cost analysis excludes the effect of 
inflation and the comparison of the values of small and large hydropower schemes were carried out 
in constant Swiss Francs. 
Comparison with Other Studies 
The results confirm the finding of previous studies that the main portion of large hydropower 
projects face cost overruns. The data sample of Swiss projects shows that 67% of the projects suffer 
cost overruns. This is very close to the figures presented by previous studies, which are all in the 
range of about 3 out of 4 projects.  
However, the results clearly do not confirm the magnitude and variability of cost escalations shown 
in the previous studies.  
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A significant divergence of the mean values is observed, which can be explained by extreme figures, 
which skew the results significantly.  
Ansar et al. (2014) found that the actual costs were on average 96% higher than the estimated costs. 
The density trace shows an extremely long tail to adverse outcomes and the data sample includes 
projects with extreme cost overruns of up to more than 5’000%.  
Sovacool et al. (2014) present a mean cost overrun of 77% with extreme cost overruns reaching up 
to 513% (estimated for the project Sardar Sarovar Dam in India). No explanations are given on the 
specific cases leading to this magnitude of cost overrun. 
The WCD (2001) shows a mean cost overrun of 56% with values up to 180%.  
Bacon and Besant-Jones (1998) came to a mean cost overrun of 27%. It has to be noted that this 
study excluded outliers based on a statistical approach and the data sample included projects with 
a maximum cost overrun of up to approximately 122%.  
Based on the comparison (see also Table 8), the following conclusions are made: 
- A majority of the large hydropower projects face cost overruns. This is supported by the data 
of the Swiss projects as well as by previous studies. 
- The established data sample for this study indicates that the average cost overrun is 
significantly below the figures shown by previous studies (e.g. Ansar et al., 2014; Sovacool 
et al., 2014). 
- All studies show a large variability in cost overrun. 
- A major difference exists in terms of extreme cost overruns. In the sample of Swiss large 
hydropower projects, the maximum cost overrun is 68%, whereas other studies report 
figures up to more than 5’000% (Ansar et al. 2014). 
The large differences also highlight the importance and challenge to provide a representative data 
sample. The very high variability of the data samples indicate that a large sample size is required to 
come to meaningful conclusions. 
In addition, it is unknown how other studies dealt with changes in project scope during the 
implementation phase. Such changes can have a significant impact on the project costs as well as 
on the benefits of a project. Cost overrun estimates should only include additional costs that do not 
lead to an increase in income from energy production. More specifically, it can be expected that 
projects undergoing major changes in installed capacity or active storage will produce higher 
benefits. In the data sample of Swiss projects, this aspect was taken into account. However, it is 
unknown how previous studies dealt with project changes linked to an increase in benefits. 
Typically, no detailed cost breakdowns are available, as this information is in general confidential. 
This also limits the possibility to analyze cost escalations for specific salient features of a hydropower 
project, such as underground work for waterways, civil works at dam or powerhouse. 
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Table 8: Key data of studies analysing cost overruns of large hydropower projects 
Study n Projects 
with cost 
overrun 
Cost overrun 
   
Average Median S.D. Max. Comments 
Large 
hydropower 
plants -
Switzerland 
20 67% 15% 15% 27% 68% - Limited to Swiss 
projects 
- Inflation-adjusted 
- Hydropower plants only 
- Not limited to schemes 
with large dams 
Bacon and 
Besant-
Jones 
(1998) 
71 appr. 75% 
(estimated 
from 
frequency 
plot) 
27% - 38% (appr. 
122%) 
 
- Global data base 
- Projects mainly in 
developing countries 
with loans from WB 
and IDA 
- Incl. inflation 
- Omission of projects 
with an actual to 
estimated cost ratio of 
more than 4 S.D. from 
the mean of the 
remaining points 
- Max cost overrun lies 
within 2.5 S.D. from the 
mean 
WCD (2001) 81 appr. 75% 
(3 out of 4 
dams) 
56% - - 180% - Global data base 
- Inflation-adjusted 
- Sample also includes 
non-hydropower dams 
Ansar et al. 
(2014) 
245 appr. 75% 
(3 out of 4 
dams) 
96% 27% - 
 
(appr. 
5’000%) 
- Global data base 
- Inflation-adjusted 
- Sample also includes 
non-hydropower 
projects 
- Limited to plants with a 
dam height > 15 m 
Sovacool et 
al. (2014) 
61 77% 71% 30% 112% 513% - Global data base 
- Inflation-adjusted (all 
projects based on 
inflation from the 
Statistical Abstracts of 
the U.S.) 
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Another issue is the adjustment for inflation in the host country, or inflation in foreign countries if 
finance or resources are imported. This can have a major effect on cost escalations. Typically, 
inflation adjustments are based on publicly available consumer price indexes. However, inflation in 
the construction sector does not necessarily follow the inflation levels of other goods or services.  
The method of data collection is basically driven by which data items are available. Private investors 
are in general sensitive to sharing project data with the public or academia. It has to be noted that 
construction cost estimates published by investors or project developers are linked to strategic 
considerations because of their potential impact on the tender process. Projects financed by the 
World Bank (WB) or other international development agencies (IDA) are often located in countries 
that face high political and market uncertainties. This raises the question how representative these 
projects are for all hydropower projects.  
5.5.3 Comparison of Cost Overrun of Small and Large Hydropower Projects 
The focal point of this chapter is comparing cost overruns between small and large hydropower 
projects. 
The general assumption that small hydropower projects are less exposed to cost overruns than large 
hydropower projects is not supported by the data available to us. The average cost overruns of small 
and large projects are in a similar range. Large projects suffer a mean cost overrun of about 15%, 
whereas small hydropower projects face a cost escalation of about 18%. 
However, major differences in empirical distributions can be observed. Whereas the density trace 
of small projects shows a narrow distribution around a median of 2% and a long tail to adverse 
outcomes, the density trace of large projects almost follows a normal distribution with a median of 
15%. 
The comparison leads to following main conclusions: 
- Small projects tend to have more extreme cost overruns. The density trace of small plants 
shows a much longer tail to adverse outcomes.  
- The chance for small projects to have a cost overrun is smaller than for large projects. The 
costs of small hydropower plants were underestimated for about 1 out of 2 projects. 67% of 
the large projects suffered cost overruns. 
- For small hydropower plants, cost underestimation is almost as likely as cost overestimation. 
This is clearly not the case for large hydropower projects. 
- The average cost overruns are in a similar range. 
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Figure 22: Density trace of cost overrun for small (SHP) and large hydropower projects (LHP)  
 
Figure 23: Box plot of cost overrun of small (SHP) and large hydropower projects (LHP) ; central 
mark indicates the median, bottom and top edges indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles, whiskers 
extend to the most extreme data points not considered outliers (Whisker corresponds to 
approximately ±2.7 S.D.), outliers are plotted as crosses. 
5.6 Results and Discussion on Energy Production Forecasts 
5.6.1 Introduction 
The second main factor influencing significantly the overall performance of a hydropower plant 
beside construction costs is energy production. Energy production estimates are also subject to a 
number of uncertainties, some of which are caused by long-term hydrological uncertainties. 
Uncertainties in hydrological forecasts may stem from errors in the measured data, interpretation 
of incomplete data, errors and simplifications inherent in the hydrological model structure and 
errors and uncertainty due to the values of the model parameters (Refsgaard and Storm, 1990), or 
from potential climate change (see Chapter 4.2). Beside hydrological uncertainties, the hydraulic 
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design and water management (incl. sediment management, hydraulic losses, operation pattern, 
release of compensation flow etc.) and the reliability of the hydro and electromechanical equipment 
can lead to overestimation of the production figures. 
The performance of energy forecasts has been analyzed by comparison of actual versus estimated 
energy production. Production overestimation is expressed as the actual mean energy production 
minus the estimated mean energy production in per cent of the estimated mean energy production.  
5.6.2 Energy Production Forecast of Small Hydropower Plants 
The following chapter is structured as follows. The first subsection analyses the overall performance 
of the mean annual energy production estimates of small hydropower plants in Switzerland. The 
focal question is the level of accuracy of production estimates. In addition, the relation between the 
accuracy of estimates and the plant size of small hydropower schemes is investigated. 
The second subsection compares energy production estimates for greenfield projects against those 
for rehabilitation or extension projects. A potential source of uncertainty is often the limited 
availability of hydrological data. Some of the small hydropower plants in Switzerland are planned in 
ungauged catchments. Therefore, it could be expected that rehabilitation projects have better 
estimates than greenfield projects because of the availability of operational data that can be used 
for the analysis of the historical inflow.  
The third subsection compares the accuracy of production estimates for pure hydropower plants 
and for multipurpose schemes. Studies on the performance of international large hydro dams 
indicate that hydropower schemes tends to meet the target value more often than multipurpose 
schemes (WCD, 2001). 
Finally, early-life failure of small hydropower plants is analyzed.  
A limitation in the following analysis is that the operational data records cover only one to five years. 
Therefore, the analysis allows to identify some general trends only. Conclusions on long-term effects 
should be derived carefully because of the relatively short production periods.  
Energy Production 
The data shows a general high tendency for overestimating the energy production. In 7 out of 10 
projects, the estimated energy production was below actual generation.  
The data sample of small hydropower plants leads to a bell-shaped empirical distribution around an 
average production overestimation of 14% (see Figure 25). The key data are summarized in Table 9. 
  
 59 
Table 9: Small hydropower projects: Statistical key data of production overestimation 
n 264 
Total estimated production [GWh] 572 
Total actual production [GWh] 544 
Average overestimation  14% 
S.D. 27% 
Median 13% 
Projects with overestimation 69% 
More than 20% 38% 
More than 50% 10% 
 
The comparison of the total actual and estimated production values shows low divergence (4%). 
This can be explained by the fact that larger projects with higher production figures had much better 
estimates. A comparison of the production overestimation by plant sizes supports this finding.  
The installed capacity and the actual mean production have been selected as indicators for the plant 
size. Figure 24 shows production overestimation for different groups of installed capacities (Box Plot 
A) and different groups of actual mean annual production (Box Plot B). 
Overestimation of production decreases significantly with increasing installed capacity (see Figure 
24, Box Plot A). The data is categorized into four groups. Very small hydropower plants with an 
installed capacity of less than 100 kW (GR-IC 1) show an average production overestimation of 20% 
(median 18%). For projects with an installed capacity from 100 kW to 500 kW (GR-IC 2), the 
estimated production was on average 9% higher than actual generation (median 10%). Productions 
with an installed capacity of 500 kW to 1 MW (GR-IC 3) show only 6% (median 8%) and projects with 
an installed capacity higher than 1 MW (GR-IC 4) achieved the target production value (median -
1%).  
A similar strong increase in the accuracy of energy production estimation can be observed when 
plotting production overestimation versus actual mean annual production (PA). Projects with an 
annual production less than 200 MWh (GR-Pr 1) suffered highest production overestimation. Mean 
production overestimation is 26% (median 26%). Projects with a mean annual production from 200 
MWh to 1000 MWh then have a much better performance of energy forecast. Mean production 
overestimation drops to about 10%. Projects with an energy production of 1000 MWh or more have 
a similar mean production overestimation, GR-Pr 3 about 2% and GR-Pr 4 approximately 3%, but 
group 3 shows a higher variability.  
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A) B) 
  
Figure 24: Box plots of production overestimation for different plant sizes; Box plot A) Plant size 
indicated by installed capacity categorized into four groups (GR) GR-IC 1: IC < 100 kW, GR-IC 2: 
100 kW ≤ IC < 500 kW, GR-IC 3: 500 kW ≤ IC < 1000 kW, GR-IC 4: IC ≥ 1000 kW; Box plot B) Plant 
size indicated by actual mean annual production (PA) categorized into four groups GR-Pr 1: PA < 
200 MWh, GR-Pr 2: 200 MWh ≤ PA < 1000 MWh, GR-Pr 3: 1000 MWh ≤ PA < 5000 MWh, GR-Pr 4: 
PA ≥ 5000 MWh; central mark indicates the median, bottom and top edges indicate the 25th and 
75th percentiles, whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not considered outliers 
(Whisker corresponds to approximately ±2.7 S.D.), outliers are plotted as crosses. 
Energy Production of Rehabilitation and Greenfield Projects 
It can be expected that rehabilitation projects have better estimates than greenfield projects as 
operational data can be used for the analysis of the historical inflow. Therefore, the performances 
of production estimates for rehabilitation and greenfield projects have been compared.  
Figure 25 shows the comparison of the density trace of all projects in the data sample, both 
rehabilitation and greenfield plants. No significant changes can be observed. Average values lie 
between 12% (greenfield projects) and 17% (rehabilitation projects) and there is no major difference 
as to median values (median of greenfield projects 10%, median of rehabilitation projects 16%).  
The available data do not support the hypothesis that rehabilitation projects have significantly 
better estimates than greenfield projects and this is also supported by the results obtained in the 
Mann-Whitney U test (p=0.187, h=0). 
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Figure 25: Density trace of production overestimation for all projects in the data sample, 
rehabilitation and greenfield projects  
 
Energy Production of Singlepurpose Hydropower and Multipurpose Projects 
The study of WCD (2001) describes that large dams constructed for pure energy production tend to 
meet generation targets more often than multipurpose projects. This trend has been checked for 
small hydropower plants in Switzerland.  
Figure 26 shows the density trace of hydropower and multipurpose plants. Projects designed for 
pure energy production have a mean production overestimation of 18% (median 17%). In contrast 
to hydropower projects, the estimation performance of multipurpose schemes was on average 
closer to target (average 12%, median 5%). However, the Mann-Whitney U test indicates that there 
is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis that there is a positive shift in the median 
(p=0.379, h=0).  
About 75% of the hydropower plants in the sample (n = 85) did not achieve the estimated energy 
production, whereas 8 out of in total 13 multipurpose projects in the sample were below target 
(62%).  
The trend found for large dams according to which hydropower projects tend to have production 
figures closer to target than multipurpose projects cannot be observed in the data sample of small 
hydropower plants. On the contrary, the data indicates a trend towards less production 
overestimation for multipurpose projects. 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
-120% -100% -80% -60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
D
e
n
si
ty
 T
ra
ce
Production Overestimation
All Projects
Rehabilitation Projects
Greenfield Projects
 62 
 
Figure 26: Density trace of production overestimation for all projects in the data sample, 
hydropower and multipurpose plants  
 
Hydrological Production Potential during the Period 2010 to 2014 
Energy production estimates for hydropower plants are typically covering a forecast period of 25 to 
80 years. In contrast, the data sample analyzed in this study covers only production periods up to a 
maximum of 5 years (2010 to 2014).  
Hydrological variation over the period from 2010 until 2014 can influence the analysis of production 
overestimation. The index of potential production published annually by the Swiss electricity 
statistics (BFE, 2011 - 2015) was used as a reference of the mid-term hydrological variation for this 
period. As small hydropower plants typically have no significant storage capacity and the main 
portion of energy production is generated during summer months, the index of potential production 
for the summer periods (IPPS) was selected.  
The IPPs for the period 2010 to 2014 was very close to 1 (mean IPPs 2010 to 2014: 1.02), meaning 
that this period was close to the long-term average hydrological period in Switzerland.  
Figure 27 shows the index of potential production and the ratio of estimated to actual annual energy 
production in the relevant years. Production overestimation can be observed in all years, also in 
years with an IPPs above 1 (i.e. 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014). Thus, even in years with a hydrological 
production potential greater than the long-term reference, the estimated energy production could 
not be reached on average. The ratio of the actual to estimated energy follows the yearly fluctuation 
of the IPPs. 
The conclusion is that the hydrological inflow for the period 2010-2014 was very close to the long-
term average and consequently there is no evidence that production overestimation is caused by a 
below-average discharge period.  
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Figure 27: Comparison between the Index of Potential Production for summer periods (IPPs) and 
the ratio of actual to estimated average annual energy (Pact/Pest) 
 
Early-Life Failure and Energy Production 
Figure 28 shows production overestimation as a function of the number of years in operation. Values 
summarized in group 1Y refer to the first year of operation, values categorized in 2Y are production 
overestimations for the first and second operation years, and so on.  
As shown in the chart, the production values in the first year of operation are significantly below 
the target value, and power plants with a longer operation period tend to be closer to the targets. 
In the first year of operation, energy production was on average 29% below the long-term estimates. 
After the second production year, the values are closer to the estimated generation targets with 
production overestimation ranging between 8% and 13%. 
A possible explanation for such relatively poor performance in the first production years is early-life 
failure. Early-life failures are most probably related to the electromechanical and hydromechanical 
equipment and maybe also to inadequate operation shortly after commissioning. Most probably, 
poor hydraulic design or inadequate construction is less relevant as it can be expected that such 
issues would affect the production figures over a period of more than 1-2 years.  
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Figure 28: Box plot of production overestimation as a function of the number of years in 
operation; 1Y = energy production of 1st production year, 2Y= average of energy production of 1st 
and 2nd production years,…,5Y= average of energy production from 1st up to 5th production 
years; central mark indicates the median, bottom and top edges indicate the 25th and 75th 
percentiles, whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not considered outliers (Whisker 
corresponds to approximately ±2.7 S.D.), outliers are plotted as crosses. 
 
Comparison with Long-Term Production Data 
The data for small hydropower schemes shows an overestimation of energy production in the mid-
term. However, the time horizon is clearly limited and allows no conclusions on the long-term 
performance of estimates. That is because the data covers a production period of up to 5 years only 
and because actual production especially in the first production year was significantly below the 
estimate. 
To provide an indication of the quality of long-term forecasts for small hydropower plants, an 
additional data sample was established. All plants included in the sample had an installed capacity 
between 420 kW and 9.2 MW and the production period covered at least 43 years.  
Table 10 summarizes the statistical key data. Almost half of the projects in the data group exceeded 
the targets set for power production. But the production was slightly overestimated also in the long 
term. Production overestimation was 5% on average, and about 20% of the projects in the sample 
achieved less than 80% of the estimated long-term production.  
It has to be noted that the sample size was relatively small (n= 15). In addition, it was not possible 
to obtain long-term production data for power plants with an installed capacity below 300 kW. The 
analysis of the production figures for a mid-term period shows that especially such small 
hydropower plants are subject to higher production overestimation than larger projects.  
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However, with account being taken of these limitations, a tendency for overestimating the 
production can be observed, which supports the findings obtained with the sample that includes 
projects with mid-term production data. 
Table 10: Small hydropower projects: Statistical key data of long-term production overestimation 
n 15 
Total estimated production [GWh] 228 
Total actual production [GWh] 217 
Average production overestimation  5% 
S.D. 14% 
Median 0% 
Projects with overestimation 47% 
More than 20% 20% 
More than 50% 0% 
 
5.6.3 Energy Production Forecasts of Large Hydropower Plants 
Large hydropower plants in Switzerland in our sample (n=24) have on average exceeded the 
production estimates. For about 4 out of 5 projects, actual production was higher than the 
estimated values published before commissioning. The estimated or target figures were exceeded 
by about 8% on average. 
Table 11: Large hydropower projects: Statistical key data of long-term production overestimation 
n 24 
Total estimated production [GWh] 4'699 
Total actual production [GWh] 5'086 
Average production overestimation  -8% 
S.D. 10% 
Median -6% 
Projects with overestimation 21% 
More than 20% 0% 
 
In contrast to the study by WCD (2001), the sample of the Swiss large hydropower plants show a 
higher performance in energy forecasts in terms of frequency of exceedance of the power 
generation target, average production overestimation, and variability of the results.  
In contrast to the samples of small hydropower plants, there has been no downward bias in energy 
production estimates. The Mann-Whitney U test indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of equal 
medians (p=0.0072, h=1) and supports the finding that there is a positive shift of production 
overestimation for large and small hydropower projects.  
A majority of large hydropower schemes exceeded the production targets by 8% on average. In 
contrast, about half of the projects in the sample of small hydropower plants reached the 
production targets and the mid-term and long-term production data show an average production 
overestimation of 14%, or 5%, respectively. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
The first objective of this study was to analyze the extent of cost overruns typically suffered by small 
hydropower projects.  
The analysis of cost overruns of small hydropower projects show that there has been a large 
downward bias in the estimation of construction costs. Cost overrun is about 18%. The median 
shortfall of cost estimates was only 2%. However, the results show a very high variability. About 24% 
of the projects suffered a cost overrun of more than 20%, and 10% of the facilities had a cost overrun 
of even more than 50%. In addition, almost half of the projects had lower actual costs than 
estimated.  
The second main objective was to analyze whether large Swiss hydropower projects face cost 
overruns similar to those of international projects. 
The established data base of Swiss projects confirms the finding of previous international research 
studies as far as the trend of chance of cost overrun is concerned (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 1998; 
WCD, 2001; Ansar et al., 2014; Sovacool et al., 2014). In about 67% of the projects the actual costs 
exceeded the estimates.  
The average cost overrun is however significantly below the figures derived from global databases. 
The data sample of Swiss projects shows an average cost overrun of 15%, whereas previous studies 
presented figures in the range of 27% up to 96%. 
The main reason for the difference is most probably that the present study analyses Swiss projects 
only. Hydropower projects in Switzerland face much lower commercial and political uncertainties, 
compared with some of the other countries. Uncertainties in Swiss projects are mainly stemming 
from project-specific uncertainties. That is not the case for all other studies, which included projects 
from all over the world with a wide range of different political and commercial uncertainties. It has 
to be noted that part of the projects included in the previous studies were financed by the World 
Bank or other international development agencies. Such projects are often located in countries that 
face high political and market uncertainties.  
Another crucial aim of this study was to investigate the assumption that the cost overrun of small 
hydropower schemes is generally lower than that of large hydropower plans. 
The comparison of large and small hydropower projects leads to the following main findings:  
 Average cost overruns in small and large projects are quite similar. The average cost 
underestimation of small hydropower projects was 18%, and for large hydropower plants 
the average cost overrun was 15%.  
 Small projects tend to have more extreme cost overruns than large facilities. The density 
trace of small plants shows a much longer tail to adverse outcomes. Compared with large 
hydropower plants, the variability of cost overrun was much higher.  
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 The chance for a small project to suffer a cost overrun is much smaller than for large projects. 
Costs for small hydropower plants were underestimated for about 1 out of 2 projects. 67% 
of the large projects suffered a cost overrun. 
It is concluded that the cost estimations have been overoptimistic for small as well as large 
hydropower projects. However, a major difference can be observed in the empirical distributions of 
the cost overruns. Small projects show a higher variability of cost overrun compared with large 
projects. A possible explanation for this high variability of the performance of construction cost 
estimates are the limited engineering resources typically involved in the planning and execution 
phases of small hydropower plants.  
In hydropower, the size of the scheme is not necessarily linked to complexity. Small hydropower 
schemes require the same technical disciplines as large schemes such as geology, hydrology, 
hydraulics, civil engineering, electro and hydromechanical engineering, and similar interfaces have 
to be taken into account. Since the available budget is usually limited, the number of engineers is 
often reduced, leading to the effect that engineers in charge have to also cover disciplines outside 
their core competencies. Large projects on the contrary can rely on a team of relevant specialists 
and experts and also on a completely different setup to ensure a high level of quality control is 
typically established. The engagement of the different parties, including contractors, owners and 
lenders’ engineers leads to much higher engineering standards compared with small projects.  
The final objective of this study was to analyze the performance of energy forecasts for small and 
large hydropower projects. For this purpose, the actual versus the estimated energy production was 
compared.  
The data of small hydropower plants covering a production period up to 5 years shows a generally 
high tendency for overestimating the energy production. In 7 out of 10 projects, estimated energy 
production was above actual generation and average production overestimation was 14%. 
Small hydropower projects were suffering a slight production overestimation also in the long term. 
The production of large hydropower projects, on the contrary, was on average 8% higher than the 
estimated figures. About 80% of the projects reached or exceeded the production targets.  
In addition, production overestimation shows a relationship to plant size. Larger projects in the 
group of small hydropower plants tend to have more accurate energy forecasts than smaller 
projects. Especially very small projects with an installed capacity in the range of 100 kW, or projects 
with an annual production lower than 200 MWh, tend to lead to overestimation of the energy 
production.  
There is no technical reason why production estimates for small hydropower projects would lead to 
lower accuracy, compared with estimates elaborated for large projects. For both types of 
hydropower projects, uncertainties in the hydrological forecasts may originate from errors in the 
measured data, interpretation of incomplete data, errors and simplifications inherent in the 
hydrological model structure and errors and uncertainty due to the values of the model parameters 
or inadequate consideration of climatic changes. Also, the quality of the hydraulic design and of the 
water management study (incl. sediment management, operation pattern, release of compensation 
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flow etc.), or the performance of hydro and electromechanical equipment can affect the production 
estimates for both large and small hydropower plants.  
The question is whether the above listed potential causes are dealt with at a same level of detail. 
Hydrological studies of large hydropower plants are typically based on long-term hydrometric 
measurements and comprehensive hydrological studies. In contrast, small hydropower plants tend 
to be more often placed in ungauged catchments and to have limited resources available to 
establish a comprehensive hydrological study. Besides that, additional errors can be caused by the 
project team’s limited experience in hydraulic design or water management. Finally, poor 
construction can’t be excluded either. 
5.7.1 Policy Implications 
The methods for estimating the construction costs and energy production of small hydropower 
projects in Switzerland have been overoptimistic. Cost overruns of small hydropower plants show a 
large variability, and a tendency for energy production overestimation can be observed. From this 
perspective it can be concluded that “small hydropower projects are not always beautiful”. 
If cost overrun is formulated as specific cost overrun per installed capacity, it becomes apparent 
that small hydropower projects have a higher specific cost overrun than large hydropower projects 
(see Table 12).  
Table 12: Specific cost overrun of large and small hydropower projects 
  
Small 
hydropower 
projects 
Large 
hydropower 
projects 
n 30 20 
Portfolio [CHF million] 208 14'114 
Total installed capacity [MW] 33 2'432 
Specific construction costs [CHF million/MW] 6.3 5.8 
Average cost overrun 18% 15% 
Specific average cost overrun [CHF million/MW] 1.2 0.9 
 
The difference is mainly due to the lower specific construction costs of large hydropower projects 
(5.8 million CHF/MW) compared to small hydropower projects (6.3 million CHF/MW); in other 
words, as the average construction costs per installed capacity of larger schemes are lower than for 
small hydropower projects, less cost overrun per installed capacity is to be expected.  
The analysis of cost overruns of the small hydropower plants reported in this study indicates 
potential for improvement, especially in terms of the methods applied for estimating the 
construction costs, including the quality of design, and in terms of appropriate approaches to control 
actual construction costs.  
From a technical perspective, no reason can be given why very high cost overruns leading to a long 
tail to adverse outcomes were avoided for large projects but not for small facilities. Most probably, 
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this is related to lower risk awareness or maybe to higher risk acceptance of the project teams in 
charge of small hydropower projects.  
In a first step, risk awareness should be increased in small projects. Beside the classical method of 
communication of risks affecting small hydropower plants to the relevant authorities and project 
developers, it would be beneficial to foresee a project-specific assessment of small power plants 
with cost overruns exceeding a certain benchmark. A cost overrun benchmark of 20% could be 
applied as target value of the accuracy of construction cost estimates according to the Swiss 
standards (SIA 103, 2014). It is expected that most causes are related to inadequate engineering 
and not to unpredictable site conditions.  
In a second step, the possibilities to improve the overall quality of the design and construction works 
of small hydropower projects should be evaluated. One option could be to establish a supporting 
system including measures to ensure adequate quality of both project design and execution. That 
could be achieved by providing an adequate engineering budget.  
Another crucial finding of this study is that the Swiss power plants in our sample have faced 
significantly less cost overrun than projects from previous international studies. When taking into 
account the fact that the actual production rates of most of the hydropower plants were above 
targets, the assumption that large hydropower schemes are typically highly risky structures must be 
questioned.  
5.7.2 Implication for Design and Planning 
The following sections describe possible ways to incorporate uncertainties of construction cost and 
energy production forecasts into the evaluation of a project.  
Adjustment Factors 
The analysis shows that the methods of estimating construction costs tend to be overoptimistic. For 
a majority of the hydropower projects, the unforeseen additional construction costs could not be 
covered with the contingencies. A common approach is to estimate hydropower project cost 
contingency on the basis of predetermined guidelines. Often, single contingency or float values for 
different cost items are applied. The projects in the data base show that the foreseen contingencies 
on average were too low.  
One possibility is to increase contingencies. On the assumption that future projects will be similar 
to the projects in the data base, adjustment factors could be proposed. However, the large 
variability of cost overruns, especially for small hydropower projects, clearly shows the disadvantage 
of such an approach.  
In order to take the large variability of the results into account, the reference class forecast (RCF) 
technique can be applied. The RCF technique is part of the “outside view”. This method provides 
that decision makers apply an uplift or downlift to the estimated figures (“inside view”) in order to 
generate a de-biased “outside view” forecast, depending on the acceptable chance of not reaching 
the target figure (Flyvbjerg, 2008; Ansar et al., 2014).  
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A predictor for construction costs and energy production was derived from the findings of the 
investigations on small and large Swiss hydropower projects (see Figure 29 and Figure 30). The 
objective of this predictor is to adjust the biased construction cost or energy forecasts. It can be 
used as a basis for the creation of uncertainty profiles.  
Small and large hydropower projects are handled as reference classes. If a planner is willing to 
accept a 10% cost overrun chance, the required uplift will be 83% for a small hydropower project 
and 61% for a large hydropower project.  
Similar to the predictor for construction costs, adjustment factors were derived from the established 
data bases. If a chance of production overestimation of 25% is acceptable for small hydropower 
projects in the mid-term, the estimated energy production figures have to be multiplied by an 
adjustment factor of 0.7; for long-term estimates an adjustment factor of about 0.85 has to be 
chosen. For large hydropower projects, an adjustment factor of 1.0 corresponds to a 25% chance of 
production overestimation. However, adjustment factors for long-term energy production forecasts 
have to be interpreted carefully, as the data sample is relatively small. 
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A) B) 
  
Figure 29: Adjustment factors for construction costs as a function of the acceptable level of chance 
of cost overruns. A) Small hydropower projects (n=30), B) Large hydropower projects (n=20). 
A) B) 
  
C)  
 
 
Figure 30: Adjustment factors for energy production forecasts as a function of the acceptable level 
of chance of production overestimation. A) Small hydropower projects, mid-term (n=264), B) Small 
hydropower projects, long-term (n=15), C) Large hydropower projects, long-term (n=24), 
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Expected Net Present Value, Value at Gain and Value at Risk  
A more comprehensive project evaluation can be captured by the criteria of Expected Net Present 
Value (ENPV), Value at Risk (VaR) and Value at Gain (VaG) instead of the Net Present Value (see also 
Mun, 2006).  
VaR is defined as the maximum expected loss over a target horizon with a given level of confidence 
(Jorion, 1997). In contrast, VaG quantifies the performance in the upside scenarios.  
The basic procedure to produce project risk profiles (Monte Carlo Simulation) was proposed 
decades ago by Hertz (1964).  
In general, the following three-step approach can be applied: 
1. Development of probabilities for uncertain parameters  
2. Monte Carlo simulations to generate a set of input data for the economic model 
3. Evaluation and comparison of alternatives under the criteria of ENPV, VaR and VaG 
However, criteria such as ENPV, VaG and VaR have been rarely applied for hydropower projects 
because of the strong assumptions they impose on the underlying probability distributions.  
The datasets elaborated for this study allow the definition of probabilities based on empirical data. 
Table 13 gives the probability distributions fitted to the different samples of large and small 
hydropower projects in Switzerland.  
Table 13: Definition of probabilities of construction costs and energy production of small and large 
Swiss hydropower projects 
Factor Probability distribution Parameter 
Small hydropower projects     
Construction costs Generalized Extreme Value  shape parameter = 0.311717 
scale parameter = 0.169882 
location parameter = 1.00562 
Mid-term energy production Weibull  scale parameter = 0.951203 
shape parameter = 3.51844 
Long-term energy production Weibull  scale parameter = 1.00559 
shape parameter = 9.28587 
Large hydropower projects     
Construction costs Generalized Extreme Value  shape parameter = -0.265507 
scale parameter = 0.260957 
location parameter = 1.05859 
Long-term energy production Generalized Extreme Value  shape parameter = -0.140319 
scale parameter = 0.091807 
location parameter = 1.03486 
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Illustrative Example of Application 
A typical case has been developed in order to test the probabilistic evaluation of a project. The case 
represents a high-head run-of hydropower scheme in the Swiss Alps (see Chapter 8).  
The objective is to provide an evaluation of the economic performance by considering the 
uncertainties of construction costs and energy production forecasts. The key data of the 
hydropower plant and the calculated NPV based on the classical deterministic approach are given 
in Table 14. 
Table 14: Key data of case study 
Parameter Unit   
Design discharge (Qd) [m3/s] 4 
Max. generation discharge [m3/s] 5.4 
Gross head [m] 522 
Net head (Hn) [m] 511.3 
Specific hydraulic loss coefficient [-] 0.667 
E&M equipment efficiency (η) [-] 0.88 
Installed capacity (IC) [MW] 18 
Construction costs [CHF million] 47.1 
Annual energy production (PA) [GWh] 64.83 
NPV-deterministic [CHF million] 13.66 
 
It is assumed that the project developer is accepting a chance of 20% for both cost overrun and 
production overestimation: adjustment factors of 1.44 for construction costs and 0.99 for energy 
production were defined on the basis of the predictors shown in Figure 29 B) and Figure 30 C). 
Applying these factors gives adjusted construction costs of CHF 67.82 million and adjusted annual 
energy production of 64.18 GWh. Based on these figures, a DCF calculation was made, resulting in 
a negative NPV of about CHF -11 million. 
The other approach relies on the probability distributions fitted to our sample of large hydropower 
plants. General Extreme Value distributions as defined in Table 13 were applied to construction 
costs and energy production. 
Based on these distributions, 1000 runs consisting of construction costs and energy production were 
generated using the Monte Carlo method. 
Subsequently to the generation of the wide range of runs, the NPVr is calculated for each run. It is 
assumed that each of the runs has the same probability, which here is 1/1000 (pr). The following 
equation is used to calculate the ENPV. 
𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑉 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑟 ∙ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑟
1000
𝑛=1
 (10) 
 
Table 15 combines the results of the deterministic approach and those of the probabilistic 
evaluation. The deterministic NPV is only slightly above the ENPV. The chance that the realized NPV 
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exceeds the deterministic NPV is in the range of 50%. The VaR (P 10%) leads to CHF -8.9 million and 
the VaG (P 90%) suggests that this project can be economically very promising. As shown in Figure 
31, the chance that the project will lead to a negative NPV is about 23%. 
Table 15: Economic results for project evaluation 
Economic parameter Unit  
NPV - deterministic [CHF million] 13.7 
ENPV [CHF million] 11.7 
VaR (P 10%) [CHF million] -8.9 
VaG (P 90%) [CHF million] 31.3 
 
Compared with the estimation based on the predictor, which is a single-point estimation, a decision 
on whether or not further planning steps should be taken for this project will most likely turn out to 
be completely different. If the decision is based on the results derived from the adjustment factors, 
the project will be most probably stopped. The project will on the contrary most probably continue 
if the decision is made on the basis of the more comprehensive figures derived by Monte Carlo 
simulations.  
 
 
Figure 31: Cumulative distribution of NPV, Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) and deterministic 
NPV  
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Discussion 
Adjustment factors derived from the reference class forecast provides valuable information for the 
evaluation of the whole group of projects. In addition, it is a simple approach which can be easily 
applied by a project team. On the other hand, as it is a one-point estimation, it can lead to misleading 
conclusions. 
The criteria of ENPV, VaG and VaR allow for a more comprehensive evaluation of projects and 
project alternatives. The elaborated probability distribution provides an efficient and transparent 
way to incorporate uncertainties of construction costs and energy production into the evaluation 
process. 
It has to be noted that the distributions are based on historical data and that an application of these 
methods implies the assumption that future uncertainties will be similar to the uncertainties 
represented in the sample. This is especially crucial for energy production forecasts, as it is 
questionable whether the climate of the historical period will still be relevant for the operation time 
of new hydropower plant. This issue is getting more important in the light of the climate change. 
Another limitation of these approaches is that they cannot address project-specific uncertainties. If 
a decision needs to be made as to which design alternative should be used, a project-specific 
assessment will be required. This approach is described in the next chapter.  
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 Project-Specific Assessment of 
Uncertainties – Establishment of a Register of 
Uncertainties 
6.1 Introduction 
Uncertainties and especially downside risks of hydropower projects have for decades been the 
subject of discussion, typically a risk discussion. There are various academic studies and applied 
project reports dealing with this topic and mentioning project-specific risks. However, with a view 
to incorporate uncertainties into the design process, the following issues have been identified: 
 Uncertainties are discussed on a general level for large engineering projects, and specific 
hydropower issues are not mentioned explicitly. 
 The analysis is directed to specific sources of uncertainty only (such as uncertainties of 
hydrology associated with climate change). 
 Uncertainties of hydropower projects are discussed for specific project phases only, in most 
cases for the construction phase. 
 Uncertainties are limited to the negative effects. 
 Uncertainties are not linked to performance parameters. 
 Only uncertainties that can be quantified (incl. likelihoods or probabilities) have been 
considered. 
Based on literature research and brainstorming, uncertainties affecting hydropower projects were 
collected and combined in a register. The register gives an overview on the wide field of 
uncertainties affecting hydropower projects, from political uncertainties to site-specific 
uncertainties. The performance-oriented register of uncertainties shows the linkage between the 
uncertainties and the input factors of an economic evaluation of a project. The register can be used 
as a basis for the preparation of project-specific assessments of uncertainties.  
6.2 Literature Review 
Perry and Hayes (1985) 
Perry and Hayes have identified primary sources of risks in projects. These are physical, 
environmental, design, logistics, financial, legal, political, construction and operational risks. The 
authors argue that each of these primary sources of risks needs to be thoroughly considered in order 
to draw up a comprehensive project-specific list before the risk analysis and response can be 
elaborated. 
Cooper et al. (1985) 
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The paper by Cooper et al. (1985) discusses a risk analysis of a construction cost estimate for a large 
hydroelectric project. The aim of the study was to provide a check on the reliability of the cost 
estimate and the adequacy of the contingency allowance. The sources of risk were basically 
structured according to the line items of the cost estimate of each structure. The risks that affect 
specific line item costs were grouped into quantity risks, unit cost risks, schedule risks and global 
risks. The latter comprise labour rates, contractors’ profit margins and taxes. The effect of a risk on 
each item was assessed via distribution of proportional variations on the base-cost estimate for the 
item. However, the study focuses only on risks that might be considered as “normal” variations for 
projects. The common feature of “normal” risks is that they cannot cause long delays to the project. 
Abnormal or catastrophic risks were not considered, such as: 
 Major design changes 
 Site changes 
 Water charges  
 Labour problems 
 Land acquisition 
 Major floods 
 Jurisdictional and regulatory processes 
Goldsmith (1993) 
Goldsmith’s book on the economic and financial analysis of hydropower projects (1993) mentions 
general risks of infrastructure projects. The following four groups of risks are described: 
 Technical risks: malfunction, unduly early obsolescence due to becoming outdated by 
technical progress and unduly rapid deterioration of the facilities. The latter can be due to 
failure to meet their expected performance or to stand up to the conditions they are exposed 
to.  
 Operational risks: unexpected, or unpredicted, changes in the parameters on which the 
design was originally based (hydrology, site conditions, power market response) 
 Financial risks: construction cost overruns, delays in completion or unpredictable changes in 
costs and revenues throughout the lifetime of the asset, including the effects of inflation and 
currency movements 
 Commercial risks: failure to meet predetermined financial targets 
Brenner et al. (1997) 
Brenner et al. (1997) present a general classification of the most common risks with relevance to 
hydropower projects. The risks were linked to the design phase, construction phase, operation 
phase and finally to the project’s performance. Brenner et al. argue that the most significant risk 
periods are the construction and operation phases. However, one of the most significant risks for 
hydropower plants, namely energy price, is not listed. 
Kelman et al. (1997) 
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Kelman and his colleagues give a list of typical risk issues related to dam projects to be addressed 
by the financiers and the concession company. The risk issues are categorized into the following 
three groups: 
 Physical: damage to the works, and/or construction plant, machinery or equipment 
 Political: company risks, legal proceedings, change in legislation, people risks, contract risks, 
taxation 
 Financial: inflation, foreign exchange, credit risks, interest rates and availability of finance. 
Typical project risk issues in addition to the above-mentioned three main groups are presented 
along the time line of the project phases. 
Head (2000) 
The study elaborated by Head (2000) describes issues and challenges related to the private financing 
of hydropower projects in developing countries and highlights construction, hydrological and 
environmental risks. According to this study, construction risks arise in principal from geological 
conditions, which can have a major influence on the construction schedule as well as on the final 
costs. Other sources of construction risks are linked to the construction sites, which are often 
located in remote areas vulnerable to flooding and logistical problems. In respect to hydrological 
risks, the study describes the following main types: 
 Flood damage: during construction phase or during operation phase 
 Short-term duration deficits: dry period with an inflow below the long-term average 
 Sustained production deficits: causes can be either an incorrect original hydrological 
assessment of the long-term inflow or subsequent changes in the hydrological regime.  
Another main risk for hydropower projects is environmental risk. Environmental clearance can be a 
time-consuming and expensive business, especially if the project has to meet local environmental 
permitting requirements as well as acceptable international standards as defined by organizations 
such as the World Bank. The required studies vary substantially between projects and can be 
complex. 
Miller and Lessard (2001) 
Miller’s and Lessard’s work on large engineering projects distinguishes between the following risks: 
 Market-related risks 
o Demand risks 
o Financial risks 
o Supply risks 
 Completion risks 
o Technical risks 
o Construction risks 
o Operational risks 
 Institutional risks 
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o Regulatory risks 
o Social acceptability risks 
o Sovereign risks 
According to Miller and Lessard, many risks are linked to the life cycle of the project. For example, 
regulatory risks diminish very soon after permits are obtained, or technical risks drop as engineering 
experiments are performed.  
Head (2006) 
Head distinguishes between political, commercial and project risks and provides examples for each 
of the three groups.  
Palmieri (2015) 
Palmieri mentions the same three main types of risks as Head (2006): political (country), commercial 
(market, defaulting offtaker) and project (site-specific) risks. Beside these general main types of 
risks, special attention is given to geotechnical risks in the form of unforeseen geological conditions. 
According to this publication, geological risk is a key factor in cost and schedule control on all major 
civil engineering projects and is a major contributor to cost and schedule overruns.  
Malovic et al. (2015) 
Malovic et al. prepared a guide for IFC to discuss each step of hydropower project development (site 
selection, plant design, permitting/licensing, financing, contracting and commissioning) while 
explaining key issues and typical responses. The guide also lists risks associated with hydropower 
projects and mentions typically applied mitigation measures. The following groups of risks are 
mentioned: 
 Political risks 
 Economic and financial risks 
 Technical risks 
 Social risks 
 Environmental risks 
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6.3 Performance-Oriented Register of Uncertainties 
The three main uncertainties for the evaluation of hydropower projects are costs, benefits and time 
framing. These factors are affected by underlying uncertainties such as CAPEX, energy price or 
construction time, which in turn stem from a wide range of political, commercial or project-specific 
uncertainties. Obviously, some of the causes can affect more than just one main uncertainty and 
interact with one another, such as CAPEX and construction time. 
This structure reflects the input to economic evaluation and allows for direct incorporation of the 
uncertainty assessment into the economic assessment (see Figure 32) 
Each hydropower plant is a unique structure and therefore requires a project-specific uncertainty 
assessment. The performance-oriented register of uncertainties can be used as a starting point and 
extended where and as required.  
The causes, or uncertainties listed on the lowest level, have been categorized into the following 
three groups (see also Head 2006): 
 Political uncertainties (see Table 16): This group includes the failure of the host government 
to fulfil its obligations under the project agreements. As well as the political uncertainties, 
all country uncertainties are included. Typically, this group affects the complete hydropower 
sector in a country.  
 Commercial uncertainties (see Table 17): This category summarizes risks that affect revenues 
despite the fact that the host government is honouring its agreements and that the power 
plant is operating as planned. Examples are enforced changes in tariffs, or payment default 
of the offtaker. Typically, this group of uncertainties affect the complete hydropower sector 
providing the same services (energy production, flood control, etc.) for the same market. 
They are equal to market uncertainties. 
 Project uncertainties (see Table 18 and Table 19): This group includes all site-specific risks 
that can occur during implementation and in the operation stages, such as cost and 
construction time overrun, hydrological risk (power production lower than the estimated 
one), environmental and social risks. 
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Figure 32: Concept map, structure of uncertainties and links to economic performance parameter 
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Table 16: Political uncertainties 
 
Table 17: Commercial uncertainties  
 
 
No Category Cause C1 C2 B1 B2 B3 T1 T2 T3 T4
Po1 Political uncertainties Political change or instability (revolution, war) x x x x x x x x x
Po2 Political uncertainties Corruption x x x x
Po3 Political uncertainties Import embargoes x x x
Po4 Political uncertainties Threat by terrorists or political organisations x x x x x x x x x
Po5 Political uncertainties Strikes or labour disputes involving: workforce, 
suppliers, unions
x x x x x
Po6 Political uncertainties Tax regulation x x
Po7 Political uncertainties International objections on social, environmental or 
cultural grounds (incl. NGOs)
x x x
Po8 Political uncertainties Expropriation, Failure to provide the site or access x
Po9 Political uncertainties Public enquiry x x x
Po10 Political uncertainties Local law, legal differences between home country and 
home countries of suppliers, contactors, designers
x x
Po11 Political uncertainties Jurisdictional and regulatory processes x x x x
Po12 Political uncertainties Changes in legislation x x x x x x x
Po13 Political uncertainties Changes in dam safety regulations x x
Po14 Political uncertainties Changes in regulations on flood water control x x x
Po15 Political uncertainties Changes in water charges x
Po16 Political uncertainties Changes in regulations on fish migrations x x
Po17 Political uncertainties Changes in regulations on compensation flow x x
Po18 Political uncertainties Changes in fees for use of transmission lines etc. x
Po19 Political uncertainties Failure to recompensed the project company for any 
adverse changes in legislation
x x
Po20 Political uncertainties Permits x x x x
Po21 Political uncertainties Transboundary issues x x x
Po22 Political uncertainties Sequestration of the assets x x x
Po23 Political uncertainties Currency restrictions x
Po24 Political uncertainties Change in energy tariff systems or subsidize systems x
Po25 Political uncertainties Change of type of energy market (liberalization) x
Po26 Political uncertainties CO2 market x
Po27 Political uncertainties Project cancellation x x
Po28 Political uncertainties Concession agreements x
Po29 Political uncertainties Land acquisition x
Po30 Political uncertainties Right of way x
No Category Cause C1 C2 B1 B2 B3 T1 T2 T3 T4
C1 Commercial uncertainties Exchange rate fluctuations, inflation x x
C2 Commercial uncertainties Currency restriction x x
C3 Commercial uncertainties Credit risks x
C4 Commercial uncertainties Availability of specialized resources-expertise, 
designers, contractors, supplies, scarce construction 
skills, materials
x x x
C5 Commercial uncertainties Market conditions - Contractors and suppliers (low bids, 
labour rates, contractors profit margins)
x
C6 Commercial uncertainties Limited marked for equipment (maintenance and 
rehab) 
x
C7 Commercial uncertainties Fluctuations in market demand for product or service x x x
C8 Commercial uncertainties Lack of a market for the services provided x x
C9 Commercial uncertainties Enforced change in tariffs x
C10 Commercial uncertainties Default of the offtaker in respect of his payment 
obligations
x x
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Table 18: Project uncertainties  
 
  
No Category Cause C1 C2 B1 B2 B3 T1 T2 T3 T4
Pr1 Project uncertainties Availability of funds, adequacy of insurance x x x x
Pr2 Project uncertainties Financing packages x x
Pr3 Project uncertainties Adequate provision of cash flow x x x
Pr4 Project uncertainties Losses due to default of contractors, suppliers x
Pr5 Project uncertainties Liability for acts of others, direct liabilities x
Pr6 Project uncertainties Physical loss or damage by fire, earthquake, accident, 
landslip
x x x x x x x x
Pr7 Project uncertainties Flood damage during construction phase x x
Pr8 Project uncertainties Flood damage during operation phase x x x x x x
Pr9 Project uncertainties Climate conditions (Snow, avalanges, rain periods etc.) x x x x
Pr10 Project uncertainties Remote areas vulnerable to logistical problems x x x
Pr11 Project uncertainties Insufficient data from site investigations (geology, 
topography, hydrology)
x
Pr12 Project uncertainties Geological conditions x x
Pr13 Project uncertainties Construction material at site x x
Pr14 Project uncertainties Design adequacy x x x
Pr15 Project uncertainties New technology & innovative applications x x x x
Pr16 Project uncertainties Detail, precision and appropriateness of specifications x x
Pr17 Project uncertainties Major design changes x x x
Pr18 Project uncertainties Contractors and suppliers interfaces, schedule risks x
Pr19 Project uncertainties Quality and availability of management and supervision x x x
Pr20 Project uncertainties Contractor’s experience x x
Pr21 Project uncertainties Delay due to customers/suppliers downtime x x
Pr22 Project uncertainties Loss or damage in the transportation of materials and 
equipment
x
Pr23 Project uncertainties Ecological damage, pollution, waste treatment, 
nuisance 
x x
Pr24 Project uncertainties Land and water use conflicts x x x x
Pr25 Project uncertainties Resettlement and social unrest x x
Pr26 Project uncertainties Public health and safety risks x x
Pr27 Project uncertainties Cultural heritage issues x x
Pr28 Project uncertainties Wetlands protection x
Pr29 Project uncertainties Requirements of fish migration facilities x
Pr30 Project uncertainties Damage payable in respect of legal liability x
Pr31 Project uncertainties Injury to public/third party property x x
Pr32 Project uncertainties Change in labor costs for operation x
Pr33 Project uncertainties Sedimentation x x x x
Pr34 Project uncertainties Unsuitability of equipment or failure to perform 
intended function, malfunction
x x
Pr35 Project uncertainties Structural adjustments: Change in operation 
proceedings for water release or flood control
x
Pr36 Project uncertainties Changes in upstream/downstream flow regime x x
Pr37 Project uncertainties Short-term duration variation: Dry period with an 
inflow below the long-term average
x x
Pr38 Project uncertainties Long-term variation: Incorrect original hydrological 
assessment, change in hydrological regime
x x
Pr39 Project uncertainties Plant availability “Firm power” delivery x
Pr40 Project uncertainties Performance shortfalls due to design or construction 
problems
x x
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Table 19: Project uncertainties (continue) 
 
6.4 Conclusions and Recommendations for the Application 
The concept map shows the breakdown of the uncertainties and their relationship with the main 
objective, a certain economic performance parameter, such as NPV or IRR. This structure reflects an 
input to economic evaluation and allows the uncertainty assessment to be directly incorporated 
into the performance evaluation.  
A register of commercial, political and project uncertainties was established, which can be used as 
a basis for the development of a project-specific register.  
In addition, the register reflects the wide range of potential uncertainties that can have an impact 
on the performance of a hydropower project.  
For a project-specific assessment, the following working steps are recommended (see also ICE, 
2014): 
 Preparation of a discounted cash-flow model and calculation of the economic performance 
parameter (such as the NPV) of the baseline scenario. 
 Elaboration of a project-specific register of uncertainties based on the list provided in Table 
16, Table 17, Table 18 and Table 19.  
 Preliminary impact assessment of each uncertainty listed in the project-specific register. A 
first attempt to evaluate the significance of each uncertainty can be made on the basis of 
the following categorizations: (i) clearly significant, (ii) possibly significant and (iii) probably 
insignificant.  
 In-depth studies on uncertainties with significant impact. 
 Estimating the chances of occurrence of an uncertain event during the economic lifetime. 
 Estimating the impact or consequence of an uncertain event.  
 Calculation of risk-adjusted economic performance parameter (such as risk-adjusted NPV). 
  
No Category Cause C1 C2 B1 B2 B3 T1 T2 T3 T4
Pr41 Project uncertainties Electro-mechanical equipment performance x
Pr42 Project uncertainties Hydraulic net head x
Pr43 Project uncertainties Unduly rapid deterioration of the facilities x x x x
Pr44 Project uncertainties Fitness for purpose (unsuitability of equipment or 
failure to perform intended function)
x x
Pr45 Project uncertainties Latent defects x x
Pr46 Project uncertainties Maintenance needs x x x
Pr47 Project uncertainties Safety of operation x x x x
Pr48 Project uncertainties Organizational interfaces x x x
Pr49 Project uncertainties Detail risks arising from survey, investigations x
Pr50 Project uncertainties Site changes x
Pr51 Project uncertainties Project delay or cancellation or stop of production for 
environmental or social reasons
x x x x
Pr52 Project uncertainties Unduly early obsolescence due to becoming outdated 
by technical progress 
x
Pr53 Project uncertainties Experience of owner (decisionmakers) x x x x x x x
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 Management of Uncertainty – The 
Proposed Framework 
7.1 Introduction  
In this study “management of uncertainty” is understood as an active response to uncertainty.  
Whereas the approaches described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 focus on the assessment of 
uncertainties affecting a hydropower project, the methods presented in this chapter make one step 
further. They are seeking ways to actively avoid threats or exploit opportunities by design choices. 
A wide range of methods have been proposed by previous studies, but most of them have never 
been applied on real ongoing projects. One of the problems is that there is no available framework 
for the various methods to be applied to hydropower projects with a view to provide guidance for 
the selection of appropriate design methods. 
The following chapter firstly summarizes the current praxis of managing uncertainties in 
hydropower projects and, secondly, gives an overview on relevant research studies. Finally, the 
framework for hydropower projects is described.  
7.2 Current Praxis 
The four classical ways of mitigating threats to infrastructure projects are described in RAMP (ICE, 
2015). Other authors (Malovic et al., 2015; Head, 2006) explain the threats to hydropower projects 
and give typical examples for mitigation measures. These four classical ways of mitigating threats at 
hydropower plants can be summarized as follows: 
 Reduced or eliminated 
One possibility to reduce or eliminate threats is to adjust the design. This way of managing 
threats can be found in several hydropower projects, especially in early project stages. A 
proper hydropower design takes construction risks (such as availability of construction 
material, geological risks of foundation and waterway alignments, construction flood risks) 
into account and reduces or eliminates them by design adjustments. Also, design approaches 
to safety-relevant risks (such as flood safety, seismic hazard, terrorist attacks etc.) fall into 
this category. Other typical examples are the selection of experienced engineers and 
contractors, or a proper management setup. 
 
 Transferred to another party 
From a theoretical point of view, the risk should be borne by the party best able to control 
it. So the threats are allocated to the employer, contractor, engineer or insurance 
companies, depending on the overall project strategy. According to Head (2006), political 
threats are typically insurable under guarantees, commercial threats are partly insurable, 
whereas project threats are normally not insurable. The allocation of project threats (in this 
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context typically known as project risks) is a major point in the contractual setup for the 
tender and construction phases. Finally, threats can be also shared with external parties. 
This category comprises projects with feed-in tariffs or projects with risks shared with 
external investors.  
 Avoided 
The threats in question are not involved in the project at all. Typical examples in hydropower 
projects are the avoidance of resettlements of villages by selecting a different dam location. 
 Absorbed  
Threats that cannot technically or economically be eliminated, transferred or avoided must 
be absorbed. Contingency for cost estimations fall into this group. 
It has to be noted that these classical approaches are clearly focused on threats without taking 
exploration of opportunities into account. Therefore, the classical approaches can be improved by 
adding weight to the upside opportunities associated with uncertainty.  
In addition, a significant level of uncertainty is related to long-term forecasts. There are numerous 
hydropower projects where the long-term forecasts were not matching the effective values and 
finally the plants did not reach the expected performance targets. Therefore, hydropower is strongly 
affected by uncertainties, which make many developers skeptical about hydropower. This is a major 
reason why some hydropower projects are not constructed and cannot contribute to sustainable 
energy supply.  
Especially, the uncertainties related to climate change and the large energy price fluctuations have 
created a demand for methods that consider the uncertainties of long-term forecasts in the 
selection of design parameters for hydropower projects. 
7.3 Research Studies 
The following section gives an overview on reports discussing methods of managing uncertainties 
for hydropower projects or for the water resource sector. These studies can be categorized into two 
groups. The first group focuses on single methods. The second group of papers does not focus on 
one specific method only, but gives an overview of various promising approaches for the water 
sector.  
7.3.1 Methods to Manage Uncertainties 
Various reservoir sizing models for deterministic and stochastic environments have been developed 
for the design of hydropower plants (e.g. Stedinger et al., 1983; Lall and Miller, 1988; Sinha and 
Bischof, 1998). Labadie (1997) presents a review of reservoir system optimization models with 
stochastic dynamic programming approaches. 
Michailidis and Mattas (2007) apply the real-option approach to an irrigation dam in Greece. The 
analyzed option is delay of investment. One of the main findings is that new advanced 
methodologies could significantly diminish the weaknesses of the discounted cash flow techniques.  
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Bockman et al. (2008) present a real options-based method to define investment timing and optimal 
capacity choice for small hydropower projects. Additionally, an optimal trigger price for initiating an 
investment is estimated. The method is illustrated at the example of three small hydropower 
projects in Norway.  
Wang (2008) provides a comprehensive overview on real options applied in river basins. His work 
shows that the application of real options allows the net benefit to be increased and/or the 
downside risk to be reduced.  
Nassopoulos et al. (2012) apply the regret approach to dam dimensioning in the water management 
sector. The study focuses on the choice of a reservoir volume and considers different climate 
scenarios. Finally, a reservoir volume that leads to the lowest regret is selected.  
Elverhøi et al. (2010) present a decision support framework for hydropower producers with 
production facilities due for rehabilitation. Real Option Analysis was used to evaluate the 
investment opportunities.  
Fertig et al. (2014) analyzed optimal investment timing and capacity choice for a pumped 
hydropower storage scheme in Norway. In total five capacity alternatives of the hydropower 
scheme with arbitrage in the German spot market are analyzed. Real Option Analysis was used to 
value the investment opportunity in order to account for uncertainty of the electricity market and 
intertemporal choice.  
Arsenault et al. (2013) highlight the value of adaptive management of the operation rules. The study 
compares the possibilities of adding an additional turbine to an existing power plant and adapting 
the operation rules of this power plant for a wide range of climate change projections.  
Cervigni et al. (2015) evaluate the impacts of climate change on hydropower and irrigation 
expansion plans in Africa’s main river basins (Congo, Niger, Nile, Orange, Senegal, Volta, and 
Zambezi), as well as the effects on the electricity sector across four power pools (Western, Eastern, 
Central, and Southern power pools). Based on a single consistent methodology, a wide range of 
state-of-the-art future climate scenarios were analyzed. Illustrative assessments of hydropower 
projects were made within the scope of this study. A key finding is that applying the approach to 
adaptation under climate uncertainty can cut in half or reduce even more the maximum climate 
change impact (loss of revenue or missed opportunity to increase it) that would be faced in case of 
inaction. The decision method used was the Robust Decision Making approach.  
7.3.2 Overview on Various Methods Applicable in the Water Sector 
The Morgan et al. (2009) summarizes the topic of climate change and water resources and discusses 
several possibilities to respond to climate changes, which are operational, demand management, 
and infrastructure changes. Three principal strategies for making decisions in the face of 
uncertainties are presented. The report describes the classical decision analysis that seeks “optimal 
strategies”, “resilient strategies” that work reasonably well across a range of possible outcomes, 
and “adaptive” strategies that can be modified to achieve better performance as the future unfolds.  
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Hallegatte (2009) summarizes and examines five methods applicable to long-term investments and 
climate uncertainty. The following five methods are evaluated: (i) selecting ‘‘no-regret’’ strategies 
that yield beneﬁts even in the absence of climate change; (ii) favoring reversible and ﬂexible options; 
(iii) buying ‘‘safety margins’’ in new investments; (iv) promoting soft adaptation strategies, including 
long-term prospective; and (v) reducing decision time horizons. The study highlights that it is 
essential to consider both negative and positive side-effects and externalities of adaptation 
measures.  
The Water Utility Climate Alliance (Means et al., 2010) describes new planning techniques for water 
utilities to prepare for a large range of possible climate change impacts. This report describes the 
following five Decision Support Planning Methods (DSPM): Classic decision analysis, traditional 
scenario analysis, robust decision making, real-option analysis and portfolio planning. These 
methods were selected because of their relevance to the water industry. The report contains a 
comprehensive evaluation including 21 evaluation criteria. Based on these criteria, a DSPM method 
can be chosen for a specific planning need and taking into account available capabilities.  
Ray and Brown (2015) outline a process for risk assessment of water resources projects that can 
serve as a decision support tool to assist project planning under uncertainty. This report provides 
guidance on the application of proven techniques for climate change risk assessment and advanced 
tools for risk management. The proposed procedure consist of four successive phases: Phase 1: 
Project Screening, Phase 2: Initial Analysis, Phase 3: Climate Stress Test, and Phase 4: Climate Risk 
Management. Importance is given to the stress test, which allows an identification of system 
vulnerabilities. It also allows an identification of design modifications leading to a reduction of the 
system’s vulnerability. The report summarizes the following four tools for decision making under 
uncertainty: information gap decision theory, robust decision making, dynamic adaptive policy 
pathways, stochastic and robust optimization (including real-option analysis). The study includes an 
example of the application of the proposed procedure. A run-of river hydropower project in Sub-
Saharan Africa was analyzed with the objective to select the installed capacity of the scheme. The 
evaluation is based on regret criteria and a design case in the middle range is favored. However, no 
final design choice is given in the example.  
7.4 The Proposed Framework  
As described in the previous chapter, several promising methods have been proposed for the design 
of hydropower projects under uncertainties (e.g. Wang, 2008; Bockman et al., 2008; Cervigni et al. 
2015; Arsenault et al., 2013; Schleiss and Oberrauch, 2014). The studies show that applying these 
methods allows uncertainties to be managed and threats to be finally reduced, and some of the 
methods also allow exploitation of opportunities. However, for their application to hydropower 
projects some guidance is needed as to which of the design methods is best suited. 
The elaborated framework proposed in this section is specifically designed for hydropower projects. 
It provides guidance for the selection of potential design objectives that quantify or at least 
characterize its interaction with uncertainties and define the type of management of the 
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uncertainties. Various design objectives are proposed based on the work by McManus and Hastings 
(2005). 
These objectives are summarized in Table 20.  
Table 20: Design objectives and descriptions 
Design  
objective 
Description 
Robustness Ability of the hydropower scheme to provide its originally defined services 
over a wide range of alternative futures, without any structural or 
operational adjustments 
Versatility Ability of the hydropower scheme to provide additional services not originally 
included to this extent in the requirements definition, with operational 
adjustments and without any structural adjustments 
Flexibility Ability of the hydropower scheme to be structurally adjusted to provide 
additional services not included in the original requirements definition, or to 
increase the services originally defined  
Interoperability Upstream storage schemes: Ability of the system to control water flow which 
can increase the energy production and energy value of existing or potential 
new downstream hydropower plants.  
Downstream and diversion schemes: Ability of the scheme to make use of 
potential upstream hydropower projects.  
 
Figure 33 shows the framework including the design objectives. As it can be seen in this figure, a 
crucial criterion for the selection of a design objective is whether or not the strategy of managing 
uncertainty requires structural adjustments. From the perspective of a project team developing a 
new hydropower plant or a rehabilitation project, this is a critical issue.  
 
Design Objectives 
Robustness 
Versatility 
Flexibility 
Interoperability 
No structural adjustment 
required during operation 
phase 
Requires structural 
modification 
New additional hydropower 
scheme in a hydropower 
cascade or diversion 
scheme 
No structural adjustment 
required during operation 
phase 
Structural Adjustments Mitigation/Exploitation Methods 
Robust Decision Making 
Info-Gap Decision Theory 
Real Option Analysis 
Adaptation of Operation Rules 
Portfolio Planning 
Flexible Design 
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Figure 33: Concept of the framework  
 
Whereas it is often assumed in research papers (e.g. Wang, 2008) that a hydropower project can be 
adjusted to given physical constraints, practical experience shows that environmental and non-
power operation constraints are often the dominant limitations. 
For hydropower plants, several of these constraints, such as full supply level, minimum operation 
level, maximum discharge capacity, minimum discharge requirements, or limitation to do 
hydropeaking, are typically defined in the concession contracts.  
A change in such legal constraints often is a long long-lasting process and leads to additional threats. 
If a design change includes the assumption that a hydropower plant can be adjusted during the 
operation phase, it is necessary to consider the downside risk that permissions for structural 
adjustments might be withheld or granted after several years of delay only.  
As to the criterion whether a project is a greenfield plant or an existing plant, the question to be 
answered by the project team is whether or not structural adjustment are a possible option. 
If structural adjustments are considered not to be an option, robustness or versatility can be 
selected. These design objectives are focused on the services that can be provided with the schemes 
as built or designed. The robustness of a scheme is set during the planning stage and cannot be 
influenced during the operation phase. Therefore, versatility is the only design objective that can be 
investigated for existing hydropower schemes where no structural adjustments are to be 
considered. 
Compared with the design objective robustness, versatility focuses on additional services not 
originally foreseen in the design requirements.  
Services to be provided are defined in the planning phase and are based on the needs and 
opportunities of a hydropower scheme. Typically, requirement definitions of the services describe 
the type of energy to be provided: base load, peak energy and/or reserve energy. In case of a 
multipurpose scheme, the requirement definitions include also the design criteria for other 
purposes such as flood control, irrigation or water supply. Versatility aims to improve the 
performance by integrating additional purposes such as flood control, or by providing additional 
energy production services such as reserve energy instead of peak energy.  
Flexibility and interoperability require structural modification or major extension. Interoperability is 
only relevant if a new hydropower scheme will possibly be constructed in the river basin. 
Flexibility foresees a reconstruction or upgrading of an existing power plant in order to better match 
the observed conditions and the forecasted scenarios for the next decades. A shift in the electric 
supply market, hydrology, sedimentation, or ecological preferences can change the definition of 
what effective designs are, and the original design criteria elaborated for the construction of the 
power plants would have to be adjusted and structural modification to be undertaken. Flexibility 
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includes options such as increase in storage capacity by dam heightening, installation of an 
additional turbine make, or extension of the scheme by constructing an additional diversion scheme.  
Interoperability focuses on river basin development and not on standalone hydropower plants.  
Depending on the design objectives, different mitigation or exploitation methods can be applied. 
Robustness can be achieved by applying the Robust Decision Making (RDM) method or the Info-Gap 
Decision Theory (IGDT). Adaptation of the Operation Rules or Portfolio Planning can be used where 
versatility is the selected design objective. Real-Option Analysis or the more general concept of 
Flexible Design allows a design for flexibility or interoperability. 
The design objectives also differ with regard to the implementation phase. Measures to achieve 
high robustness are planned and implemented during the planning phase. In other words, this is an 
active process during the planning phase and a passive process during the operation phase. 
Measures focused on versatility, flexibility or interoperability can be designed during the planning 
phase, but the decision whether or not they will be implemented will be made during the operation 
phase, depending on the potentially changing operation conditions. Compared with robustness, 
these management measures are active processes during the operation phase. 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Phase of implementation of the measures depending on the design objectives 
7.5 Conclusions 
A simple framework for hydropower projects was developed, allowing a straightforward selection 
of the design objective and the required design method. It includes methods that have to be carried 
out during the planning phase as well as methods that are more suitable for power plants in 
operation.  
Importance is given to the question whether or not structural adjustments are required, as this can 
be a critical item for a project team’s decision whether or not to follow up on certain possibilities. 
Details on the proposed design objectives and their application are given in the following chapters.  
 
Planning Phase Operation Phase 
Robustness 
Interoperability 
Flexibility 
Versatility 
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 Case Study – Description of 
Analyzed Hydropower Project 
8.1 Introduction 
A real-world hydropower project in the Swiss Alps was selected for a case study in order to test and 
illustrate the application of the different methods.  
In order to promote the different new design methods, a simple case has been selected, which 
represents a typical design problem. An adequate plant size needs to be selected based on the 
design discharge. But the energy price forecasts are highly uncertain and there also is some 
uncertainty about anticipated inflows. Inflow is expected to increase in the future as the catchment 
area is partly covered by glacier. Therefore, the classical approach, which would be to select the 
design discharge on the basis of the highest NPV without taking uncertainties into account, may not 
lead to an optimum result in terms of design discharge selection. 
The present chapter provides a description of the project selected for the case study for which the 
design objectives of robustness and flexibility have been analyzed. For the description and 
discussion of the application of the new design methods to this real project, reference is made to 
Chapter 9.3.3 for Info-Gap Decision Theory, to Chapter 9.4.3 for Robust Decision Making, and to 
Chapter 11.4 for Flexible Design.  
The technical design was developed by an engineering company and is described in the feasibility 
study by Pöyry Energy (2007). Chapter 8.2 gives a brief overview and the construction costs of the 
various design alternatives. 
Chapter 8.3 describes the hydrological study for this research project. As some of the applications 
require climate change projection, a hydrological model was elaborated and inflow time series for 
a wide range of climate change scenarios were simulated.  
All energy simulations were carried out with a production model in daily time steps. The developed 
model and the used input parameters are described in Chapter 8.4. 
Chapter 8.5 gives the assumed input parameters for the calculation of economic performance 
parameters. 
8.2 Project Description 
The project is a high-head run-of hydropower scheme in the Swiss Alps. The headworks consists of 
a weir equipped with a main gate and a flushing gate, and a two-chamber sand trap. The waterway 
is designed as an underground structure with a 1.8 km long low pressure reservoir tunnel and a 1.2 
km long inclined tunnel which will be equipped with a penstock. Two Pelton units with equal 
installed capacity are foreseen.  
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The plant size is determined by the installed capacity, which depends on the design discharge. Active 
storage is not foreseen. Five different design discharge rates within a range between 2.0 m3/s and 
6.0 m3/s are considered. The estimated construction costs are summarized in Table 21. 
Table 21: Salient features of design alternatives 
  Alternatives 
Parameter Unit Qd2 Qd3 Qd4 Qd5 Qd6 
Design discharge (Qd) [m3/s] 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 
Max. generation discharge (Qmax) [m3/s] 2.7 4.0 5.4 6.7 8.0 
Gross head(Hg) [m] 522.0 522.0 522.0 522.0 522.0 
Net head (Hn) at Qd [m] 507.3 510.2 511.3 511.7 511.4 
Specific hydraulic loss coefficient [-] 3.678 1.316 0.667 0.414 0.295 
Efficiency of E&M equipment (η) [-] 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Installed capacity (IC) [MW] 9 13 18 22 26 
CAPEX [CHF million] 40.2 43.7 47.1 50.1 52.7 
 
8.3 Hydrology 
8.3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the hydrological model was to analyze the climate impact on the design choice for 
various installed capacities of a hydropower project. Therefore, a hydrological model was applied 
to simulate various climate change scenarios. The discharge series of the different climate change 
scenarios were simulated at daily time steps and then used for energy production simulations. 
8.3.2 Catchment 
The catchment of the hydropower project covers an area of 25 km2. The catchment is partly 
glacierized (22%) and its steep alpine topography covers elevations between the altitude of the 
intake of 999 m asl and 3119 m asl.  
A gauging station (Alpbach-Erstfeld) with long-term records (start of records in 1961, ongoing) is 
located in the catchment and covers about 82% of the catchment area of the planned hydropower 
plant. The discharge recorded at the gauging station is characterized by strong seasonal fluctuations 
due to snowmelt and glacier melt in late summer. 
The records from this reference station were used for the calibration and validation of the rainfall-
runoff model. In addition, records from the period 1961 to 2013 were selected as reference inflow. 
The inflow at the intake was calculated based on the ratio of the catchment areas of the gauging 
station and at the intake location.  
Climate change studies require long-term meteorological records. As there are no meteorological 
stations in the catchment area, stations in the close vicinity were selected according to their 
distances from the catchment area and their elevations. Table 22 is a list of meteorological stations 
selected for this study.  
 96 
As reported by Kobierska et al. (2013), meteorology in this region is highly affected by altitudinal 
gradients so that the data requires pre-processing. An adjustment factor was determined on the 
basis of the long-term specific runoff in order to obtain the catchment rainfall from the point 
measurements of the observed data. 
Table 22: List of meteorological stations 
Elevation Band (EB) Parameter Meteorological stations used 
EB - Glacier Precipitation Altdorf, Engelberg, Gütsch  
EB - High Altitude Precipitation Altdorf, Engelberg, Gütsch 
EB - Medium Altitude Precipitation Altdorf, Engelberg, Gütsch 
EB - Glacier Air temperature Gütsch, Titlis 
EB - High Altitude Air temperature Gütsch 
EB - Medium Altitude Air temperature Engelberg, Gütsch 
8.3.3 Hydrological Model 
The hydrological model “Routing System” developed at the Laboratory of Hydraulic Constructions 
(LCH) of Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) was selected for the simulation of the 
mountainous catchment of the case study. This model was developed and tested for hydrological-
hydraulic modelling tool studies in high-mountainous catchment areas (Dubois, 2005; García 
Hernández et al., 2007; Bieri, 2013). The hydrological forecasting process is based on the semi-
distributed conceptual approach, and spatial precipitation and temperature distributions can be 
taken into account for simulating the dominant hydrological processes, such as glacier melt, 
snowpack constitution and melt, soil infiltration and runoff. For details on the model, reference is 
made to García Hernández et al. (2007). 
The catchment area was discretized in three elevation bands. Each elevation band is characterized 
by a dominant hydrological process. The elevation band between 2’727 m asl and 3’119 m asl is 
mainly covered by glaciers. The middle and lower elevation bands have no permanent ice cover, 
but, due to their different elevations, the major difference between them lies in the seasonal 
evolution (melt and accumulation) of snowpack. Table 23 gives the elevation bands and their areas.  
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Table 23: Discretization of catchment  
 
Catchment 
area 
Min. 
elevation 
Max. 
elevation 
Mean 
elevation 
Elevation Band km2 m asl m asl m asl 
EB - Glacier 5.50 2’313 3’119 2’727 
EB - High Altitude 12.85 1’803 3’040 2’225 
EB - Medium Altitude 6.93 999 1’803 1’462 
Total Catchment 25.27 999 3’119 2’094 
8.3.4 Calibration and Validation 
The purpose of the hydrological study is to simulate energy production of a run-of scheme using 
different design alternatives corresponding to different design discharges. Therefore, the ratio of 
the simulated and observed design volumes (rQmax) was used for calibration. The design volume 
(VQmax) determines the potential energy production of a run-of hydropower scheme. It expresses 
the mean volume of water that can be expected to be available for energy production for a specific 
maximum generation discharge (Qmax). For run-of river plants, VQmax is typically derived from flow 
duration curves. For further information on how to calculate VQmax, see Hänggi and Weingartner 
(2012).  
rQmax is defined as follows: 
𝑟𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  
𝑉𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠𝑖𝑚
𝑉𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑜𝑏𝑠  (11) 
where 𝑉𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠𝑖𝑚  = simulated volume for a specific maximum generation discharge; 𝑉𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑜𝑏𝑠  = observed 
volume for a specific maximum generation discharge.  
The model was calibrated for the time period from 01.01.1983 to 31.12.1996 and validated for the 
following 13-year period until 31.12.2009. 
The calibration shows good agreement between the measured and simulated runoffs and tends to 
be on a conservative side. For the comparison of the project alternatives it is important that no 
significant variation of the different rQmax is observed.  
The results of the validation period indicate for the simulated annual volume an accuracy in the 
range of about ±8%, which was found to be adequate for the purpose of this study. 
 
Table 24: rQmax for calibration and validation periods 
Max. generation discharge [m3/s] 2.7 4 5.4 6.7 8 
Calibration Period (01.01.1983-31.12.1996) 
𝑟𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 [-] 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 
Validation Period (01.01.1997-31.12.2009) 
𝑟𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥 [-] 1.03 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.08 
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8.3.5 Climate Change Scenarios 
In total 10 climate change scenarios were considered. The climate change scenarios are based on 
the data elaborated for the extensive research project “Swiss Climate Change Scenarios CH2011” 
(CH2011, 2011; Bosshard et al. 2011). This report and the corresponding data provide a detailed 
basis for climate impact studies. The data is based on 30-year mean temperature and precipitation 
changes and is generally suitable for analyses of mean annual cycles. The precipitation and 
temperature datasets were derived from regional climate model data provided by the ENSEMBLES 
project (Linden and Mitchell, 2009). In total 10 model chains, each consisting of one general 
circulation model (GCM) driving one regional model (RCM), were studied. All model chains are based 
on the A1B emission scenario so that the differences between the 10 model chains represent 
modelling uncertainty. The A1B emission scenario is characterized by balance across fossil-intensive 
and non-fossil energy sources, describing a future world of very rapid economic growth with a global 
population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter. In addition, it assumes a rapid 
introduction of new and more efficient technologies (CH2011, 2011). 
The 10 different model chains considered in this study are given in Table 23. 
Table 25: Climate change – Model chains  
Institute GCM RCM 
ETHZ HadCM3Q0 CLM 
HC HadCM3Q0 HadCM3Q0 
SMHI HadCM3Q3 RCA 
DMI ECHAM5 HIRHAM 
KNMI ECHAM5 RACMO 
ICTP ECHAM5 REGCM 
MPI ECHAM5 REMO 
SMHI ECHAM5 RCA 
CNRM ARPEGE ALADIN 
SMHI BCM RCA 
 
The dataset provides changes relative to the reference period from 1980 until 2009 for the scenario 
periods 2021-2050 (referenced as 2035), 2045-2074 (referenced as 2060), 2070-2099 (referenced 
as 2085). The changes of temperature and precipitation for the 10 models chains are available for 
various meteorological stations in Switzerland. 
8.3.6 Results  
Figure 35 presents the mean annual inflow volume of projections from near (2035) to far future 
(2085). In the near future all 10 model chains indicate a relatively low increase of the annual runoff 
(<10%). In the long future 5 out of 10 model chains lead to a moderate increase of the annual runoff 
in the range from 15% to 20%.  
Figure 36 shows the monthly average discharges of the 10 model chains over a simulation period of 
27 years. In terms of seasonal pattern, the simulation leads to similar results.  
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Discharge increases during spring and early summer. The peak flow shifts from July towards June 
and will be more pronounced. The discharges of July and August fall below the long-term records. 
In addition, simulation results predict higher winter discharge.  
A) B) 
  
Figure 35: Annual inflow of the simulated model chains for different climate change projections 
A) shows the calculated annual inflow, B) presents the changes relative to the reference discharge 
 
Figure 36: Monthly discharge of different climate change projections and the reference discharge 
(black line); discharge projections for the periods 2035 (orange lines), 2060 (blue lines) and 2085 
(green lines)  
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8.4 Energy Model 
An energy production model applicable for a high-head run-of river power plant was elaborated. 
The spreadsheet model simulates daily energy production of a stand-alone hydropower plant for 
periods up to 50 years. The model needs long-term daily inflow and the required environmental 
flow, on the one hand, and the technical parameters of the analyzed design alternative on the other 
(see Table 21).  
8.5 Economic Evaluation 
A DCF model is used for the calculation of economic performance parameters. Input parameters for 
the DCF model are listed in Table 26. 
Table 26: Input for economic model 
Parameter  
CAPEX Depending on design alternative 
OPEX 1% of CAPEX, plus CHF 50‘000/year (fixed costs) 
Re-investment in E&M equipment  (35 years after start of operation) 
WACC 3% 
Construction period 3 years 
First year of operation 4th year 
Economic lifetime 50 years 
Water royalties CHF 110 /kW gross capacity 
 
Table 27 gives the NPVs for the analyzed design alternatives based on the assumption of a long-
term energy price of 65 CHF/MW. A design discharge of 4 m3/s, which corresponds to an installed 
capacity of 22 MW, has the highest NPV (Alternative Qd4), followed by design alternative Qd5.  
Table 27: NPV of alternatives 
  Alternatives 
  Unit Qd2 Qd3 Qd4 Qd5 Qd6 
NPV  [CHF million] 1.32 10.36 13.66 13.30 11.37 
8.6 Conclusions 
An actual hydropower project has been selected for the application of the different new design 
methods. The selected case represents a typical design problem, namely the choice of a design 
discharge. The conventional approach would lead to a design discharge of 4 m3/s (Design alternative 
Qd4). 
The climate change projections indicate an increase in long-term inflow in comparison with the 
historical discharge data. However, the climate change projections cover a wide range of future 
states. In addition, the long-term energy price is considered to be a major source of uncertainty with 
a potential impact on the design discharge to be chosen for this power plant.  
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Therefore, new promising design methods have been applied. For the description and discussion of 
the application of the new design methods to this real project, reference is made to Chapter 9.3.3 
for Info-Gap Decision Theory, to Chapter 9.4.3 for Robust Decision Making, and to Chapter 11.4 for 
Flexible Design.  
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 Robustness  
9.1 Introduction 
No uniform definition of robustness exists. Morgan et al. (2009) gives on overview on the various 
definitions and concepts. Two promising approaches in hydropower design are Robust Decision 
Making (RDM) (Lempert et al., 2003) and the Info-Gap Decision Theory (IGDT) (Ben-Haim, 2006).  
Lempert et al. (2003) define robust strategy as one that performs well over a very wide range of 
alternative futures – in comparison with its alternatives.  
Based on the robustness definition used in the info-gap approach developed by Ben-Haim (2006), a 
robust strategy sacrifices a small amount of optimal performance in order to obtain less sensitivity 
to broken assumptions. 
In recent years, a strong focus has been put on the development of robust decision methods, 
especially under the pressure of climate change. In this context, robustness is often defined as 
keeping options open. Adaptive decision strategies or system flexibility make part of these concepts 
(IPCC, 2001; Rosenhead, 2001). However, this work distinguishes between design objectives 
according to whether or not they require structural modification. The concept of flexibility takes 
into account that the structure of a hydropower scheme can be adjusted during its life cycle, 
whereas the concept of robustness assumes that no structural changes (other than maintenance or 
rehabilitation) will be carried out during the operation period.  
9.2 Application Potential 
The methods have the potential to guide the project team to define robust plant size parameters, 
e.g. design discharge and active storage, without agreeing on the potential futures.  
Especially for hydropower plants, where there is no possibility of extension of services or structural 
modification, robust design is the preferred measure. 
Examples of manageable factors under severe uncertainty include:  
 Electricity price 
 Inflow (including climate change) 
 Compensation flow 
 Water supply  
 Irrigation water 
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9.3 Info-Gap Decision Theory 
9.3.1 Description of Method 
The Info-Gap Decision Theory (IGDT) is a methodology developed by Ben-Haim for supporting 
model-based decisions under severe uncertainty. According to Ben-Haim (2010), an info-gap is 
defined as follows: 
An info-gap is a disparity between what is known and what needs to be known in order to make a 
comprehensive and reliable decision.  
For the design of a hydropower plant we often have an info-gap on the energy price. We know very 
little about how the energy price will develop in the long run, but we need this information to make 
a comprehensive and reliable decision on the design parameters.  
An info-gap is also included in the inflow forecast. Uncertainties related to the measured data, 
interpretation of incomplete data, simplifications inherent in the hydrological model structure, 
model parameters (Refsgaard and Storm, 1990) or, more generally, climate change lead to a certain 
info gap. 
Further aspects can also be treated as info gaps, depending on a given project, such as water supply, 
which may change over the long term with a growing population, irrigation water depending on 
agricultural development and/or climate change, or compensation flow, which may change due to 
changes in legislation. 
The info-gap analysis is based on the following three elements: 
 Info-gap model of uncertainty: This is a non-probability quantification of uncertainty, such 
as the mean annual energy price over the economic lifetime or the mean inflow volume 
 System model: The system model in the context of hydropower design is typically structured 
in several sub-models (energy price forecast model, hydrological model, energy production 
model, construction cost estimation and economic model), which leads finally to the 
performance parameter.  
 Performance requirements: This can be a set of values that define the outcomes to be 
achieved, which can be a certain NPV or annual energy production, the reliability of the 
energy production, or the definition of various types of energy (peak, base or reserve 
energy), or a combination of these requirements.  
Two decision functions are formulated based on the analysis of the info-gap including the 
components uncertainty model, system model and performance requirements. The following 
decision functions support the selection of a reliable design concept: 
 Robustness function: The robustness function assesses the greatest tolerable horizon of 
uncertainty by satisfying the performance requirements. In other words, how wrong can our 
assumptions or forecasts be while still providing an acceptable performance of the 
hydropower plant. 
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 Opportuneness function: The opportuneness function assesses the lowest horizon of 
uncertainty possible for an outcome better than anticipated. However, this is about 
potential, not guarantee. Some design parameters may bring great “windfalls”, such as 
additional installed capacity allowing additional energy to be generated in case of 
unexpected flow from climate change-induced glacier melt.  
The robustness and opportuneness functions do not necessarily lead to the same preferred design 
parameters. The robust-satisficing decision strategy selects the more robust option, whereas the 
opportune-windfalling decision strategy chooses the concept that can lead to a better performance 
than expected.  
9.3.2 Application to Hydropower Design 
According to our best knowledge, the IGDT approach has never been used in hydropower projects 
so far, whereas various research work has been done in water infrastructure. 
A comparison of both methods for water system planning was prepared by Matrosov et al. (2013). 
RDM and IGDT were applied in an expansion project for London’s water supply system to identify 
the most robust alternative out of 20 water supply infrastructures. Uncertainty of future 
hydrological inflows, water demands and energy prices were considered. For the identification of 
the most robust system, multiple criteria of system performance were into account. The study 
concludes that the methods are complementary and can be beneficially used together to better 
understand results.  
9.3.3 Case Study 
Description of Case 
The application of the IGDT has been tested for the high-head run-of hydropower plant described 
in Chapter 8. 
Uncertainty Model 
It was assumed that the long-term annual energy price (ũ1) would be 65 CHF/MWh. The hydrological 
studies estimated an average inflow volume of 64.51 million m3/a based on records of the period 
1961-2013 (ũ2). 
The energy price (u1) and the inflow volume (u2) are both highly uncertain and influence the NPV. 
No probability on the energy price and inflow forecasts can be given, or is agreed on, by the project 
team. 
The energy price might decrease to about 30 CHF/MWh or increase to about 120 CHF/MWh. The 
hydrological study estimates a range between 59.91 million m3 (historical long-term average, 1961-
2013) and 71.12 million m3 of annual inflow. All inflow series that take climate change into account 
lead to an increase of the inflow volume. 
These ranges of estimates are integrated in an uncertainty model to form upper and lower 
boundaries, i.e. σl (lower boundaries) and σr (upper boundaries). The scaling factors are ωl for the 
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left-hand side and ωr for the right-hand side. The uncertain parameters (energy price and inflow 
volume) are scaled by h for each “horizon” or increment of uncertainty. 
The info-gap model becomes:  
 𝑈(ℎ, ?̃?) =  {𝑢 ∶  𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝜎𝑙, (1 − 𝜔𝑙ℎ)?̃?𝑖] ≤  𝑢𝑖 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝜎𝑟 , (1 + 𝜔𝑟ℎ)?̃?𝑖]},   
 
ℎ ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2 
(12) 
 
The available information and assumptions are summarized in the following table. 
Table 28: Input to the IGDT model 
 Convention Value 
Estimated energy price ũ1 65 
Estimated inflow volume ũ2 59.91 
Lower boundaries σl σl = [30, 59.91] 
Upper boundaries σr σr  = [120, 71.12] 
Scaling factor, left-hand side ωl ωl = [0.538, 0.000] 
Scaling factor, right-hand side ωr ωr = [0.846, 0.187] 
 
 
Figure 37: Info-Gap uncertainty model showing the uncertainties from a best estimate (ũ) of the 
energy price and the annual inflow of each horizon (h).  
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System Model 
The system model is composed of an energy production model and an economic model. For the 
simulation of energy production, a model with daily simulation time steps was selected. For details, 
reference is made to Chapter 8.4 and Chapter 8.5. 
Performance Requirement 
A NPVc = 0 was selected. That means that the NPV will be always positive under the consideration 
of the estimated uncertainties. 
Robustness and Opportuneness Functions 
The actual net present value of each design alternative (NPVd) is unknown, as the actual energy price 
and actual inflow volume are unknown. The robustness to uncertainty of the design alternative is 
the greatest horizon of uncertainty up to which the NPVd of that design is not worse than a critical 
NPVc. The robustness function for each design alternative (d) is defined as follow: 
ℎ̂ (𝑑) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {ℎ: min
𝑢𝑖∈𝑈(ℎ)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑑 (𝑢𝑖, 𝑑)  ≥ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑐} (13) 
 
The opportuneness from uncertainty of the various design alternatives is the lowest horizon of 
uncertainty at which the NPV can be as high as the NPVw: 
?̂? (𝑑) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {ℎ: min
𝑢𝑖∈𝑈(ℎ)
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑑 (𝑢𝑖 , 𝑑) ≥ 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑤} (14) 
 
Results 
The design alternative Qd4 is the most robust solution, tolerating a 14% decrease of the energy 
price and using the historical inflow, which corresponds to the lowest estimate. (Level of robustness 
is 0.26). An annual inflow of about 59.91 million m3/year and a mean energy price of about 56 
CHF/MWh will lead to an NPV equal or higher than zero. For NPVs larger than the critical NPV, the 
design alternative Qd4 is always the preferred design alternative. 
Qd5 is the next most robust design alternative, able to maintain an acceptable level of performance 
with an energy price 13% lower than the best estimate (level of robustness of 0.24).  
The slopes of the robustness curves equal the increments of robustness that can be obtained by 
reducing the performance by one unit. A steep slope means that the robustness can be increased 
with only small loss of performance. In the analyzed case, design alternatives with a smaller design 
discharge have larger slopes. This leads to a crossing of Qd3 and Qd6 at a robustness level of about 
0.13.  
The opportuneness curves show the performances of each of the design alternatives that can be 
achieved in more benign futures (see Figure 40). The focus is on the lowest opportuneness curves 
with a shallow gradient, which indicate a high increase in performance for small increments of 
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uncertainty. The higher the design discharge is, the smaller the slopes of the opportuneness curves 
are. Should the inflow and the energy price turn out to be higher than expected, a larger plant size 
can provide for a higher increase of the NPV. 
The opportuneness curves show a crossing of Qd5 and Qd4 at an increment level of about 0.10. In 
other words, if the inflow volume increases to more than about 61.03 million m3 and if the energy 
price exceeds 69 CHF/MWh, Qd5 will result in a higher NPV. Qd6 crosses Qd4 at a horizon of 0.15 
(inflow volume of 61.59 million m3, energy price of 70 CHF/MWh).  
In a more benign future, Qd5 and Qd6 will lead to similar results, if the uncertain parameters (inflow 
volume and energy price) are both scaled together. That means that energy price and inflow volume 
will increase proportionally.  
For an analysis of each uncertain parameter, the value of the other parameter is set at the best 
estimate (see Figure 41 and Figure 43). If only one of the two uncertain parameters is considered, 
i.e. either the energy price or the inflow volume, it can be observed that the opportuneness curves 
of Qd6 and Qd5 do not cross and Qd5 will always be the preferred design alternative. Only if both 
the energy price and the inflow increase, Qd6 could turn out to be the best solution. 
Should the project team be risk-averse, Qd4 would be the preferred solution. This design alternative 
leads to a positive NPV also under harsher futures. If more attention is given to opportuneness, 
either Qd5 or Qd6 could be selected; Qd6, however, is found to be attractive only if there is an 
increase in energy price and inflow. 
 
Figure 38: Robustness curves for different design alternatives (Qd2 to Qd6). Qd2 is the design 
alternative with a design discharge of 2 m3/s, Qd3 has a design discharge of 3 m3/s…Qd6 has a 
design discharge of 6 m3/s. NPVc is the performance requirement (NPVc = 0). 
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Figure 39: Detail view of Figure 38: Robustness curves for different design alternatives 
(Qd2 to  Qd6). Qd4 is the most robust design alternative.  
 
Figure 40: Robustness and opportuneness curves for different design alternatives (Qd2 to Qd6). 
NPVc is the performance requirement (NPVc = 0). 
 
Figure 41: Robustness and opportuneness curves for different design alternatives (Qd2 to Qd6) 
based on inflow uncertainty only 
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Figure 42: Robustness curves for different design alternatives (Qd2 to Qd6) based on energy price 
uncertainty only. NPVc is the performance requirement (NPVc = 0). 
 
Figure 43: Robustness and opportuneness curves for different design alternatives (Qd2 to Qd6) 
based on energy price uncertainty only 
 
9.3.4 Discussion 
The Info-Gap Decision Theory (IGDT) offers a structured framework to analyze a hydropower 
scheme in highly uncertain situations. In the reported example, energy price and inflow were 
considered as the uncertain parameters. However, the method can be easily extended to include 
other factors, such as weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
On the one hand, the method allows the most robust design for harsher futures to be identified, 
but, on the other, it also shows clearly the opportuneness of design alternatives. 
The robustness and opportuneness curves are providing valuable information for a comprehensive 
decision, and an especially advantageous feature of this approach is that the continuous robustness 
and opportunities curves allow for the identification of the uncertainty level at which a different 
design concept would lead to better results. 
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In addition, the method can be applied without assigning any probabilities to any of the uncertain 
factors and it can be used on the basis of best estimates and lower and upper boundaries. Best 
estimates of inflow, energy price or construction costs are part of any design study of hydropower 
projects, and can be directly integrated into the IGDT. 
Another advantage of this method is that both the concept and the results can be easily 
communicated also to decision-makers not familiar with design methods considering uncertainties. 
The definition of the uncertainty model can be challenging, especially if the uncertain parameters 
are to be handled as time series (such as hydrological inflow series based on climate change 
scenarios). 
A clear limitation of this approach is the lack of examples of the application of IGDT for hydropower 
projects. According to our best knowledge, the above-reported case study is the very first attempt 
to apply this approach to hydropower projects. Further guidance for engineers would be needed to 
implement it in practice. 
9.4 Robust Decision Making 
9.4.1 Description of Method 
Robust Decision Making (RDM) is a set of methods and tools designed to support decision-making 
under deep or severe uncertainty. The method describes uncertainty by considering the 
performance over a wider range of futures. For the selection of a design alternative, preference is 
given to robustness over optimality.  
The decision framework combines features of both classic decision analysis and scenario planning. 
Morgan et al. (2009) characterize classic decision analysis as a method that describes uncertainty 
with well characterized probabilities, recommends optimal strategies, and uses tools such as 
decision trees or influence diagrams to illustrate planning options. Robust decision differs from 
classic decision analysis in two aspects. Firstly, it evaluates robust strategies or design concepts as 
opposed to one optimum criteria (Lempert and Collins, 2007). Secondly, RDM is based on either 
scenario without probability distributions, or it considers imprecise probability distributions. Later 
there can be a probability covering a range of values (Means et al., 2010). In contrast to sensitivity 
analysis, it provides a mechanism for controlling the sensitivity and is therefore not only a reactive 
approach. 
An RDM analysis for hydropower design basically follows the following working steps (see also 
Cervigni et al., 2015): 
1. List of possible future states 
2. Selection of design alternatives 
3. Simulation of performance for different future states: During this working step the 
performance for many different future states are simulated. 
4. Sensitivity and vulnerability: The trade-offs among the design alternatives and the 
performance across the different futures are analyzed in order to identify the sensitivity 
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and to characterize the vulnerabilities. A differentiation between sensitivity and 
vulnerability is useful, as some projects may be sensitive to harsh futures but will not be 
very vulnerable as the overall performance is very high.  
5. Ranking of design alternatives: Design alternatives are ranked based on a selected robust 
decision rule or a combination of them. 
These working steps can lead to a final design decision or to a preliminary robust design, which can 
be used as a new starting point for additional iterations through the process.  
Robust Decision Rules 
The selection of a design alternative is based on a robust decision rule. For hydropower design three 
different rules have been suggested (see Table 29). All rules are based on a measure of regret, which 
is defined as the difference between the performance of a design alternative in some future and the 
performance of the best design alternative for that future (Cervigni et al., 2015). 
The mini-max regret criterion was introduced by Savage (1950) and has often been applied for 
decisions under deep uncertainty. This approach has become more and more widely discussed in 
the literature in decision-making that incorporates the uncertainties of climate change (e.g. Cervigni 
et al., 2015; Harry, 2008; Willows et al. 2003; Lempert and Collins, 2007). The mini-max regret is 
easy to implement, but can be unduly influenced by extreme cases.  
The domain criterion defines a robust design as one that performs reasonably compared to the 
alternatives across a wide range of plausible futures. The aim is to reduce the interval of plausible 
futures over which a strategy performs poorly (Lempert and Collins 2007).  
If some probabilistic information on the relative likelihood exists, the third criterion can be applied. 
That can be done by excluding the most extreme alternative futures (e.g. driest or wettest hydrology 
projections).  
Depending on the robustness criteria applied, a satisficing criterion has to be defined. A possible 
satisficing criterion is to define those of the design alternatives that exceed a certain economic 
performance parameter (threshold figure). An alternative satisficing criterion can be the design 
alternative that performs better than all other plausible design alternatives, in other words a 
measure of regret.  
The choice of design parameters can vary according to the applied robustness criteria. 
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Table 29: Robustness Criteria (Source Cervigni et al. 2015) 
Robustness Criteria References 
Minimize maximum regret Savage, 1950 
Domain criteria: satisfice over a wide range of future 
conditions 
Rosenhead 2001; Lempert et al., 2006; 
Lempert and Collins, 2007 
Satisfice over a wide range of likelihoods for future 
conditions 
Lempert and Collins, 2007; Nassopoulos 
et al., 2012 
9.4.2 Recent Application to Hydropower Design 
Nassopoulos et al. (2012) apply RDM to dam dimensioning in the water management sector. In that 
paper the “regret” (or error cost) is calculated if the dam is designed using one of the climate 
scenarios, while another one is the “correct” one. The reservoir volume with the potential for 
smallest regret is found to be the best concept.  
Cervigni et al. (2015) applied the RDM method to five hydropower projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The test projects cover different types of schemes (run-of-river and storage schemes) and different 
project purposes (hydropower, irrigation and water supply). The RDM methodology was used to 
structure the analysis and to identify potentially robust project configurations. In this study three 
different robustness criteria (see Table 29) were applied. All of the applied criteria include a measure 
of regret.  
9.4.3 Application to the Case Study 
The RDM method was applied to the hydropower project in the Swiss Alps described in Chapter 8. 
The objective is to select a robust design discharge by considering a wide range of possible future 
states of inflow and energy prices. 
The selected design alternatives cover a range of design discharges between 2 m3/s and 6 m3/s.  
The hydrological study considering various climate projections suggests a range of plausible changes 
of the inflow to the planned hydropower intake. The model projections indicate an increase of the 
annual inflow in the near future (2035) from 2% to 10%. The range of inflow projections in the far 
future (2085) is 7% to 19%. 
The reference period selected for the inflow was the long-term recorded discharge. The records 
cover the period from 1961 to 2013. 
As well as the inflow, the energy price is a highly uncertain parameter. Three scenarios were 
assumed for future states of the energy price. The “High” energy price scenario corresponds to 
120 CHF/MWh, the “Central” energy price scenario assumes 65 CHF/MWh, and the “Low” energy 
price scenario is based on a mean energy price of 30 CHF/MWh. 
Sensitivity to Climate Change and Energy Price 
The climate change analyses conducted for different projection periods show that the energy 
production is sensitive to future climate (see Figure 44). 
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All climate change projections for the near up to far future predict an increase of the annual energy 
production compared with the long-term reference period 1961-2013. In the near future, the 
climate change may result in an increase up to about 10%. Additional increase can be expected for 
the periods referenced as 2060 (up to plus 19%) or 2085 (up to plus 28%).  
The alternative with the smallest design discharge has the highest sensitivity of the annual energy 
production to climate change, whereas design alternatives in the middle range (Qd4 and Qd5) show 
less sensitivity. 
Figure 45 presents the value of the produced energy for each design alternative relative to the 
reference scenario. For the reference scenario, the central energy price scenario and the long-term 
recorded discharge were assumed. The energy value for the High energy price scenario is shown as 
blue dots, the Central energy price scenario is marked red and the Low energy price scenario is 
plotted green.  
The range of the climate change projections is shown by a range plot. The top edges show the 
maximum, the central dot the median and the bottom edges the minimum value of the chances of 
the energy value as a function of the climate change projections.  
The energy price analyses show a very large sensitivity of the energy value to the energy price 
scenarios. Because of the large range of assumed energy prices, the value of the produced energy 
can vary significantly, depending on whether it is the low, central or high energy price scenario.  
Compared with the energy price scenario, the climate change projections have a very small 
influence on the energy value.  
In relation to the reference scenario, the highest increase of the energy value can be expected for 
the smallest design alternative (Qd2), with an increasing effect over time from the near future to 
the far future (see Figure 45).  
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2035 
  
2060 
  
2085  
  
 
Figure 44: Sensitivity of energy production based on 10 climate change projections for the future 
periods 2035, 2060 and 2085. Left plots: Annual energy production for different climate change 
projections. Right plots: Relative variation of energy production compared with the reference 
period.  
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2035 
 
 
2060 
 
 
2085  
 
 
Figure 45: Variation of energy value as compared with the reference scenario as a function of 
climate change projections and energy price scenarios for the different design alternatives (Qd2 to 
Qd6). Upper plot for future period 2035, middle plot for future period 2060 and lower plot for 
future period 2085. Each plot shows the results of the three energy price scenarios: high 
(diamond), central (circle) and low (horizontal line). Range of results depending on climate change 
projections are shown as whiskers. Central mark indicates median, whisker extends to the most 
extreme data points of climate change projections for each energy price scenario. 
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Vulnerability to Energy Price Scenarios and Climate Change Projections 
In general, some projects can lead to benefits and revenues so high that the chance for negative 
performances is low, even under harsh futures.  
Means et al. (2010) defines vulnerability in the context of water planning and dealing with climate 
change as the degree to which a system is susceptible to an adverse effect. 
In the discussed case study, all climate change projections lead to an increase in energy production. 
Consequently, the only adverse effect stems from an energy price below the reference estimate. 
The analyses of the vulnerability as defined in terms of NPV show a significant impact on the 
economic performance of all of the design alternatives. 
Table 30 summarizes the vulnerabilities of the design alternatives. Compared with the reference 
scenario, a decrease of the NPV between 2749% and 379% can be expected. Qd2 has the highest 
relative vulnerability because of the lowest NPV in the reference scenario. 
Relative vulnerability, which is defined as the difference between the most adverse performance 
and the estimates of the reference periods, seems to be less important for decision-making than 
absolute vulnerability.  
For a low energy price, all design alternatives lead to a negative NPV and very high relative and 
absolute vulnerabilities. The absolute vulnerability increases with increasing project costs (higher 
design discharge).  
Table 30: Absolute vulnerability and relative vulnerability of design alternatives 
    Qd2 Qd3 Qd4 Qd5 Qd6 
NPV [CHF million] 1.32 10.36 13.66 13.30 11.37 
Lowest NPV [CHF million] -34.90 -35.83 -38.09 -40.93 -43.77 
Absolute vulnerability [CHF million] -36.22 -46.19 -51.74 -54.23 -55.13 
Relative vulnerability [%] -2749% -446% -379% -408% -485% 
 
Figure 46 shows the NPVs across energy price scenarios for the five design alternatives. In addition, 
the most advantageous design alternative for each energy price scenario is indicated as “best design 
alternative” (marked yellow). For the reference inflow and the central energy price scenario, the 
design alternative Qd4 would be the preferred option. In case high energy prices are assumed, Qd5 
will lead to the highest NPV. On the contrary, the smallest design will limit the maximum loss in case 
of an adverse energy price. 
Figure 47 shows the NPVs, taking into account the energy projection as well as the climate change 
projections. The range of the climate change projections are shown as a range plot. Similar to the 
observed influence of climate change on the energy value, the climate projections give a very small 
effect on the NPV compared with the energy price scenarios.  
For all future climate projections and in case of the High energy price scenario, the largest design 
alternative Qd6 would be the preferred option. 
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For the Central energy price scenario, a shift from Qd5 in the near future to Qd4 in the far future 
can be observed. One explanation can be that the increase of the energy production in smaller 
design alternatives is relatively larger than that of project alternatives having a higher design 
discharge as shown in Figure 44. 
Assuming the Low energy price scenario, Qd2 would minimize the economic loss, independently of 
the climate change projections.  
Reference Period  
(1961-2013) 
 
 
Figure 46: NPVs of different design alternatives (Qd2 to Qd6) for high (diamond), central (circle) 
and low (horizontal line) energy price scenarios. Calculations are based on inflow in the reference 
period (1961-2013).  
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2035 
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Figure 47: NPV of different design alternatives (Qd2 to Qd6) for high (diamond), central (circle) 
and low (horizontal line) energy price scenarios. Range of NPVs depending on climate change 
projections are shown as whiskers. Central mark indicates median, whisker extends to the most 
extreme data points of climate change projections for each energy price scenario. 
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Ranking of Design Alternatives 
As shown by the sensitivity and vulnerability analyses, the various design alternatives have different 
vulnerabilities and lead to different NPVs depending on the future states. However, the analyses do 
not provide the information necessary to frame and make a decision.  
In the following sections, the “minimize maximum regret” decision criterion and the domain 
criterion are discussed.  
Minimize Maximum Regret 
As shown in the NPV plots over a wide range of future states, larger designs perform better in case 
of high energy prices and the smallest design alternative has the highest NPV in case of the Low 
energy price scenario.  
Table 31 summarizes the maximum regrets of each design alternative depending on the climate 
projections and the energy price scenarios. Figure 48 shows the regrets of all analyzed future states. 
The minimize maximum regret criterion leads to the choice of the design alternative Qd5 when all 
energy price scenarios are considered (see Table 31 and Figure 48). Climate projections in the near 
future and in the far future do not influence this design choice, which is determined by the energy 
price scenarios. If high energy prices occur, Qd5 leads to better performance than Qd4, and for low 
energy prices, Qd5 will reduce losses in comparison with Qd6.  
The results summarized in Table 31 show that in case of high energy prices the “cost” of selecting 
the small design alternative (Qd2) will be 6-7 times higher than the regret in a case where the largest 
design alternative (Qd6) was selected and low energy prices will occur.  
From a project developer’s perspective, the project will most probably be stopped if the low energy 
price scenario is considered to be a likely scenario. Also when neglecting the low energy price 
scenario, Qd5 is the most robust concept for the near future. However, if the project is postponed 
and the central and high energy price scenarios are considered, the ”minimize maximum regret” 
criterion will lead to Qd4. 
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Figure 48: Regret of climate change projections and energy price scenarios for the design 
alternatives (Qd2 to Qd6) in the climate change projections for the near (2035), middle (2060) and 
far (2085) futures. Regrets based on the high energy price scenarios are shown as blue dotted 
lines. Red continuous lines refer to the central energy price scenario and green dashed lines 
represent the results of the low energy price scenarios. Each line stands for a climate change 
projection. 
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Table 31: Regrets of climate projections and energy price scenarios for the design alternatives 
Maximum Regret [CHF mill.]       
Climate Projection Energy Price Scenario Qd2 Qd3 Qd4 Qd5 Qd6 
2035 High 42.74 19.08 6.73 1.51 0.00 
2035 Central 12.91 3.98 0.39 0.16 1.54 
2035 Low 0.00 0.96 3.21 6.06 8.89 
2035 Low-High 42.74 19.08 6.73 6.06 8.89 
2060 High 40.21 18.99 7.63 2.27 0.00 
2060 Central 11.32 3.56 0.44 0.59 2.26 
2060 Low 0.00 1.04 3.52 6.52 9.43 
2060 Low-High 40.21 18.99 7.63 6.52 9.43 
2085 High 41.97 18.22 7.07 1.87 0.66 
2085 Central 12.40 3.45 0.38 1.30 3.42 
2085 Low 0.00 0.92 3.48 6.68 9.72 
2085 Low-High 41.97 18.22 7.07 6.68 9.72 
 
Satisfice over a Wide Range of Future Conditions 
The domain criterion defines a robust design as one that performs reasonably compared to the 
alternatives across a wide range of plausible futures. The aim is to reduce the interval of plausible 
futures over which a strategy performs poorly (Lempert and Collins 2007).  
A possible approach is to count the cases having the minimum regret and to select the design 
alternatives having the highest number of minimum regrets. However, this approach can lead to 
questionable results, as the criterion is highly sensitive to the selected scenarios and simulation 
intervals.  
When simulating a few scenarios at large intervals only, the criterion can lead to unreliable results. 
This case study gives preference to design alternatives on the extreme side (Qd2 and Qd6). The 
smallest design has low regrets for low energy prices, whereas the largest design is preferred for 
high energy prices, as shown in Table 32. 
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Table 32: Number of minimum regret cases 
No of Minimum Regret 
Cases       
Inflow Projection Energy Price Scenario Qd2 Qd3 Qd4 Qd5 Qd6 
2035 High 0 0 0 0 10 
2035 Central 0 0 2 8 0 
2035 Low 10 0 0 0 0 
2035 Low-High 10 0 2 8 10 
2060 High 0 0 0 0 10 
2060 Central 0 0 6 4 0 
2060 Low 10 0 0 0 0 
2060 Low-High 10 0 6 4 10 
2085 High 0 0 0 2 8 
2085 Central 0 0 7 3 0 
2085 Low 10 0 0 0 0 
2085 Low-High 10 0 7 5 8 
 
An alternative to analyzing the domain criteria is to map the regrets over the future states. Figure 
49 shows the regrets against the inflow volume and the energy price. The inflow volumes represent 
the climate change projections. In this case, the mapping shows almost vertical isolines of regret, 
indicating that the regret is mainly sensitive to the energy price scenarios.  
Qd4 has low regrets in the area of the central price estimations. Larger design alternatives have low 
regrets for higher energy prices, whereas small design alternatives perform better for low energy 
prices.  
In general, the regret criterion does not differentiate between more harsh or more opportune 
futures. In Figure 49, “A” indicates the area with higher inflow and higher energy prices compared 
to the reference scenario. All climate projections result in higher inflow volumes than those in the 
reference period thereby leading to a vertical split of the plots. A comparison between the areas A 
in each of the various plots shows that a selection of Qd5 is mainly driven by more opportune 
futures. A robust design choice with focus on more harsh future states would be Qd4. 
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Figure 49: Regrets over the simulation range for the analyzed design alternatives (Qd2 to Qd6), 
“A” indicates the area with higher inflow and higher energy prices compared to the reference 
scenario 
9.4.4 Discussion 
The Robust Decision Making method provides information on the performance of scenarios across 
large ensembles of plausible futures. Potential vulnerabilities can be identified and this can help to 
identify better design concepts.  
A main advantage of Robust Decision Making is that various scenarios can be directly, i.e. without 
further simplification, integrated into the procedure. Therefore, this seems to be particularly 
valuable in cases where climate change scenarios have to be considered. 
A limitation of the method is that a large set of simulation runs is required.  
Qd2
Energy Price [CHF/MWh]
In
fl
o
w
 V
o
lu
m
e
 [
1
0 
6
 m
3
]
 
 
40 60 80 100 120
60
62
64
66
68
70
Qd3
Energy Price [CHF/MWh]
In
fl
o
w
 V
o
lu
m
e
 [
1
0 
6
 m
3
]
 
 
40 60 80 100 120
60
62
64
66
68
70
40 60 80 100 120
60
62
64
66
68
70
Qd4
Energy Price [CHF/MWh]
In
fl
o
w
 V
o
lu
m
e
 [
1
0 
6
 m
3
]
 
 
40 60 80 100 120
60
62
64
66
68
70
Qd5
Energy Price [CHF/MWh]
In
fl
o
w
 V
o
lu
m
e
 [
1
0 
6
 m
3
]
 
 
40 60 80 100 120
60
62
64
66
68
70
Qd6
Energy Price [CHF/MWh]
In
fl
o
w
 V
o
lu
m
e
 [
1
0 
6
 m
3
]
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
A
AA
A
Regret [CHF million]
A
 124 
Another disadvantage is that the results depend on the selected design alternatives and future 
states. The identification of key scenarios in a systematic and transparent way can be a major 
challenge for a project team.  
The approach to count the cases with minimum regrets and then to select the design alternative 
having the highest number of minimum regrets can lead to misleading design choices. A better 
approach to analyze the domain criterion is mapping of the regret. 
9.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The classical approach of selecting the design alternative with the highest NPV and neglecting 
uncertainties of climate change and energy price fluctuations leads to Qd4.  
This design choice is basically confirmed by the Info-Gap Decision Theory method. For a risk-averse 
project team, Qd4 would be the preferred solution. This design alternative gives a positive NPV also 
under harsher futures. If more attention is given to opportuneness, Qd5 or Qd6 could be selected, 
but Qd6 is found to be attractive only if there is a projected increase in energy price and inflow. 
Robust Decision Making tends to favor the larger design discharge. The minimize maximum regret 
and domain criteria lead to the choice of the design alternative Qd5. However, as shown by the 
mapping of the regret, this design selection is mainly driven by the regrets of more opportune 
futures. A robust design choice with focus on harsher future states would be Qd4. 
In addition, Robust Decision Making shows that the project is highly vulnerable to dropping energy 
prices, whereas the plant is not vulnerable to climate changes. The absolute vulnerability is higher 
for larger design alternatives, as they require higher upfront investment costs. But the analyses 
show that in case of high energy prices the “cost” of selecting the small design alternative (Qd2) will 
be 6-7 times that of the regret if the largest design alternative (Qd6) is selected and energy prices 
are low.  
The classical approach, Info-Gap Decision Theory and Robust Decision Making reached similar 
results. The classical approach as well as the robustness curves of the Info-Gap Decision Theory 
promote Qd4. Robust Decision Making suggests the larger design alternative Qd5, but only if the 
decision gives the same weight to more harsh and more opportune futures. 
The application of the methods leads to the following main findings: Firstly, the classical approach 
can lead to robust design choices also if the uncertainties are not incorporated into the decision 
finding process. Secondly, Info-Gap Decision Theory and Robust Decision Making help to assess the 
robustness of the different design alternatives of a hydropower project and lead to similar but not 
entirely matching results. The final selection depends primarily on the risk attitudes of the decision 
makers and less on the applied method. Both methods suggest Qd4 in cases where the focus is 
placed on more adverse conditions, whereas Qd5 is suggested in cases where attention is also given 
to the opportuneness. 
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Current research in respect to climate change and hydropower design has mainly focused on Robust 
Decision Making, whereas Info-Gap Decision Theory has not been applied for hydropower design so 
far.  
The observation that the design choice derived by the classical approach can also lead to a robust 
design is essential for the next steps in developing design methods considering uncertainties. It 
highlights the priority placed on providing methods that can be efficiently applied to check the 
robustness of a design choice derived via the classical approach. Based on the finding of this study, 
Info-Gap Decision Theory is a very promising method for this purpose.  
Therefore, a two-step approach for hydropower projects is suggested. In a first step the classical 
approach can be applied, and in a second step Info-Gap Decision Theory is used to prove the 
robustness. Especially in early design stages, where several design choices have to be made within 
limited time and with limited resources, this procedure could be applied. 
In addition, comprehensive forecast scenarios and climate change projections are not often 
available in an early design stage. Info-Gap Decision Theory can be applied with best estimates of 
the uncertain factors. It allows identification of the uncertainty level at which a different design 
choice leads to a better performance. It is suitable to check the robustness of various design choices 
derived by the classical approach. 
For later design stages and larger projects both methods may be applied. However, it has to be 
noted that several overlapping working steps are required for the application of Info-Gap Decision 
Theory and Robust Decision Making. Therefore a combined procedure is proposed, which is shown 
in Figure 50. The combined procedure requires 10 working steps and achieves the following 
advantages: 
 Reduction of working steps 
 Direct incorporation of scenarios 
 Including sensitivity and vulnerability analyses 
 Analysis of switch of design preferences  
 Differentiation between robustness and opportuneness 
 Regret over complete range 
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Figure 50: Working steps for combined Robust Decision Making (RDM) and Info-Gap Decision 
Theory (IGDT) procedure 
  
IGDT 
6. Uncertainty Model 
7. Performance Requirement 
8. Robustness and Opportuneness 
10. Selection of Design Alternative 
RDM 
2. Future States 
3. Design Alternatives 
4. Simulation of Performance 
5. Sensitivity and Vulnerability 
1. Case Definition 
Combined Procedure 
9. Regret 
 127 
 
 128 
 Versatility 
10.1 Introduction 
The concept of versatility covers a wide field of possible applications and the finally selected 
approach depends significantly on the specific hydropower project. The derivation of a general 
procedure to achieve versatility is therefore not seen as helpful. However, in order to provide a 
comprehensive overview on different methods applicable in hydropower design, this chapter 
describes the general concept and possible methods to achieve versatility. In addition, a summary 
of previous studies in the hydropower sector is given.  
In this work, versatility is defined as the ability of the hydropower scheme to provide additional 
services not originally included to the same extent in the requirements definition, without any 
structural adjustments. Compared to flexibility or interoperability, it is a non-structural measure 
(see Figure 33).  
For hydropower projects, versatility can be achieved by the adaptation of operation rules or by 
portfolio planning. Adaptation of operation rules focuses on pure hydropower projects, whereas 
portfolio planning could be applied for multipurpose schemes. 
10.2 Adaptation of Operation Rules – Previous Studies 
In general, operation rules are defined during the planning phase and are followed over the entire 
operation period. A driving factor for the adaptation of operation rules can be a changing demand 
for services to be provided by a hydropower scheme during the operation period. In other words, 
changing energy market conditions can emphasize a rethinking of the operation rules. Several Swiss 
and European utilities have started to analyze their current operation rules in the wake of the drop 
of energy prices in 2008.  
Adaptation of the operation rules can also increase the performance of a scheme in a case where 
the effective inflow is not matching the estimated inflow originally defined for the construction 
project.  
The possibilities of adjustment of the operation rules are constrained by the technical characteristics 
of a power plant, such as minimum operation level, full supply water level, flood water levels, 
capacity of outlet structures and waterways, limits of transient conditions in the waterways, or 
regulations on water releases. In addition, existing agreements and regulatory constraints are often 
strongly limiting the range of potential adjustments.  
Project designs that select versatility to manage uncertainties need to identify options for widening 
the respective limits in order to increase the production flexibility for future conditions.  
A few studies were carried out to analyze the challenges of reservoir management and operation 
rules for various climate change projections. 
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The value of an adaptive management of the operation rules has been clearly demonstrated by 
Arsenault et al. (2013). The study compares the possibilities of adding an additional turbine to an 
existing power plant and adapting the operation rules of this power plant for a wide range of climate 
change projections. The study concludes that power production can be increased both by adding 
turbines and by optimizing the operation rules. The concept of adapting the operating rules is found 
to be sufficient to reap most of the benefits of increased water availability.  
Georgakakos et al. (2012a, b) highlight the value of adaptive reservoir management in the context 
of climatic change for Northern California. The study shows that adaptive management can be an 
effective mitigation measure for climate change and improve the performance of the scheme in 
terms of water supply, energy, and environmental water.  
Minville et al. (2010) evaluate the water resource system of the Peribonka River in Canada under 
various hydrological regimes using different climate change scenarios. In this climate change 
context, adaptive operation rules are used and compared with the historical operation rules. 
Veijalainen et al. (2010) studied the climate change impact on hydrology and water resources in the 
Vuoksi watershed in Finland in order to assess the possibilities of adapting lake regulation to the 
projected changes. The study concludes that a modification of the regulation practices and limits is 
an effective way to adapt to climate change.  
10.3 Portfolio Planning 
Versatility is also related to the concept of portfolio planning. The principal concept of portfolio 
planning is that by providing a greater portfolio of services the uncertainties can be better absorbed. 
This concept could be valuable for multi-purpose projects. Multipurpose projects can provide a wide 
range of services, such as: 
 Energy production:  
o base load energy 
o peak energy 
o reserve energy 
 Irrigation 
 Industrial water supply 
 Municipal water supply 
 Water supply for fire fighting 
 Navigation 
 Flood control 
 Drought control 
 Aquaculture 
 Tourism 
A kind of hedging could be provided by diversifying the service portfolio of a multi-purpose project 
into services that are not affected by the same uncertainties.  
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To the knowledge of the author, this approach is currently not in use for hydropower design. Some 
studies (Means et al., 2010) indicate its potential for application in the water sector or more 
specifically in the hydropower sector. 
10.4 Conclusions 
Versatility is a hydropower scheme’s ability to provide additional services not originally included in 
the requirements definition. The concept focuses on the adaptation of the operation without any 
structural adjustments. Previous studies on the adaptation of operation rules (e.g.  Arsenault et al., 
2013; Georgakakos et al., 2012a, b) underline the value of this design objective for hydropower 
storage schemes. 
Multipurpose projects would also allow for portfolio planning. However, there is a lack of experience 
in the formulation and application of portfolio planning in the hydropower sector.  
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 Flexibility 
11.1 Introduction 
A hydropower project is a flexible system with several options, such as: 
 Increase of the storage capacity by dam heightening or additional storage 
 Upgrade of the installed capacity  
 Extension by an additional diversion scheme 
 Change of a storage scheme to a pump storage scheme, or 
 Investment timing 
Many hydropower projects have undergone reconstruction or upgrading to better match the 
observed conditions and the forecasted scenarios for the next decades. Shifts in the electric supply 
market, hydrology, sedimentation or ecological preferences have changed the definition of what 
effective designs are, and so the originally constructed scheme was adjusted or the option was 
identified, but not realized. Some examples of design options in hydropower are summarized in 
Table 33. 
However, the original design of most of these projects did not consider a possible future structural 
adaptation. Especially extensions of waterways can lead to significantly higher costs if the possibility 
of an extension was not included in the original design. In addition, considering the value of an 
option to extend a project can increase the value of a scheme. Finally, this can also have an influence 
on the selection of design alternatives for greenfield projects. In some cases, smaller concepts with 
an extension option for changing conditions in the future might turn out to be the better design 
alternatives.  
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Table 33: Examples of flexibility in hydropower projects 
   
KW Bürglen, Switzerland Göscheneralp dam, 
Switzerland 
KW Forbach, Germany 
The Bürglen power plant 
started operation in 1964. 
After about 50 years of 
operation, the option to install 
an additional turbine was 
analyzed with the aim to 
reduce the spill. Finally, an 
additional unit with an 
installed capacity of 3.5 MW 
was added, leading to a total 
installed capacity of 24.5 MW. 
Because of the available space 
in the power house only minor 
adjustments were necessary, 
i.e. no adjustments were 
required on the headworks 
and the main waterway.  
The Göscheneralp dam is a 
155 m high earth-core rockfill 
dam which forms the 
75 million m3 reservoir for the 
Göschenen hydropower plant 
with a 164 MW installed 
capacity. The dam was 
constructed between 1955 
and 1962 and was the highest 
earth-core rockfill dam in 
Europe at the time.  
About 50 years later, the 
market conditions changed 
and a further increase in peak 
energy was expected.  
Therefore, the option of 
heightening the dam to 
increase the reservoir volume 
by about 15% was 
investigated.  
The dam heightening project 
was not realized and finally 
abandoned, partly due to the 
significant drop of the 
electricity prices after 2008. 
The Forbach power plant is 
part of the German 
hydropower scheme known as 
Rudolf-Fettweis-Werk. The 
scheme was constructed 
between 1914 and 1926.  
Already at the time of 
construction, an alignment for 
an additional penstock was 
foreseen to make allowance 
for a more cost-efficient 
installation of an additional 
penstock should the project be 
expanded. 
 
One approach to analyze the flexibility of hydropower or, more generally, of infrastructures is the 
Real Option Analysis. Real option in engineering is conceptually similar to financial options. Both 
financial and real options are rights but not obligations to future actions. The analysis of financial 
options is a well-established discipline in financial economics based on a detailed theoretical 
foundation. In addition, several application tools have been developed and are increasingly applied 
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also in engineering. Some research studies show that this method is promising also for hydropower 
plants. An overview on these studies is provided in Chapter 11.2. 
However, according to de Neufville and Scholtes (2011), the theory of financial options is of limited 
value in the context of engineering projects. This is because the context of engineering projects 
differs significantly from that of financial transactions. Financial option theory is based on 
assumptions and on a context that makes their application questionable for engineering systems. 
The context differences or financial, design and, more specifically, hydropower options are 
summarized in Table 34. 
Another approach for design flexibility in engineering projects, which includes different tools and 
analysis techniques, has been proposed by de Neufville and Scholtes (2011). The proposed method 
focuses on large-scale, long-lasting projects with irreversible investment decisions. It holds the 
promise that a project’s value can be enhanced by recognizing the fact that the future is inevitably 
uncertain and that by creating flexible designs one can adapt to eventualities. This method can be 
summarized under the term “Flexible Design”. 
In general, it is not possible to make a final and conclusive recommendation as to whether the Real 
Option Analysis or the Flexible Design approach is more appropriate for hydropower projects. For a 
pure hydropower project, which will trade its electricity on the market, Real Option Analysis can be 
applied. In cases where the project is located in a country without electricity market or where 
additional services, such as water supply, flood protection etc. are or can be provided in the future, 
Flexible Design is the preferred approach. 
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Table 34 Context differences between financial and design options. Source of content of the 
columns “Financial option” and “Design option in engineering systems”: de Neufville and Scholtes 
(2011).  
Financial option Design option in engineering 
systems 
Design options in hydropower  
Asset is widely replicated 
(company stock, commodities, 
financial assets) 
Asset is unique (a bridge, a 
building, a new product) 
Hydropower plants are unique 
structures 
There is a market for such 
assets 
No market in general (maybe 
for a product such as for 
copper from mine) 
An electricity market exists in 
some countries.  
Typically, no market exists for 
other services that can be 
provided by a multipurpose 
project (irrigation water, flood 
protection, municipal water 
supply etc.) 
A replicating portfolio can be 
created 
Unlikely to be able to create 
replicating portfolio (maybe in 
short term, as for traded 
commodities such as copper, 
but unlikely over years of 
option) 
In countries having an 
electricity market, energy 
supply can be traded. 
Very unlikely for other services 
that can be provided by a 
multipurpose project. 
Option valid for months Option for years, even decades Options for several decades 
Market data available Data spotty, maybe 
unavailable 
Market data for electricity are 
available in some countries. 
Apart from the market data, 
inflow data may be unavailable 
or very limited 
Recent market data credible 
for anticipation of market 
variations over life of option 
Historical data do not 
anticipate trend breakers likely 
to occur over long life of option 
Historical data of long-term 
inflow and electricity prices 
can have a limited reliability 
for anticipating future 
variations. Climate changes 
and unpredictable events on 
the energy markets make it 
questionable to base an 
assessment entirely on 
historical data.  
Option characteristics well 
defined (strike price, time of 
maturity, payoffs) 
Option characteristics may be 
unclear and change over time 
(indefinite life of option, 
indefinite exercise type, size, 
and price) 
Options of hydropower plants 
are often highly unclear. As 
well as technical issues 
(variation of technical 
lifetime), contractual or 
political constraints can 
influence the characteristics of 
an option.  
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11.2 Real Option Analysis 
11.2.1 Description of Method 
The Real Option Analysis method was developed by Black and Scholes (1974) for the financial sector. 
It recognizes that the decisions that determine project cash flows are made sequentially over many 
episodes and that the value of a project can be increased if uncertainties are faced by flexibility.  
Real Option Analysis holds the promise that the value of flexibility can be evaluated also for an 
engineering system. Consequently, the economic value of a project at a stage where it is still 
relatively unformed is often greater than the discounted present value of the estimated future cash 
flow. Embedding flexibility in infrastructure systems already optimized for performance under 
traditional deterministic concepts has reportedly led to substantial savings in numerous cases (de 
Weck et al., 2004; Priemus et al., 2008) 
Real options can be divided into those that are either “on” or “in” projects. Real options “on” 
projects are financial options, in which the engineering system itself is treated as a black box. Real 
options “in” projects focus on the flexibility of an engineering system. Therefore, engineering 
knowledge to design appropriate options is required (de Neufville, 2004).  
Different methods have been established to evaluate real options. According to Mun (2002), the 
methods mostly used are closed-form solutions, partial differential equations, and binomial lattice 
trees. Closed-form solutions, such as the Black Scholes model, are exact and easy to implement. But 
they are also very specific in nature and have limited modelling flexibility. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
provide a comprehensive overview on methods based on partial differential equations and their 
theoretical background for investment under uncertainty.  
Compared to those methods, the binomial lattice approach has several advantages for the 
application in hydropower projects. The binomial lattice method, which was originally proposed by 
Cox et al. (1979), is highly flexible and easy to understand and can provide good approximation. 
According to Mun (2002), the binomial lattices have been accepted by the industry for application 
in real option analysis, mainly because of their transparency and simplicity, which can be essential 
for the development of a project strategy involving different decision makers.  
11.2.2 Application to Hydropower Design 
Michailidis and Mattas (2007) applied the real option approach to an irrigation dam in Greece. The 
analyzed option is delay in investment time. One of the main findings is that new advanced 
methodologies could significantly diminish the weakness of the discounted cash flow techniques.  
Bockman et al. (2006) present a real options-based method to define investment timing and optimal 
capacity choice for small hydropower projects. Additionally, an optimal trigger price for initiating an 
investment is estimated. The method is illustrated at the example of three small hydropower 
projects in Norway.  
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Wang (2008) provides a comprehensive overview on real options applied in river basins. His work 
shows that applying real options allows the net benefit to be increased and/or the downside risk to 
be reduced.  
Elverhøi et al. (2010) present a decision support framework for hydropower producers with 
production facilities due for rehabilitation. Real Option Analysis was used to evaluate the 
investment opportunities.  
Fertig et al. (2013) analyzed optimal investment timing and capacity choice for a pumped 
hydropower storage scheme in Norway. In total five capacity alternatives of the hydropower 
scheme with arbitrage in the German spot market are analyzed. Real Option Analysis was used to 
value the investment opportunity in order to account for uncertainty of the electricity market and 
intertemporal choice.  
11.3 Flexible Design 
Flexible Design focuses on the methods and tools that will lead to a flexible system able to adapt to 
future needs and opportunities and therefore able to increase its long-term expected value, 
compared with traditional procedures for developing and implementing projects (de Neufville and 
Scholtes, 2011). The basic procedure consist of the following working steps: 
 Estimating the distribution of future possibilities 
 Identifying candidate flexibilities 
 Evaluating and choosing flexible design 
 Implementing flexibility 
De Neufville and Scholtes (2011) provide a detailed description of each working step and of the 
methods and tools generally applicable to engineering projects. In contrast to robust design or 
versatility, flexibility analyzes structural adjustment. 
Designing flexibility is a kind of engineering thinking rather than a clearly defined procedure or 
method. Therefore, several methods or tools that are used in Flexible Design, such as Monte Carlo 
simulations or dynamic forecasting, are applied also in other design methods for uncertainty.  
In contrast to real option analysis, which is strongly influenced by the financial option approach, the 
methods for Flexible Design have been adjusted to develop engineering projects.  
11.4 Application to the Case Study 
A Flexible Design approach has been selected for the case study. The hydropower plant on which 
the case study was carried out is described in Chapter 8. 
The objective of the IGDT and RDM methods is to increase robustness by selecting the best design 
alternative and not to anticipate any structural adjustments during the operation phase of the 
project. In contrast thereto, the following design methods include the possibility of structural 
adjustment of the power plant during the operation phase.  
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The option of expanding the plant size by installing an additional turbine if future changes is 
analyzed. It is assumed that the design discharge can be increased should the plant owner decide 
to do so.  
The best case of a one-stage project leading to the highest ENPV is the design alternative Qd5.  
Two multi-stage strategies have been analyzed. One possibility would be to construct a smaller 
project (Qd4) in a first stage and to allow for adding a turbine if future conditions lead to better 
production conditions. This concept anticipates an increase to a total capacity equal to the capacity 
of Qd5 or Qd6. This extension strategy is referred to as ExtQd4.  
The second extension strategy foresees the construction of Qd5 and possible extension to the 
installed capacity of Qd6, referenced as ExtQd5. 
11.4.1 Modeling Framework 
For the evaluation of different design alternatives, it is necessary to derive the expected net present 
value (ENPV) and other distribution of outcome indicators such as VaG and VaR. The results finally 
allow a comparison of the different design strategies and are the final point of multiple steps of 
methodologies (see Figure 51). In principal, the structure reflects the basic working steps required 
to calculate the economic performance parameter of a hydropower project, with the difference that 
distributions of future possibilities of the main factors are considered.  
The study focuses on the uncertainty of inflow and thus on the uncertainty of both energy 
production and electricity price. Factors for which uncertainty was considered in modelling are 
marked red in Figure 51. 
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Figure 51: Model cascade used for this case study  
11.4.2 Climate Change –Inflow – Energy Production  
Different climate change projections were considered to reflect the uncertainties of the future 
inflow as derived by the methodology described in Chapter 8.3. The inflow series simulated by the 
hydrological model were used in energy production simulations with daily simulation time steps 
(see Chapter 8.4). In order to cover the assumed economic lifetime (50 years), the climate change 
projection for the period from 2021 to 2050 was extended by the first 20 years of the projections of 
the 2060 period. The operation rules of the hydropower plant are simple as it is a run-of scheme in 
which only the ecological flow has to be released while the remaining inflow can be used for energy 
production as long as it is below the maximum discharge capacity. The annual energy productions 
over the 50-year simulation period for the different climate change projections and for selected 
design alternatives are shown in Figure 52. An annual trend of about 5% can be observed for all of 
the design alternatives. The design alternatives show the following average energy productions: 
Qd4 is 68.3 GWh, Qd5 is 71.9 GWh, and Qd6 is 73.9 GWh. 
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Figure 52: Annual energy production considering the climate change projections for the design 
alternatives Qd4 (black lines), Qd5 (red lines) and Qd6 (green lines) 
11.4.3 Electricity Price 
For long-term investments, a possible approach to describe the electricity prices in an electricity 
market is the Geometric Brownian Motion. This model reflects only long-term variation, whereas 
short-term variations are neglected. However, Smith and Schwartz (2000) claim that for long-term 
investments the long-term factor is the determining one. Also Pindyck (2000) argues that, when 
considering long-term investments, a geometric Brownian motion description of the price will not 
give large errors. Besides that, also other studies analyzing long-term investment decisions in the 
energy sector rely on this approach (e.g. Fleten et al., 2007). Based on the foregoing aspects and 
due to the simplicity of the approach, the geometric Brownian motion was selected for the case 
study.  
The change of the electricity price dS is defined by the geometric Brownian motion as: 
𝑑𝑆 =  𝜇 𝑆 𝑑𝑡 +  𝜎 𝑆 𝑑𝑧 (15) 
 
where μ is the annual risk-adjusted growth rate and σ is the annual volatility of the electricity price. 
The last term dz is the Wiener process, a special diffusion process. For details on this approach and 
possible applications see Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
In this study, cash flow calculations with annual time steps are applied.  
For the simulation of this process, the electricity price at discrete time steps can be solved according 
to Brigo et al. (2007) as follows: 
𝑆(𝑡𝑖+1) = 𝑆(𝑡𝑖) 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ([𝜇 −
1
2
 𝜎2] (𝑡𝑖+1 − 𝑡𝑖) + 𝜎√𝑡𝑖+1 − 𝑡𝑖 𝑍𝑖+1)  (16) 
 
Where Z1, Z2,…Zn are independent random draws from standard normal distribution.  
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The model is to represent the long-term electricity price and not short-term deviations. Therefore, 
model parameters are often derived from forward contracts with longest time to maturity. One 
possibility would be to analyze Phelix futures prices, the physical electricity index in the EEX spot 
market for Germany and Austria. However, there is a very limited trading volume for long-term 
contracts and therefore it will not reflect the market conditions (Fertig et al., 2016).  
Thus, a sensitivity analysis was carried out, analyzing the effect of volatility on the value of the 
flexible design alternatives. To limit the sensitivity analysis to a plausible range, the annual volatility 
estimated by Fleten et al. (2007) on the basis of over-the-counter contracts in Norway with time 
periods longer than 3 years was used as a benchmark. The study estimated an annual volatility of 
0.103. The sensitivity analysis was carried out for an annual volatility from 0.05 to 0.20. 
In order to allow a comparison between these results and the findings from the RDM and IGDT 
methods, a starting electricity price (S0) of 65 CHF/MWh was assumed. This value corresponds to 
the best estimate or ‘Central’ electricity price scenario assumed for the IGDT or RDM approach, 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 53: Geometric Brownian Motion of electricity price (μ=0, σ=0.10, S0=65). Mean path (red), 
5 sample paths (black), 10% and 90% percentile paths (red dashed) 
11.4.4 Identifying Candidate Flexibilities 
The flexibility of the power plant is limited to a potential scaling of the installed capacity. Starting 
from the static evaluation of the different design alternatives, the analyzed design alternatives cover 
design discharges within a range from 4 m3/s (Qd4) to 6m3/s (Qd6). 
Other design flexibilities, such as constructing a reservoir, can be excluded because of the physical 
constraints at the project site.  
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11.4.5 Valuation Model 
The valuation model has to consider the possibility of design changes and their effects. De Neufville 
and Scholtes (2011) argue that the rules for exercising flexibility should mimic what decision makers 
would do if they ever had to deal with a situation. 
Power plant owners often base their decisions on historical data covering the last few years. 
Therefore, it was assumed that a decision on whether or not to make an extension is triggered by 
the average of the electricity price and inflow over the last three years before the decision on a 
potential expansion is made. Based on the three-year average electricity price and inflow, the 
annual income, and finally in consideration of the investment costs for the additional turbine, the 
NPV is calculated. If the NPV of the extension project turns out to be positive for the remaining 
lifetime, the decision will be to install the additional turbine, ignoring the fact that a later investment 
may be more beneficial. 
Because of the limited space in the power house, the upgrade project can be realized only once in 
the project’s lifetime. 
The decision-making process does not necessarily lead to an optimal choice, as revenue may 
decrease over the following years and finally lead to a non-profitable investment. However, it was 
found that such a decision rule was the best way to mimic decision-making for mid-size hydropower 
plants. 
The valuation model finally calculates the expected net present value for the project without and 
with the extension by simulating 1000 runs.  
A discount rate of 3% and water royalties of 110 CHF/kW for the gross capacity were assumed. The 
other input parameters for the economical calculations are summarized in Table 35. 
Another important assumption is that the additional turbine will be installed during the winter 
months and will not cause any energy production loss to the base project. Also, it is assumed that 
the additional turbine will start full operation shortly after installation in the same year and can 
generate the full annual production of the respective year. 
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Table 35: Economical input parameters for valuation model, extension project ExtQd4 
 Base Project 
Extension Project 
ExtQd4 
Parameter Qd4 Extension to Qd5 Extension to Qd6 
CAPEX CHF 47.1 million CHF 3.2 million CHF 5.8 million 
OPEX 
1% of CAPEX, plus CHF 
50‘000/year 
1% of CAPEX 1% of CAPEX 
Re-investment in E&M equipment  
35 years after 
start of operation 
35 years after 
start of operation 
35 years after 
start of operation 
Construction period 3 years - - 
First year of operation 4th year 
same as year of 
installation 
same as year of 
installation 
Economic lifetime 50 years end of base project end of base project 
 
Table 36: Economical input parameters for valuation model, extension project ExtQd5 
 Base Project 
Extension Project 
ExtQd5 
Parameter Qd5 Extension to Qd6 
CAPEX CHF 50.1 million CHF 2.8 million 
OPEX 
1% of CAPEX, plus 
CHF 50‘000/year 
1% of CAPEX 
Re-investment in E&M equipment  
35 years after 
start of operation 
35 years after 
start of operation 
Construction period 3 years - 
First year of operation 4th year 
same year as 
installation 
Economic lifetime 50 years end of base project 
 
11.4.6 Evaluating and Choosing Flexible Design 
The results show a low value for flexible design strategies. Compared with the best one-stage project 
Qd5, the multi-stage project ExtQd4 leads to a less than one percent increase of the ENPV for an 
annual volatility σ = 0.10. If the volatility is equal to 0.20, an increase of about 3.6% can be expected 
(see Table 37).  
Upgrading the design alternative Qd5 to Qd6 is even less attractive and gives no increase of the 
ENPV.  
The measures of distribution of the best single-stage project Qd5 and the two multi-stage projects 
for an annual volatility of 0.20 are shown in Table 38. Also, the comparison of the Value at Gain 
(VaG) and Value at Risk (VaR) of the one-stage and multi-stage projects underlines the low value of 
flexibility in this hydropower plant. 
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Table 37: Relative change of ENPV compared to Qd5 
σ ExtQd4 ExtQd5 
0.05 -1.2% 0.0% 
0.10 0.4% 0.0% 
0.15 2.2% 0.0% 
0.20 3.6% 0.0% 
 
Table 38: Measures of distribution of outcomes of Qd5, ExtQd4 and ExtQd5 for σ = 0.20 
Metric Qd5 ExtQd4 ExtQd5 
VaG (P 90%) 114.4 113.6 114.4 
ENPV 17.8 18.4 17.8 
VaR (P 10%) -54.8 -51.8 -54.8 
 
11.5 Discussion 
Flexible Design can be useful to identify a flexible strategy that leads to a higher project value, 
including a balanced assessment of the investment risk.  
The method can be applied and adjusted to consider different uncertain parameters with probability 
information being required for each of them. Especially, the elaboration of an electricity price model 
for long-term future projections is a difficult task. This was found to be the major limitation of this 
approach as regards its application in engineering practice. Long-term stochastic electricity price 
models are not often available for hydropower projects, especially for smaller hydropower plants  
In addition, the decision-making process should mimic the decision of the power plant’s 
management. For the case study, it was assumed that the management decision was based on 
short-term historical data. However, this may vary between responsible managers and can change 
over the lifetime of a project. In contrast, real option valuation does without such an assumption on 
the decision-making process. It optimizes the value of flexibility independently of management 
preferences, which is an advantage in cases where available information on management 
preferences is limited.  
11.6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
For large uncertainties and for hydropower projects having a substantial flexibility, real options or 
more generally flexible design strategies can lead to a more valuable project. However, the value of 
expansion in this case study is low. 
For hydropower plants, additional important aspects have to be considered and this clearly limits 
the attractiveness of a flexible concept.  
As mentioned by Gaudard et al. (2016), the regulatory framework can limit the plant operator’s 
flexibility and often makes it difficult to adopt a real-option approach. 
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In Switzerland as well as in most countries, a structural modification or an extension requires a 
revision of the existing concession agreement on the water rights or conclusion of a new agreement. 
This can be a long process which may take several years. It has to be considered that public 
preferences can change in the future and might finally lead to an opposition to a project’s expansion. 
Consequently, it has to be considered that the expansion can be rejected or that the construction 
can be delayed. Depending on the remaining technical lifetime or concession period, a delay of the 
construction project can eventually have a significant impact on its profitability.  
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 General Conclusions and Outlook 
12.1 Uncertainties of Small and Large Hydropower Projects in Switzerland 
A main objective of this study is to assess uncertainties of hydropower projects in Switzerland. The 
outside view has been applied to analyze cost overruns and performance of energy production 
forecasts for large and small hydropower projects in Switzerland (see Chapter 5). 
12.1.1 Construction Costs 
The results show that the range of cost overrun incurred by small hydropower projects is on average 
quite similar to that of large projects. However, the chance that small projects will exceed the 
estimated costs is much smaller than for large projects. Costs for small hydropower plants were 
underestimated in about 1 out of 2 projects, whereas 67% of the large projects suffered a cost 
overrun. 
Small projects tend to have more extreme cost overruns than large facilities. The density trace of 
small plants shows a much longer tail to adverse outcomes. This long tail indicates a potential for 
improvement, especially in terms of the methods applied for estimating the construction costs, 
including quality of design, and in terms of appropriate approaches to controlling actual 
construction costs. 
Compared to previous research studies on cost overrun of large hydropower schemes, the results 
for Swiss projects show that the average cost overrun is significantly below the figures derived from 
global databases. The data sample of Swiss projects shows an average cost overrun of 15%, whereas 
previous studies presented figures in the range from 27% up to 96%. The chance that a large project 
will suffer a cost overrun is in a similar range as what previous studies indicated. The main reason 
for the difference most probably is that the present study analyses Swiss projects only and the 
project faced much lower commercial and political uncertainties compared with some of the other 
countries.  
12.1.2 Energy Production 
The analyses of mid-term energy production of small hydropower plants show in general a high 
tendency for energy production to be overestimated. In 7 out of 10 projects, the estimated energy 
production was below actual generation, leading to an average production overestimation of 14%.  
The projects show a relatively poor performance in the first production year then followed by a 
decrease in production overestimation. This indicates frequent early-life failures of the small power 
plants.  
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To provide an indication of how accurate long-term forecasts for small hydropower plants are, an 
additional data sample was established. The production was slightly overestimated also in the long 
term. Production overestimation was 5% on average, and about 20% of the projects in the sample 
achieved less than 80% of the estimated long-term production. This tendency for production 
overestimation in small hydropower projects supports the findings from mid-term production data. 
In contrast, the production of large hydropower projects in the long term was on average 8% higher 
than the estimated figures. About 80% of the projects reached or exceeded the production targets. 
12.1.3 Policy Implications 
The analysis of cost overruns of small hydropower plants reported in this study indicates potential 
for improvement, especially in terms of the methods applied for estimating the construction costs, 
including quality of design, and in terms of appropriate approaches to controlling actual 
construction costs.  
From a technical perspective, no explanation can be given why very high cost overruns, which led 
to a long tail to adverse outcomes, were avoided for large projects but not for small facilities. Most 
probably, this is related to lower risk awareness or maybe to higher risk acceptance by the project 
teams responsible for small hydropower projects.  
Another crucial finding of this study is that the Swiss large power plants in our sample have faced 
significantly less cost overrun than projects from previous international studies. In addition, the 
long-term energy production target was exceeded. The assumption that large hydropower schemes 
are generally highly risky structures must be questioned. 
12.1.4 Implication for Design and Planning 
The study allowed to establish statistical distributions of the uncertainties of construction cost 
estimations and energy production forecasts. These distributions can be applied in the evaluation 
process for hydropower projects if the conditions expected for such projects are similar to those of 
the projects in the data sample. The reference class forecast methods and the evaluation based on 
the metrics Expected Net Present Value (ENPV), Value at Gain (VAG) and Value at Risk (VAR) were 
applied. The latter is found to be more suitable for hydropower projects.  
12.1.5 Discussion and Limitations 
The present study is the first study to focus on cost overrun and performance of production 
estimation of small hydropower projects. In a nutshell, it can be stated that “small hydropower 
projects are not always beautiful”.  
However, a limitation of the present study is that no detailed project information was available. 
Especially for projects with poor estimates, specific information (including cost breakdown of each 
study phase and technical reports) would have been beneficial. Also, it would have been useful to 
know the project team’s explanations and reasoning on the differences between estimates and 
actual figures to increase the reliability of the results. 
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The results for large Swiss projects provide useful indications on the historical cost overruns and 
performance of energy production forecasts. However, only a limited sample size could be 
established and, similar to the data group of small hydropower plants, no detailed project 
information was available. Considering the high variability of cost overruns and the difference to 
previous studies, it would be beneficial for future studies to include and consider detailed project 
information as has been recommended for future work on small hydropower plants. 
Using the derived distributions for the evaluation of hydropower projects implies the assumption 
that future uncertainties will be similar to the uncertainties represented in the sample. This is 
especially crucial for energy production forecasts as it is questionable whether the climate of the 
historical period will still be relevant for the operation time of the new hydropower plant. This issue 
is getting more and more important in the light of the climate change and limits the possibilities of 
application.  
12.2 Project-Specific Assessment 
A performance-oriented register of uncertainties potentially affecting hydropower projects was 
elaborated (see Chapter 6). The elaborated register can be used as a basis for the preparation of 
project-specific assessments of uncertainties.  
The uncertainties listed in the register are linked to the key economic performance parameter, such 
as NPV or IRR, and allow the uncertainty assessment to be directly incorporated into the 
performance evaluation.  
The method is considered to be more suitable for larger projects as several experts and an adequate 
budget will be required to elaborate a project-specific assessment.  
Beside the application aspects, the register gives a comprehensive overview of the wide range of 
potential uncertainties that can have an impact on the performance of a hydropower projects.  
12.3 New Design Methods for the Management of Uncertainties 
This part of the study focused on the formulation, application and evaluation of new design methods 
which allow for management of uncertainties. 
12.3.1 The Proposed Framework 
In a first step, a framework for hydropower projects was developed to allow a straightforward 
selection of the design objective and the required design method (see Chapter 7). It includes 
methods that have to be carried out during the planning phase as well as methods that are more 
suitable for power plants in operation. Importance is given to the question whether or not structural 
adjustments are required, as this can be a critical item for a project team’s decision whether or not 
to follow up on certain possibilities. 
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12.3.2 Application of the New Design Methods 
Robust Decision Making, Info-Gap Decision Theory and Flexible Design were formulated and applied 
to a real hydropower project (see Chapter 9 and Chapter 11).  
The selected case is representative of a typical design problem. The task is to select an adequate 
plant size determined by the design discharge. But energy price forecasts are highly uncertain and 
there is also some uncertainty about anticipated inflow. The inflow is expected to increase in the 
future as the catchment area is partly covered by glaciers. Therefore, the classical approach, which 
is to select the design discharge on the basis of the highest NPV without taking uncertainties into 
account, may not lead to an optimum selection of the design discharge.  
To take uncertainty of climate change into account, a hydrological model was established and 
climate change projections were generated. Based on these climate change projections, the energy 
productions for a wide range of possible futures were simulated.  
Uncertainty of electricity prices was reflected by three scenarios. The “High” energy price scenario 
corresponds to 120 CHF/MWh, the “Central” energy price scenario assumes 65 CHF/MWh, and the 
“Low” energy price scenario is based on a mean energy price of 30 CHF/MWh. 
The classical approach of selecting the design alternative with the highest NPV while neglecting the 
uncertainties of climate change and energy price fluctuation leads to a plant size in the middle range 
(Qd4). This design choice is confirmed by the Info-Gap Decision Theory for a risk-averse project 
team. Qd4 leads to a positive NPV also under harsher futures. If more attention is given to 
opportuneness, larger design alternatives could be preferred. 
Robust Decision Making tends to favor a larger design discharge. The minimize maximum regret and 
domain criteria lead to the choice of the design alternative Qd5. However, as shown by the mapping 
of the regret, this design selection is mainly driven by the regrets of more opportune futures.  
In such case, the classical approach, Info-Gap Decision Theory and Robust Decision Making reached 
similar although not entirely matching results. The classical approach as well as the robustness 
curves of Info-Gap Decision Theory support Qd4. Robust Decision Making suggests the larger design 
alternative Qd5, but only if the decision gives the same weight to both more harsh futures and more 
opportune futures. 
Application of the methods leads to the following main findings: Firstly, the classical approach can 
lead to a robust design choice although uncertainties are not incorporated into the decision-finding 
process. Secondly, Info-Gap Decision Theory and Robust Decision Making help assess the robustness 
of the different design alternatives of a hydropower project and lead to similar but not entirely 
matching results. The final selection depends primarily on risk attitudes of the decision makers 
rather than on the method applied. 
Current research on climate change and hydropower design has mainly focused on Robust Decision 
Making, whereas Info-Gap Decision Theory has not been applied in hydropower design so far. The 
observation that the design choice derived by the classical approach may also lead to a robust design 
is essential for the next steps of developing design methods considering uncertainties. It highlights 
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the priority of providing methods that can be efficiently applied to check the robustness of a design 
choice derived via the classical approach. Based on the findings of this study, Info-Gap Decision 
Theory is a very promising method for this purpose.  
In addition, flexible design strategies were evaluated for the same hydropower plant. The option of 
expanding the power plant by installing an additional turbine was analyzed. In this particular 
hydropower case, flexibility has a low value. 
12.3.3 Limitations of the Applications of the New Design Methods 
A limitation of this work lies in the assumptions about the long-term mean electricity prices and the 
stochastic electricity price model. Simplified approaches were selected to determine the input 
required to apply the different design methods. This is found to be a major limitation also for the 
application in the engineering practice. Long-term stochastic electricity price models are not often 
available for hydropower projects, especially for smaller hydropower plants.  
In addition, more comprehensive quantitative studies on the accuracy of historical long-term 
electricity price forecasts would be beneficial. A possible approach has been used in this study (see 
Chapter 4.3.2 and Chapter 4.3.5). The difference between the projected electricity price and the 
actual electricity price was analyzed and characterized by the mean percentage error and the mean 
absolute percentage error. However, only mid-term electricity price forecasts could be obtained. 
Surprisingly, no study on this issue for the Swiss or European electricity market could be identified.  
As the new design methods were applied to just one real hydropower project, further experience 
with their application has to be gathered. For further development of the design methods, their 
application to virtual cases is not seen as a major improvement. It is recommended to formulate 
and apply the design method to real hydropower projects. As discussed in this work, hydropower 
projects cover several planning phases, often with an engagement of stakeholders and limiting 
physical, environmental and non-power operating constraints. Typically, the range of design 
alternatives in each planning phase is further reduced and, additionally, legal frameworks can limit 
the application of robust or flexible design concept. Such limiting constraints or preferences are 
difficult to reflect by a virtual model.  
In addition, it is recommended that all main uncertainties should be considered, similar to the work 
carried out in this study. The exclusive focus on climate change may be convenient due to general 
availability of climate change projections, but may lead to questionable results as it cannot be 
excluded that other uncertainties will be more dominant for the selection of a design. 
12.4 Recommendations for Engineering Practice 
For small hydropower projects, more attention has to be paid to potential cost overrun, low 
performance of energy production forecasts, and relatively high chance of early life failures. 
Major uncertainties should be integrated into the design process. This should be contemplated not 
only for performance evaluation, but also for the selection of technical design parameters.  
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In early study phases, the evaluation of the performance of project or design alternatives can be 
based on the Expected Net Present Value (ENPV), Value at Gain (VAG) and Value at Risk (VAR). The 
calculation of these economic key metrics can be based on the statistical distributions of the 
uncertainties of construction cost and energy production forecasts described in Chapter 5.7.2.  
It has to be noted that the distributions are based on historical data of Swiss projects and that an 
application of these methods implies the assumption that future uncertainties will be similar to the 
uncertainties represented in the sample. This is crucial especially for energy production forecasts. 
Their application in projects outside Switzerland is questionable, as political or commercial 
uncertainties can be very different. 
For international projects where no statistical distributions for the performance of construction 
costs and energy production are available, and for all projects in a later design stage (from Feasibility 
Study onwards), it is recommended to develop a project-specific assessment of the uncertainties as 
outlined in Chapter 6.  
Long-term uncertainties, such as uncertainty of long-term inflow or energy price, can also be 
managed by adjusting the technical design of a hydropower project. The proposed framework 
includes guidance on the selection of one of the new design methods (see Chapter 7). 
In general, it is recommended to combine the classical approach, i.e. deterministic approach of 
estimating the key economic parameters (e.g. NPV), with the new design methods for the 
hydropower sector while incorporating the uncertainties.  
If the selected design objective is robustness, Info-Gap Decision Theory is regarded as a useful 
method. Robust Decision Making and Info-Gap Decision Theory can be applied in later design stages 
and larger projects. However, it should be noted that the methods include several overlapping 
working steps and so a combined approach can be applied (see Chapter 9.5) to reduce the number 
of working steps.  
In case flexibility is selected as a project’s design objective, particular attention and consideration 
should be given to whether or not it is appropriate to make a structural adjustment to the legal 
framework of a hydropower project.  
12.5 Future Research 
The following two research needs were identified with regard to an analysis of uncertainties in 
realized hydropower projects (see Chapter 5): 
 Increase in data sample size: First data samples for the two reference classes of small and 
large hydropower projects were built within the scope of this work. This should be followed 
up with an increase in the size of the data samples and with an analysis of the empirical data. 
Previous studies have set up global data bases. Due to the large number (i.e. population) of 
small and large hydropower projects around the world and the high variability of the main 
outcomes, preference should be given to country specific assessments.  
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 Project-specific evaluations: The reliability of the outcomes should be improved based on a 
project-specific analysis. A systematic analysis should be carried out, including a review of 
project documents and interviews of project owner and engineers, especially for projects 
with poor estimates. 
To ensure the application of a project-specific assessment as described in Chapter 6, it would be 
advantageous to place the focus of research on the following issues: 
 Development of country-specific sets of guide values or benchmarks regarding likelihoods or 
frequencies of political and commercial uncertainties.  
 Analysis of commercial, political and project uncertainties and their interactions. Therefore, 
a Bayesian belief network would be a promising model in order to visually represent the 
probabilistic relationships among the uncertainties and to analyze the wide range of 
uncertainties potentially affecting hydropower projects.  
Finally, for further development of the design methods incorporating uncertainties, the following 
research issues should be investigated: 
 The proposed framework as described in Chapter 7 should be applied to actual projects and 
further developed on the basis of expert interviews. Also, it would be beneficial to conduct 
expert interviews in order to analyze the acceptance of the proposed framework in the 
hydropower sector.  
 Additional actual hydropower projects should be analyzed by including the design objectives 
of robustness, versatility, flexibility, or interoperability in the engineering design process. 
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Appendix 
A) Protocol Large Hydropower Projects – Cost Overrun 
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1 Aarberg Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1960 Planning Phase 14 32 131
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1963 Planning Phase 14 32 119 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1968 Construction Phase 15 50 156
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1969 Operation Phase 15 55 168
"Kollaudation des Kraftwerkes Aarberg der BKW AG" Bull. SEV 59 (1968)
24.
Operation Phase 15 55 172 CCact 1.72 1.44
2 Airolo-Piotta Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1964 Planning Phase 11 25 90
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1965 Planning Phase 12 25 87 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1966 Construction Phase 13 28 93
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1967 Construction Phase 13 28 90
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1968 Construction Phase 13 28 87
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1969 Operation Phase 12 28 85
www.aet.ch/azienda/stalvedro.htm (11/8/2002) Operation Phase 13 30 94 CCact 1.20 1.08
3 Aletschwerk (Massa) Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1947 Planning Phase 16 13 62 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Operation Phase 16 12 57
Geschäftsbericht Aletsch AG 1965. Operation Phase 16 9 39 CCact 0.69 0.63
4 Bannwil - Neu Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1963 Planning Phase 17 35 131
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1964 Planning Phase 23 69 249
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1965 Planning Phase 23 71 248 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1966 Construction Phase 24 85 283
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1967 Construction Phase 24 85 272
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1968 Construction Phase 24 85 266
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1969 Construction Phase 24 85 259
"Das neue Kraftwerk Bannwil der BKW" Wasser- und Energiewirtschaft
Nr. 7/8 1969
Operation Phase 24 85 258 CCact 1.19 1.04
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5 Birsfelden Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1947 Planning Phase 64 80 379 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Construction Phase 62 113 530
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1952 Construction Phase 62 113 494
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1953 Construction Phase 82 113 497
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Construction Phase 53 113 494
"Das Kraftwerk Birsfelden", Wasser- und Energiewirtschaft Nr. 5/6/7
1954
Operation Phase 88 145 636 CCact 1.81 1.68
6 Bürglen II Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1963 Planning Phase 17 24 89 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1964 Construction Phase 20 48 171
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1965 Construction Phase 20 48 166
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1966 Construction Phase 20 48 158
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1967 Operation Phase 20 48 152
"KW Bürglen", EW Altdorf, Broschüre 1967 Operation Phase 22 45 144 CCact 1.88 1.61
7 Kirel/ Filderich Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1953 Planning Phase 15 15 66
Simmentaler Wasserkraft Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Planning Phase 15 15 66 CCest
"Einweihung des Kraftwerkes Kirel/Filderich", Bull. SEV Bd. 50 (1959) Nr.
22
Operation Phase 17 20 83 CCact 1.33 1.26
8 Fätschbach Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1947 Planning Phase 15 10 47 CCest
"Das Fätschbachwerk", Schweiz. Bauzeitung Nr. 18 1951 Operation Phase 15 14 64 CCact 1.42 1.35
9 Les Clées II Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1947 Planning Phase 18 18 85
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Planning Phase 20 18 85
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1952 Planning Phase 20 18 79
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1953 Planning Phase 21 18 79 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Construction Phase 21 18 79
"Nouvelle centrale des clées", Bull. Schweiz. Elektrotechn. Verein 46 /
1955.
Operation Phase 24 22 95 CCact 1.22 1.20
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10 Mauvoisin Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Planning Phase 265 370 1743
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1952 Planning Phase 265 370 1622 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1953 Construction Phase 265 400 1764
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Construction Phase 310 425 1864
"Chute de Mauvoisin", le génie civil, 78e année, no.9, 1958 Operation Phase 310 450 1852 CCact 1.22 1.14
11 Miéville-Salanfe Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1947 Planning Phase 60 70 331 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Construction Phase 60 70 330
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1952 Construction Phase 80 70 307
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1953 Construction Phase 80 70 309
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Operation Phase 80 70 307
www.salanfe.ch Operation Phase 80 77 338 CCact 1.10 1.02
12 Morobbia Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1967 Planning Phase 12 11 34
(rimodernamento) Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1968 Planning Phase 15 14 45 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1969 Construction Phase 15 14 44
"Entrata in funzioni del rinnovato impiante della Morobbia", Rivista
tecnica de la Svizzera Italiana 61 (1970) 9.
Operation Phase 13 14 42 CCact 1.00 0.94
13 Rheinau Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Planning Phase 34 60 283
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1952 Planning Phase 57 60 263 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1953 Construction Phase 34 60 265
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Construction Phase 40 92 403
"Das KW Rheinau im Vollbetrieb", Bull. Schweiz. Elektrotechn. Ver. Bd. 48
(1957) Nr. 4
Operation Phase 34 92 386 CCact 1.53 1.47
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14 Schaffhausen Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Planning Phase 21 49 228
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1952 Planning Phase 21 49 213
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1953 Planning Phase 21 49 214
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Planning Phase 25 53 230
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1960 Planning Phase 22 52 212 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1963 Construction Phase 28 70 260
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1964 Operation Phase 28 75 270
"Fakten und Zahlen", Broschüre Kraftwerk Schaffhausen AG, Stand 2001. Operation Phase 26 90 288 CCact 1.73 1.36
15 Wildegg-Brugg Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1947 Planning Phase 42 95 450 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Construction Phase 46 95 448
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1952 Construction Phase 44 95 414
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1953 Construction Phase 46 95 417
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Operation Phase 46 95 414
NOK Broschure "Kraftwerk Wildegg-Brugg" Operation Phase 50 87 380 CCact 0.91 0.85
16 Oberhasli (Oberaar) Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1947 Planning Phase 27 100 473 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Construction Phase 32 95 448
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1952 Construction Phase 32 95 416
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1953 Construction Phase 32 95 419
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Construction Phase 32 95 417
"KW Oberaar-Denkschrift über den Bau 1949-1953", KWO 1954 Operation Phase 43 95 417 CCact 0.95 0.88
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17 Grande Dixence Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1954 Planning Phase 690 1000 4385 CCest
(Vollausbau) Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1960 Construction Phase 684 1400 5717
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1963 Construction Phase 684 1600 5947
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1964 Construction Phase 684 1600 5768
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1965 Construction Phase 690 1600 5578
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1966 Construction Phase 690 1600 5325
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1967 Operation Phase 690 1625 5197
"Die Wasserkraftnutzung im Wallis unter besondererer Berücksichtigung
der finanzwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen auf Kanton und Gemeinden",
Felix Walker, Diss. Uni. FR. Schweizerischer Wasserwirtschaftsverband
1967.
Operation Phase 735 1600 5118 CCact 1.60 1.17
18 Kraftwerke Hinterrhein Data base M. Balmer Planning Phase 590 2521 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1960 Construction Phase 645 600 2450
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1963 Operation Phase 645 600 2230
www.khr.ch Operation Phase 640 624 2075 CCact 1.06 0.82
19 Saas-Almagell Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1960 Planning Phase 233 380 1552 CCest
(Zermeiggern) Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1963 Construction Phase 234 400 1487
& Stalden Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1964 Construction Phase 234 400 1442
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1965 Construction Phase 234 420 1464
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1966 Construction Phase 234 450 1498
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1967 Construction Phase 236 480 1535
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1968 Construction Phase 236 480 1499
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1969 Construction Phase 236 480 1463
Broschure "Kraftwerke Mattmark AG" Operation Phase 236 490 1493 CCact 1.29 0.96
20 Gondo Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1950 Planning Phase 30 25 118 CCest
Eidg. Amt für Wasserwirtschaft, Ausbau der Wasserkräfte, 1952 Construction Phase 44 25 110
"L'équipement électro-mécanique de la centrale de Gondo", Bull. SEV 44
(1953) Nr. 22
Operation Phase 32 32 141 CCact 1.28 1.20
 169 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Protocol Large Hydropower Projects – Energy Production 
Large Hydropower Plants
Name Powerplant Year of Last
Commissioning
Installed
Capacity
Estimated Production (Pest) Actual Production (Pact) Pact/Pect Prod.
Overestimation
Reference Pest Reference Pact
No. [MW] Author Title, Date [GWh] Author Title, Date [GWh]
1 Sedrun 1 1968 147 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 253 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2010 261 1.03 -3%
2 Tavanasa (KVR) 1962 176 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 505 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 563 1.12 -12%
3 Sarelli 1978 88 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1970 157 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 180 1.15 -15%
4 Schaffhausen 1964 25 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 162 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 174 1.07 -7%
5 Rheinkraftwerk Säckingen 1966 72 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 404 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 480 1.19 -19%
6 Montbovon 1972 29 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1969 78 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 79 1.01 -1%
7 Aarberg 1968 14 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 69 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 1991 85 1.22 -22%
8 Flumenthal 1970 22 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1966 144 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2009 139 0.97 3%
9 Bannwil 1970 24 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1966 148 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 1996 152 1.03 -3%
10 Arniberg 1969 13 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1969 43 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 47 1.10 -10%
11 Bürglen (Unterschächen) 1967 25 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 96 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 99 1.03 -3%
12 Bisisthal 1962 15 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 47 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 55 1.16 -16%
13 Wernisberg 1966 20 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 65 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 76 1.16 -16%
14 Bremgarten-Zufikon 1975 20 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1972 99 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 106 1.07 -7%
15 Tierfehd (Limmern) 1964 255 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 287 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 284 0.99 1%
16 Linthal 1964 34 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 60 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 81 1.35 -35%
17 Fieschertal 1975 60 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1972 110 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 1996 110 1.00 0%
18 Lötschen 1976 110 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1973 312 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2007 327 1.05 -5%
19 Chippis-Rhône 1971 46 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1970 259 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 1996 253 0.98 2%
20 Stalvedro (AET) 1968 13 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1966 64 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 55 0.87 13%
21 Grono 1965 36 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 98 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 94 0.96 4%
22 Morobbia 1970 15 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1968 41 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 42 1.03 -3%
23 Bavona 1966 124 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 275 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 324 1.18 -18%
24 Pradella 1970 288 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 923 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 1020 1.11 -11%
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C) Protocol Small Hydropower Projects – Energy Production 
 
Small Hydropower Plants
Name Powerplant Year of Last
Commissioning
Installed
Capacity
Estimated Production (Pest) Actual Production (Pact) Pact/Pect Prod.
Overestimation
Reference Pest Reference Pact
No. [MW] Author Title, Date [GWh] Author Title, Date [GWh]
1 Ladral 1973 5.6 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1972 14 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 16 1.11 -11%
2 Thusis 1968 4.6 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1968 21 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 18 0.88 12%
3 Wunderklingen 1968 0.4 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1968 3 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 2 0.96 4%
4 Lessoc 1973 8.0 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1969 22 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 22 1.00 0%
5 La Jougnenaz 1970 2.1 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1969 6 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 6 1.00 0%
6 Arni, Engelberg 1966 2.4 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 10 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 6 0.61 39%
7 Ruosalp 1962 4.5 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 19 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 19 1.03 -3%
8 Glattalp 1970 9.0 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1970 21 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 16 0.80 20%
9 Trübsee 1967 8.4 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1966 19 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 19 1.02 -2%
10 Waldhalde 1967 2.7 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1966 16 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 16 1.02 -2%
11 Aegina 1967 9.2 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1965 20 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 22 1.08 -8%
12 Balavaud 1971 0.5 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1971 3 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 2 0.85 15%
13 Giumaglio 1967 8.7 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1966 32 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 25 0.79 21%
14 Silvaplana 1973 1.4 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1973 5 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 5 0.98 2%
15 Arosa-Litzirüti 1969 5.0 SWV Wasser und Energiewirtschaft, 1968 20 BFE Statistik der Wasserkraftanl. der Schweiz, 2016 23 1.13 -13%
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Notation 
Latin symbols 
P power output of all units [W] 
g acceleration of gravity [m/s2] 
Qd design discharge of power plant [m3/s] 
Qmax maximum generation discharge [m3/s] 
Hn net head [m] 
PFA annual plant factor [-] 
PA average annual energy [kWh] 
𝑃𝑡 theoretical maximum annual energy production [GWh] 
Pact actual average annual energy [GWh] 
Pest estimated average annual energy [GWh] 
IC installed capacity [kW] or [MW] 
NPV Net Present Value [CHF] 
Ct net cash flow at time t [CHF] 
i discount rate  
T total number of time periods  
LCOE Levelized Cost of Electricity [CHF/MWh] 
𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 present value of the total costs [CHF] 
CAPEX capital expenditure [CHF] 
OPEX operational expenditure [CHF] 
PVPA Present Value of the total energy production [CHF] 
NPVc critical NPV [CHF] 
ENPV Expected Net Present Value [CHF] 
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
VaR Value at Risk [CHF] 
VaG Value at Gain [CHF] 
MPE Mean Percentage Error [-] 
MAPE Mean Absolute Percentage Error [-] 
n sample size  
S.D. standard deviation  
IQR interquartile range, Q3-Q1  
Q1 first quartile  
Q3 third quartile  
rQmax ratio of the simulated and observed design volumes [-] 
𝑉𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑠𝑖𝑚  simulated volume for a specific maximum generation 
discharge 
[m3/year] 
𝑉𝑄𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑜𝑏𝑠  observed volume for a specific maximum generation 
discharge 
[m3/year] 
h horizon of uncertainty  
ℎ̂  robustness of design alternative   
d design alternative  
dS change of the electricity price  
dz Wiener process  
S0 starting electricity price [CHF] 
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Zn independent random draws from standard normal 
distribution 
 
 
Greek symbols 
ρ density of water [kg/m3 ] 
η overall efficiency of all units (including efficiency of turbines, 
generator, transformer) 
[-] 
ũ best estimate  
σl lower boundaries  
σr upper boundaries  
ωl scaling factor, left-hand side  
ωr scaling factor, right-hand side  
?̂?  opportuneness of design alternative (d)  
μ annual risk-adjusted growth rate  
σ annual volatility of the electricity price  
 
Acronyms 
EPFL Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne 
BFE Bundesamt für Energie 
WCD Word Commission on Dams 
SIA Swiss Society of Engineers and Architects 
CPI Swiss Consumer Price Index 
WB World Bank 
IDA International Development Association 
SHP Small Hydropower Projects 
LHP Large Hydropower Projects 
DCF Discounted Cash Flow 
IGDT Info-Gap Decision Theory 
RDM Robust Decision Making 
Qdx Design alternative, indices x design discharge 
ExtQd4 Extension project with base project Qd4 
ExtQd5 Extension project with base project Qd5 
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